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SUMMARY 
This study seeks to use the structural-functional model of Almond and 
Powell to explain the functioning of the political system of Lebowa 
as a self-governing territory in the Republic of South Africa. 
Against the background of the historical development of Lebowa and 
the emergence of apartheid - or separate development as it was also 
termed - the political process in Lebowa is described and analysed in 
terms of the conversion function of Almond and Powell's model. 
Interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-making, rule-
application, rule-adjudication and communication are examined as 
functions of the conversion process in Lebowa. 
It is evident that Lebowa's position within greater South Africa, the 
importance of traditional structures, and the existence of modern 
political structures, play a major role in the political system of 
Lebowa. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a justification for the choice of the subject 
of this study and an explanation of the concomitant problem formu-
lation. This will be followed by a general comment on the approaches 
and theoretical models used in this study. The structural-functional 
model of Almond and Powell is discussed, and an explanation of the 
concept "political system" and its functions as used in this study is 
provided. The chapter concludes with a summary of each of the chap-
ters comprising this study. 
1.1 CHOICE OF SUBJECT 
This study seeks to analyse the political process in Lebowa, a 
subject which was chosen for three reasons. Firstly, the study was 
undertaken out of personal interest as the author has served as a 
member of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly for an unbroken period of 
thirteen years including a period of three and a half years as a 
member of the Lebowa Cabinet. During this period it became clear to 
author that there was a manifest need for a detailed description and 
explanation of the political process in Lebowa. Secondly, it is 
hoped that an explanation of this kind would serve to enhance citizen 
participation in politics in Lebowa as well as a guideline for the 
professional training of political practitioners. Lastly, this study 
ought to contribute to the understanding of the political process in 
Lebowa held by foreign individuals, organizations and Governments. 
1 
1.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The political process of the national state of Lebowa is determined 
by a plethora of Acts passed by the Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa and proclamations by the State President of South 
Africa. An overall view of the political process in Lebowa requires 
an understanding of all these sources. This presents a problem to 
citizen participants in politics, political practitioners, students 
of political science and foreign observers. 
This problem is further complicated by the fact that very little has 
been written about the political process in Lebowa. In view hereof, 
this study seeks to provide an academic description and explanation ) 
of the political process in Lebowa. This will be achieved by using a 
specific model (Almond & Powell's structural-functional model) in the 
explanation and analysis. 
The problem which this study seeks to answer can be formulated as 
follows: "how does the political system in Lebowa function?" The 
conversion function of Almond and Powell's structural-functional 
model will be used as a tool to analyse the Lebowa political system. 
2 
1.3 METHOD 
The method of the study is primarily descriptive and analytic. The 
historical background which ultimately led to the establishment of 
the self-governing territory of Lebowa will be presented chronologi-
cally. Personal 
other sources will 
interviews, Acts of Parliament, Proclamations, and 
be used to provide a description of the Lebowa 
As stated, the conversion function of the 
model of Almond and Powell is used to analyse 
political process. 
structural-functional 
the political process in Lebowa. As the emphasis of this study will 
be the political process in Lebowa, this model will be used merely as 
a theoretical instrument with which a better analysis of the politi-
cal process is possible. 
The Lebowa political system emanated from an evolutionary process 
developed within the Republic of South Africa as a part of the politi-
cal ideology of apartheid or separate development policy. 
Consequently, a brief historical exposition of this ideology is 
provided. 
1.4 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICS 
Political scientists use different approaches or models to organize 
the information they have about a particular research topic as unor-
ganized facts are not very helpful in understanding things. When 
3 
something new is discovered, the question is asked: what does it 
mean? The meaning of such a phenomenon is determined by how it fits 
into the body of existing knowledge. The mechanism used to incorpo-
rate the phenomenon into existing knowledge is an approach, or a 
model - in this case, an approach to, or a model of politics. 
An approach is therefore a set of concepts, categories, or terms that 
serves to focus attention on particular aspects of politics. Ap-
proaches are intended to serve as bases for organizing information 
about most or all aspects of politics. The central concepts around 
which some prominent approaches to the studying of politics have 
emerged are SYSTEM, FUNCTION, COMMUNICATION, DECISION MAKING and 
DEVELOPMENT (Welsh 1973:62-65). 
The aim of this study is not to cover the considerable variety of 
approaches and models used in political science. In fact, it would 
be a lengthy undertaking even to summarize the most prominent of 
these. For purposes of this study, only the structural-functional 
model of Almond and Powell will be discussed (with special emphasis 
on the conversion function). 
1.4.1.1 ALMOND AND POWELL'S STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL MODEL 
The structural-functional model of Almond and Powell combines ele-
ments of a systems approach, a functional approach and a developmen-
tal approach to politics. As such, this model represents a kind of 
4 
amalgamation of some of the recent conceptual thinking in political 
science (Welsh 1973:83). 
The aim of structural-functional analysis is to provide a consistent 
and integrated theory from which can be derived explanatory hypothe-
ses relevant to all aspects of a given political system. The ap-
proach is characterized by certain common features: firstly, an empha-
sis on the whole system as the unit of analysis; secondly, a postula-
tion of particular functions as prerequisites for the maintenance of 
the whole system; and the third feature demonstrates the functional 
interdependence of diverse structures within the whole system. The 
principal objective of structural-functional analysis is to determine 
the contribution of a social item, a structure or process to the 
persistence of the system in which it occurs, that is, the role it 
plays in maintaining the system within specified limits (Bill 1973: 
202-203). 
1.4.1.2 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
While the Almond and Powell model shares several characteristics with 
David Easton's systems approach, these two perspectives can be clear-
ly discerned from one another. Almond and Powell's notion of the po-
litical system is very similar to that of Easton. They agree that 
the system is an ecological concept implying an organization interac-
ting with an environment, influencing it and being influenced by it. 
5 
This also suggests that there are many interacting internal parts to 
a system (Almond & Powell 1988:3). 
Almond and Powell consider these interactions to be roles rather than 
just persons. Similar to the interacting roles of father and mother, 
husband and wife, brother and sister in a family system, the politi-
cal system comprises interacting role incumbents like voters, legis-
lators, administrators, judges and so on (Almond & Powell 
1966:19-20). 
According to Almond and Powell, the political system is commonly asso-
ciated with the use of legitimate physical coercion in societies (Al-
mond & Powell 1966:17). They maintain that legitimate force is the 
thread that runs through the action of the political system, giving 
it its special quality and importance, and its coherence as a system. 
Easton speaks of "authoritative allocation of values" (Easton 1965: 
50) and Lasswell and Chaplain of "severe deprivations" (Lasswell 
1950: 21 ) . 
While some terms like state, government and nation, are limited be-
cause they direct attention to a particular set of institutions usual-
ly found in modern Western societies, the concept "political system" 
"directs attention to the entire scope of political activities within 
a society, regardless of where in the society such activities may be 
located" (Almond & Powell 1966:17). 
6 
1.4.1.2.1 THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
"The political system includes not only governmental institutions 
such as legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies, but all 
structures in their political aspects" (Almond & Powell 1966:18). 
The concept "political structure" is defined by Almond and Powell as 
"the observable activities which make up the political system" (Al-
mond & Powell 1966:21). In this context, the term "political activi-
ties" does not refer to the total activities of individuals, but just 
to· that part of their activities which form part of the political pro-
cess. 
That particular part of the activities of individuals which form part 
of the political process is referred to as the role. "The individual 
members of a society usually perform roles in a variety of social sys-
tems other than the political system " (Almond & Powell 1966: 
21). Almond and Powell refer to particular sets of roles which are 
related to one another as structures. They use the concept "role" 
and "structure" rather than "office" and "institution" because they 
wish to emphasize the 
involved in politics, 
institution with which 
1966:20-21). 
actual behaviour of the individuals who are 
and the actual performance of the particular 
they may be concerned (Almond & Powell 
Every political system is continually involved in recruiting individu-
als into political roles. Almond and Powell refer to this process as 
the recruitment function. A very important aspect of the development 
7 
or transformation of any political system involves role differentia-
tion or structural differentiation. By "differentiation" Almond and 
Powell refer to "the processes whereby roles change and become more 
specialized or more autonomous or whereby new types of roles are 
established or new structures and subsystems emerge or are created" 
(Almond & Powell 1966:22). Differentiation is not the only aspect 
through which political development occurs. 
1.4.1.3 POLITICAL CULTURE 
In studying any political system we need to know its underlying pro-
pensities as well as its actual performance over a given period of 
time. Almond and Powell refer to these propensities, or this psycho-
logical dimension of the political system, as the political culture. 
They define political culture as consisting of "attitudes, beliefs, 
values, and skills which are current in an entire population, as well 
as those special propensities and patterns which may be found within 
separate parts of that population" (Almond & Powell 1966:23). Some 
regional or ethnic groups or social classes may have special propen-
sities. The propensities of these particular groups are referred to 
as subcultures. 
There 
namely 
ti cal 
are two concepts that are closely related to political culture, 
"political socialization" and "cultural secularization". Poli-
socialisation "is the process whereby political attitudes and 
values are inculcated as children become adults and as adults are 
recruited into roles" (Almond & Powell 1966:24). 
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With regard to the developmental aspect of political culture, the 
term commonly used is "secularization". "Secularization is the proc-
ess whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical and empiri-
cal in their political action" (Almond & Powell 1966:24). Therefore, 
the secularization of culture involves the process whereby 
traditional orientations and attitudes give way to more dynamic 
decision-making processes. 
1.4.1.4 FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
Almond and Powell distinguish between three levels of functions, 
described as "activities". The first level comprises capability 
functions. 
the third 
functions. 
1.4.1.4.1 
At the second level are the conversion functions, while 
level is that of system maintenance and adaptation 
CAPABILITY FUNCTIONS 
"At this level we are focusing on the behavior of the system as a 
unit in its relations to other social systems and to the environment" 
(Almond & Powell 1966:28). Five types of capabilities are mentioned: 
extractive, distributive, regulative, symbolic and responsive. Al-
mond and Powell regard these concepts as simply ways of talking about 
the flows of activity into and out of the political system. 
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These concepts show how a system performs in its environment, how it 
shapes that environment, and how it is shaped by it (Almond & Powell 
1966:29). 
1.4.1.4.2 CONVERSION FUNCTIONS 
The conversion functions are internal to the system and involve the 
ways systems transform inputs into outputs. In the political system 
this involves the ways in which demands and supports are transformed 
into authoritative decisions and are implemented. 
The conversion functions of one political system may be analysed and 
compared with those of other systems according to the following func-
tional scheme: 
(a) Interest articulation: The process by which individuals and 
groups make demands upon the political decision makers is cal-
led interest articulation. It is the first functional step 
in the political conversion process. The importance of this 
function lies in the fact that it marks the boundary between 
the society and the political system (Almond & Powell 
1966:73). 
(b) Interest aggregation: It is through interest aggregation that 
the desires and demands of citizens are converted into a few 
10 
policy alternatives. In democratic societies, the candidates 
for political office, or political parties bargain with inter-
est groups and voters, offering policy commitments in ex-
change for electoral support. These policy commitments will, 
in the form of policy alternatives, represent the interests 
and the demands articulated by the voters (Almond & Powell 
1988:88-99). 
(c) Rule-making: The process by which authoritative rules are 
formulated is referred to as rule-making. According to Al-
mond and Powell, the term " rule-making" is preferred to the 
term "legislation" because the latter term, "seems to connote 
some specialized structure and explicit process, whereas in 
many political systems the rule-making function is a diffuse 
process, difficult to untangle and specify" (Almond & Powell 
1966:132). 
(d) Rule-application: These rules are applied and enforced. "The 
sheer volume of rules to be enforced, resources to be 
gathered, and information to be processed and transmitted 
requires the rule-making structure, be it monarch, 
legislature, or common assembly, to seek assistance in 
application ... " (Almond & Powell 1966:142). 
(e) Rule-adjudication: The application of rules are adjudicated 
in individual cases. The performance of the adjudication 
function involves the process whereby authoritative decisions 
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are made regarding whether or not a rule has been trans-
gressed in a given situation (Almond & Powell 1966:159). 
(f) Communication: The various activities are communicated both 
within the political system and its environment (Almond & 
Powell 1966: 29). Political communication is the 
transmission of politically relevant information through one 
or more available means (Rush & Althoff 1971:402). "The 
performance of the communication function does not include 
all the other political functions, but it constitutes instead 
a necessary prerequisite for performance of other functions" 
(Almond & Powell 1966:165-166). 
1.4.1.4.3 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE AND ADAPTATION FUNCTIONS 
The third and last level of functions in Almond and Powell's model 
involves system-maintenance and system-adaptation activities. These 
functions are political socialisation and recruitment. "The theory 
of the political system will consist of the discovery of the rela-
tions between these different levels of functioning - capabilities, 
conversion functions, and system-maintenance and adaptation functions 
and of the relation of the functions at each level" (Almond & 
Powell 1966: 30). 
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1.5 A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF LEBOWA 
Lebowa consists of thirteen geographical areas spread over a large 
part of the central, north-eastern and eastern parts of the Transvaal 
Province of the Republic of South Africa. This fragmented territory 
is a landlocked area which shares common boundaries with the Repub-
lics of South Africa and Venda in the north, Gazankulu in the 
north-east 
1983:29). 
and east, and with Kwandebele in the South (Botha 
Administratively, Lebowa is divided into eleven magisterial dis-
tricts. Land consolidation proposals are still being negotiated be-
tween various authorities and the boundaries of Lebowa could, there-
fore, change in future. According to the Lebowa Department of Agri-
culture and Environmental Conservation, the total area of Lebowa com-
prised 2 183 331 hectares or 21 833 square kilometres in 1986 (Lebowa 
Government, Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, Annu-
al Report, 1986/87). 
At its closest point Lebowa is approximately 150 kilometres from 
Johannesburg, the hub of South Africa's industrial, commercial and 
financial heartland, the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) 
region, while the furthest point is about 300 km away. The territo-
ry's proximity to the PWV area and several urban centres, especially 
Pietersburg which is a declared industrial growth point in terms of 
the R.S.A.'s policy of industrial decentralization, and towns such as 
Potgietersrus, Tzaneen and Phalaborwa as well as districts where 
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intensive agriculture is practised, results in large scale migration 
and daily and weekend commuting by many of the people of Lebowa to 
those areas. Consequently, the Lebowa's position and its present 
level of economic development result in a high leakage of purchasing 
power to adjacent areas (Botha 1983:30). 
The population of Lebowa in 1980 totalled 1 755 874 compared to 
1 108 459 in 1970. This represents an average annual growth rate of 
4, 7 percent. The urban population totalled 66 107 or 6 percent of 
the total population in 1970 as against 112 587 or 6, 4 percent in 
1980, indicating an average annual increase of 5, 5 percent. The 
non-urban population totalled 1 042 352 or 94 percent of the total 
population in 1970 as against 1 643 287 or 93, 6 percent in 1980, 
indicating an annual average increase of 4, 7 percent (R.S.A.: 
Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Central 
statistical Services, 1970 and 1980 Population Figures). Evident 
from these statistics is the fact that Lebowa has a predominantly 
rural population. 
Four different forms of population settlement may be distinguished in 
Lebowa: 
(a) Proclaimed 
were 14 
towns in the Urban areas. In September 1985 there 
proclaimed towns in Lebowa with a total number of 
19479 houses (Lebowa Government, Department of Home Affairs, 
Operational information 1983, 1984 and 1985). 
14 
(b) Traditional villages which are only present in rural areas 
which have not yet been planned agriculturally. They consist 
of scattered homesteads (hut groups) surrounded by arable 
land for use by the households. No services are provided in 
these villages (De Villiers et al 1984). The number of these 
traditional villages has declined in recent years as more 
areas become planned (author's observation). 
(c) Betterment rural villages which are linked to the programme 
of agricultural planning. Their administration is dealt with 
by a traditional leader or Chief known as a Kgoshi and a 
tribal authority in collaboration with the Department of 
Agriculture. There are no formal sanitation facilities in 
these settlements (some families have pit latrines) and peo-
ple provide their own housing. However, people do have farm-
ing rights (De Villiers et al 1984). 
(d) Closer settlements have been established near urban areas to 
cater for people who possess no farming rights. These settle-
ments are semi-urban by nature. Residents have to build 
their own houses. 
ed (De Villiers 
No formal sanitation facilities are provid-
et al 1984). There were 981 villages and 
settlements in Lebowa in 1982. In these rural areas electric-
ity is also available but on a very limited scale. 
Lebowa has never been a territorial unit in which the population 
showed an awareness of national identity. It is therefore necessary 
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to explain the divisions which exist in the territory despite some 
cultural similarities among the various segments of the population. 
As a result of cultural and linguistic differences, at least four 
subgroups can be identified within the Northern Sotho, the ethnic 
group for which Lebowa was designated by the Republic of South 
Africa: the Lowveld Sotho, the Plateau Sotho, the tribes from 
Sekhukhuneland, Nebo and Moutse, and the Eastern Sotho in Mapula-
neng. 
with 
Within each of these subgroups there are many different tribes 
different subcultures and traditional practices. 
approximately 
(Development 
128 Tribal and 12 Community Authorities 
Bank of Southern Africa, Data Bank, 1986). 
There are 
in Lebowa 
In addition 
to 
in 
these subgroups, 
Lebowa. These 
there are some Ndebele and Swazi tribes present 
are not all related to each other and therefore 
have no common history. 
Due to the linguistic and cultural diversity in this territory, the 
name "Lebowa" which simply means "the north" and is specifically 
neutral was chosen so as not to offend any of the cultural groups 
within the territory (R.S.A.: Development Bank of Southern Africa, 
Data Bank, 1986). The capital of Lebowa is Lebowakgomo. Lebowa has 
three official languages: North Sotho, English and Afrikaans. 
16 
1.6 SOURCES 
Four categories of material have been used in this study: 
(a) Official documents such as Acts of Parliament and Proclama-
tions published in Government Gazettes, and verbatim reports 
of both the South African Parliament and the Lebowa Legisla-
tive Assembly; 
(b) Books, articles and newspapers; 
(c) Interviews; and 
(d) Personal observations. 
As little has been written about the Lebowa political system, reli-
ance has had to be placed particularly on information gathered from 
the mass media, and the verbatim reports of the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly supplemented by the personal experience of the author. In 
addition, a number of interviews were conducted with leadership fig-
ures in Lebowa for purposes of this study. The study covers a period 
up to the end of 1990. 
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1.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter I is an introductory chapter outlining the content, method 
and object of the study. 
Chapter 2 outlines the constitutional and historical background of 
Lebowa, and the chronological sequence of Acts and Proclamations 
which culminated in the publication of Proclamation R225 of 1972 (the 
Lebowa Constitution Proclamation) which established the National 
State of Lebowa as a self-governing territory within the boundaries 
of the Republic of South Africa. 
These Acts and 
the ideology of 
Proclamations are all the result or manifestation of 
apartheid or separate development. Therefore, a 
brief explanation of this ideology is given. 
Chapter 3 focuses attention on how interest is articulated in 
Lebowa. Individual self-representation, anomic, non-associational, 
institutional and associational interest groups are discussed as 
examples of different interest articulation structures which articu-
late interest to a greater or lesser extent in the Lebowa. Formal 
and institutional channels of access, physical demonstrations and 
violence, personal connections and elite representation are on the 
other hand all channels of access to the decision makers. Environmen-
tal factors such as political communication, political culture and 
the distribution of resources also influence interest articulation. 
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Chapter 4 defines and describes how articulated needs are aggregated 
by the interest aggregation structures such as the bureaucracy, polit-
ical parties and traditional structures. Special attention is given 
to the only existing political party in Lebowa. Three styles of 
interest aggregation namely, pragmatic bargaining, absolute value 
oriented and traditionalistic styles are discussed. After a discus-
sion of functions, appointment and election procedures of tribal, 
regional and central governments, an assessment is made of the influ-
ence of traditional tribal aggregation. 
Chapter 5 discusses rule-making at tribal, regional and central gov-
ernmental levels with special emphasis on the different stadia 
through which such rules must pass in the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly. Finally, an evaluation of the rule-making process in re-
spect of general democratic principles is done. 
Chapter 6 sets out in broad terms the manner in which rule-applica-
tion is performed by means of different structures such as the Lebowa 
Cabinet, Lebowa Government Departments, South African Government 
Departments, Parastatal Institutions and the Lebowa Local 
authorities. 
Chapter 7 deals with rule-adjudication in the Lebowa as performed by 
Headmen, and Tribal and Statutory courts. The structural 
arrangement, modern legal principles and specific procedures are 
outlined and discussed. 
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Chapter 8 defines communication and its significance in any given 
political system, with special reference to types of communication 
structures such as personal contact, traditional social structures, 
political input and output structures and the mass media. 
Chapter 9 ends the study with a summary and conclusion. A synopsis 
is given of the empirical deductions that are made, followed by an 
evaluation of the practical applicability of the conversion function 
of Almond and Powell in the Lebowa political system. 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the above exposition that, because of the trend, 
particularly in the United States of America, during the last 30 
years towards behavioural perspectives in the study of politics, most 
of the approaches and models referred to in this study are largely 
behavioural in orientation. Both Easton's systems approach and the 
structural-functional model of Almond and Powell are, in part, a 
response to the less dynamic character of earlier theories. Almond 
and Powell express themselves as follows: "It is increasingly obvious 
that the study of politics must be a dynamic system-and-process 
analysis, and not a static and structural one" (Almond & Powell 
1966:41). With the intention of providing a conceptual framework 
within which political systems can be analysed and compared, Almond 
and Powell's structural-functional model can be used to explore 
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developmental patterns, to explain how a political system change and 
why those changes occur. 
The structural-functional model of Almond and Powell, is meant to 
provide an analytical and heuristic model. It offers taxonomic frame-
works and classificatory schemes for collecting and coding research 
material. This model of Almond and Powell is useful in the analysis 
of individual countries. The functional schema of the two writers, 
may be viewed on three different levels, namely the capability, the 
conversion and the maintenance and adaptation levels. 
The first function has to do with the capabilities of the political 
system. "When we speak of the capabilities of a political system, we 
are looking for an orderly way to describe its over-all performance 
in its environment" (Almond & Powell 1966:28). Through the analysis 
of types of inputs and outputs, the categories of capability which 
are used by Almond and Powell are determined. Consequently, " these 
concepts of regulative, extractive, distributive, and responsive capa-
bility are simply ways of talking about the flows of activity into 
and out of the political system" (Almond & Powell 1966:29). 
The second level of functioning is the conversion processes which 
will be discussed later for purposes of this study. 
Regarding the third and the final level of functioning, Almond and 
Powell speak of system maintenance and adaptation functions. These 
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functions involve the socialisation and recruitment of people into 
the political system (Almond & Powell 1966:30). 
In this study, the conversion function of the structural-functional 
model of Almond and Powell will be used to analyse the political 
process in Lebowa. Using the sixfold conversion function identified 
by Almond and Powell, the following will be examined: the manner in 
which the people of Lebowa articulate their needs and demands (inte-
rest articulation); how these demands are combined in the form of al-
ternative courses of action (interest aggregation); how these consoli-
dated demands are processed into authoritative rules (rule-making); 
how these rules are applied and enforced (rule-application); how 
these applications of rules are adjudicated in individual cases 
(rule-adjudication); and lastly, how the other conversion functions 
of the system are communicated to members of the system and to the 
system's environment, including other systems (communication). 
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CHAPTER 2: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL STATE OF LEBOWA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
To understand a political system, its historical and constitutional 
background is important, not merely in the direct sense which ex-
plains the origins of the social structure and institutional frame-
work within which the system operates, but also in the indirect sense 
which would include the way in which the views people have of their 
past affect their present political attitudes and conduct. This is 
of ten 
and 
particularly 
who seem to 
true of people whose values are being challenged 
constitutionally 
be threatened, such as Black nationalists who are 
denied the right to be represented in the central 
decision making body of the Republic of South Africa. 
This chapter deals with the historical and constitutional background 
of Lebowa as a National State or self-governing territory. 
Lebowa is, as has been stated, the product of a specific ideology or 
paradigm which is primarily associated with one political party 
namely, the National Party of South Africa. This is the ideology of 
apartheid which was later referred to as separate development. The 
purpose of this chapter is to sketch the political environment in 
which Lebowa is situated within the broader framework of South Africa 
and especially how Lebowa is a creation of apartheid, with special 
emphasis on the constitutional aspects of this creation. 
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The establishment of the National State of Lebowa brought with it 
political responsibilities and obligations for the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly as provided for in Schedule I of the Black States Constitu-
tion Act, 1971 (Act 21 of 1971 as amended), and Proclamation R225 of 
1972. 
2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO THE UNION 
OF SOUTH AFRICA 
2.2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
South Africa is internationally associated with apartheid. This 
ideology and social phenomenon of which Lebowa is part, is widely 
ascribed to the National Party and especially its policies since 
1948. However, the history of colonialism and imperialism in South 
Africa since about 1700 needs to be properly understood to realise 
that apartheid is much deeper embedded into South African society 
than merely as the policy of a political party (Cf. Giliomee & 
Elphick's The Shaping of South African Society). 
Apartheid is a difficult concept to analyse because of the diverse 
interpretations given to it. It is associated with colonialism of a 
special type, racist capitalism, pure racism or as a manifestation of 
Afrikaner nationalism. Apartheid could therefore be analysed in 
terms of class or race. The difference between these approaches 
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forms the basis of a long-standing "liberal-radical" debate (Cf. 
Saunders' The Making of the South African Past). 
In this chapter the liberal, race based approach is used to look at 
history and explain the origins of apartheid. This approach places 
much emphasis on the role played by Afrikaner nationalism in the rise 
of apartheid. Since time immemorial, Southern Africa has been the 
scene of interaction between diverse peoples. Knowledge about most 
of these processes is still meagre, but it is evident that by the 
seventeenth century people earned their livelihood in the region in 
three different ways: by hunting, by herding, and by farming 
(Thompson 1982:20). 
The Bantu-speaking people, who owned cattle, cultivated grain crops, 
and used iron implements, occupied most of the better watered eastern 
half of the region (Thompson 1982:21). 
Thompson further maintains that, before the nineteenth century the 
Black people of Southern Africa (including those in Lebowa), were 
organized in small polities, varying from single villages with no 
more than a hundred members who were biologically related to one 
another, to polities containing many villages and several thousand 
members. 
Each polity was ruled by a Chief, who held office by virtue of some 
combination of hereditary and personal qualities. The powers of the 
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Chief were limited by well-established customs and by the fact that 
decisions could only be enforced if they had popular support. 
The structure of Black society and the political system which had 
prevailed for several centuries in much of Southeastern Africa was 
transformed in 1836 when the Afrikaner Voortrekkers began to pene-
trate northern and eastern parts of the Cape Colony (Lacour-Gayet 
1970:117-118). 
2.2.2 THE FIRST PHASE OF WHITE CONQUEST 
The white 
the first 
Dutch East 
Netherlands, 
established 
conquest of South Africa took place in two phases. During 
phase - roughly coterminous with the period of rule by the 
India Company (1652-1795), White immigrants from the 
Germany, France and other parts of North-Western Europe 
themselves in Southern Africa and became a distinct and 
fairly homogeneous community, the embryonic Afrikaner nation. In the 
process they conquered the San and the Khoikhoi inhabitants of that 
area. However, many Khoikhoi remained within the expanding frontiers 
of White settlement, loosing their land, their stock and their social 
cohesion and becoming shepherds and cattleherders for the White farm-
ers (Thompson 1982:23-24). 
In the face of all these adverse developments, the leaders of the 
Khoikhoi tribes, 
their followers 
who were really weak at the time, failed to rally 
to effective resistance or response. By the turn of 
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the eighteenth century there was no visible leadership at all above 
clan level among the still independent Khoikhoi near the Cape Colony 
(Giliomee & Elphick 1979:21). 
2.2.3 THE SECOND PHASE OF WHITE CONQUEST 
During the second phase of White conquest, which roughly corresponds 
with the time of British ascendancy in South Africa (1795-1910), the 
African or Black chiefdoms were conquered and the White settlement 
was extended to its present limits. The first clear victory of 
Whites over Africans (Xhosa) was in 1812 (Davenport 1989:128), while 
the last African people in South Africa to be brought under White 
control were the Venda in the 1890s. The last flicker of resistance 
on a traditional basis to the imposition of White control was the 
Zulu rebellion of 1906 (Davenport 1989:165-170). 
In this period the White population was enlarged by further 
immigration, mainly from Britain, which began in 1820 and reached a 
considerable scale after the discovery of diamonds in Griqualand West 
during 1867 - and of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 (Lacour-Gayet 
1970:133 & 154). 
Thompson maintains that the Bantu-speaking people (Blacks) were con-
quered piecemeal, some by peaceful penetration and others by force of 
arms. While the Khoikhoi had lost control of their land, and with it 
their social and cultural autonomy, in the process of conquest, the 
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far more numerous and more formidable Bantu speaking Africans managed 
to retain part of their land and therefore were able to preserve 
their social and cultural integrity. They kept all the land that 
became the African reserves (Homelands) within South Africa (Thompson 
1982:25). 
In the process of penetration into the interior, the White Voor-
trekkers left the Cape Colony in and after 1836 and founded the inde-
pendent republics of the Orange Free State (1854-1900) and the South 
African Republic or Transvaal - (1852-77) and (1881-1900) Natal 
(Muller 1969:233-252). 
2.2.4 POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The Voortrekkers' first political and constitutional improvisations 
were for the regulation of their own affairs as migrant communities. 
When those improvisations resulted in territorial political systems, 
they ensured their dominant position by confining political participa-
tion only to Whites. 
In the Republic of the Orange Free State and the Zuid-Afrikaansche 
Republiek only the Whites had political rights (Thompson 1960:111). 
In the Cape Colony and Natal, a qualified franchise was granted to 
Blacks in 1870. The restrictions Blacks had to overcome to acquire 
the right to vote in Natal were applied in such a manner by the 
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British government that only a small number of Blacks actually 
obtained the right to vote (Trapido 1968:79). 
In the Cape a political struggle developed between the English and 
the Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants. This struggle was absent in 
Natal, where the English-speaking group was by far in the majority. 
The Blacks, both in the Cape and in Natal, firmly believed and hoped 
that the British Imperial Government would protect their rights, and 
consequently made very little effort to obtain the right to vote. 
Even if Blacks could nominally have obtained the right to vote, the 
actual practice in Natal was such that the law was administered in 
such a way that the Non-whites were, to all intents and purposes, 
debarred from obtaining the franchise (Marais 1985:50). 
A South African Native Affairs Commission appointed by Sir Alfred 
Milner in 1903 to make recommendations to the Transvaal, Orange River 
and Cape colonies, with regard to demands for land by Black tribes 
and their political rights, formalised the idea of racial segregation 
in a new way. It envisaged the territorial separation of Blacks and 
Whites for the purpose of residence and ownership, and approved the 
establishment of segregated locations for urban Blacks in various 
centres. It further urged that Blacks be represented only by Whites 
in government, and argued for the separation of Blacks and Whites in 
political life (Louw 1986:33). 
In 1905, Milner was recalled to England and some of the colonies were 
granted "self-government". A National Convention was called in 1908 
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to decide whether the colonies should form a union or a federation 
(Lauw 1986:33). 
2.2.4.1 THE NATIONAL CONVENTION AND THE DRAFTING OF A CONSTITU-
TION 
Both the government and the opposition parties of the four colonies 
were represented at the National Convention. No Blacks, Coloureds or 
Indians were present. After some lengthy deliberations all the dele-
gates signed the draft South Africa Act on the 11th May 1909. White 
South Africans gave overwhelming support to the Act, but virtually 
all politically conscious Non-whites objected to the provisions which 
concerned them, such as the question of franchise rights for Blacks, 
Coloureds and Indians (Muller 1967:375). 
Black delegates from all four colonies attended a "South African 
Native Convention" which opened in Bloemfontein on 24 March 1909. 
The Cape Coloured Association and the African Political Organization 
(APO) had held a protest meeting in the Cape Town City Hall on 5 
March 1909 and a conference in Cape Town in April 1909. Both the 
Black and Coloured congresses had decided to appeal to the British 
government to change the Non-white franchise provisions of the Act. 
W.P. Schreiner led a deputation of Black and Coloured leaders to 
London but they did not succeed in their purpose (Muller 1969:376). 
Although the colour-bar restrictions were criticized in the British 
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parliament, and the Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith, solemnly appealed 
to South African statesmen to modify the restrictive franchise provi-
sions, the bill was passed without any amendments (Muller 1969:376). 
The Union of South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910. 
2.3 UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA (1910-1961) 
The period after the formation of the Union of South Africa from 31 
May 
with 
fairs 
1910 to 31 May 1961 is known for its numerous Acts of Parliament 
regard to the administration, control and governing of the af-
of Blacks. It was during this period that Acts intended to 
define certain parts of South Africa as Black Areas were enacted. The 
Native Land Act of 1913 was one of the first steps aimed at achieving 
territorial segregation or separation between Blacks and Whites. 
Certain Acts such as the Black Authorities Act, 1951 (Act No 68 of 
1951), were aimed at creating institutions that would enable the 
various Black tribes of South Africa to administer their own affairs 
within the Black areas. The language factor played an important role 
when classifying Black tribes into ethnic or national units, which 
later formed the basis for the establishment of the National States 
or Homelands of today. 
In terms of Section 14 of the South Africa Act of 1909, a Department 
of Native Affairs was created with the purpose of incorporating the 
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similar departments of the four colonies into the new Department of 
Native Affairs (South Africa Act 1909). The control, administration 
and the proclamatory powers in respect of all Blacks in South Africa 
were vested in the Governor-General. The land reserved for Black 
locations was also vested in the Governor General (South Africa Act, 
1909, Section 147). 
Before discussing different laws on land and Black administration 
which brought about the establishment of Homelands, a brief descrip-
tion of apartheid and separate development ideology will be 
provided. Lebowa is the outcome of this ideology. 
2.3.1 THE IDEOLOGY OF APARTHEID OR SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT 
Although separatism in one form or another has constantly character-
ised relations between the colour groups since earliest contacts in 
South Africa, there have been some important shifts in both the justi-
fication and the aims of the Whitemen's ideology in respect of rela-
tions between colour groups (Hugo 1982:346). 
Traditionally, South African racial policy has reflected the determi-
nation of white South Africans to retain all political power and to 
prevent economic competition from the indigenous Blacks. Whites came 
to believe that these goals could best be attained through radical 
residential segregation, which guaranteed economic privileges to 
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Whites by compelling Blacks to develop along their own lines within 
their own areas (Moodie 1975:260). 
In their attempt to understand and to explain the determinants under-
lying the structure of intergroup relations which gave birth to the 
separate development policy in South Africa, Hugo and Kotze (1983) 
emphasised the 
of Whites and 
colour) between 
influence of factors such as the cultural differences 
Africans; the physical differences (especially skin 
racial groups; economic factors, e.g. the economic 
competition over scarce resources such as land; miscegenation, which 
may lead to the assimilation of coloured blood and ultimately, nation-
al and cultural suicide; the factor of fear on the part of Whites 
(Rhoodie and Venter 1960:190). "An emotion without which the idea of 
apartheid would probably never have been realized is fear" (Hugo & 
Kotze 1983:6-12). 
It is necessary at this stage to mention that, by the time the Nation-
alists came into power in 1948, the apartheid policy was already 
integrated into the South African political and socio-economic 
system. Therefore, the present government inherited a legacy of race 
laws which it subsequently enhanced and refined (Louw & Kendall 
1986:31). 
Separate development (or apartheid as it was commonly referred to) 
could not, prior to the forties and the advent of the National Party 
electoral victory in 1948, be described as a fully articulated 
ideology. The essence of this emergent ideology was the need for 
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White survival and the formation of the Afrikaner identity in pursuit 
of which it was felt that while the existence of segregation was to 
be maintained it should also be extended, particularly in the politi-
cal sphere, to the point of complete territorial separation between 
Black and White (Moodie 1975:260-261). 
The following statement by the National Party spokesman, Dr. N. 
Diedericks on the eve of the 1948 general election, may for purposes 
of clearer understanding, be regarded as the fundamental ideological 
underpinning of the policy of apartheid (Gregor 1968:264): 
What 
Party 
that 
is at issue between the United Party and the National 
is two outlooks on life, fundamentally so divergent 
a compromise is entirely unthinkable. On the one hand 
we have nationalism which believes in the necessary existence 
of distinct peoples, distinct languages, nations and 
cultures, and which regard the fact of the existence of these 
peoples and these cultures as the basis of its conduct. On 
the other hand, we have liberalism and the basis of its strug-
gle is the individual with his so-called rights and 
liberties. 
The 
ism 
former outlook, which emphasises the concept of nitional-
was more attractive to Whites who subsequently voted the 
National Party into office. It is this stress on a collectiv-
ism which may be seen as the central ideological tenet of 
apartheid and later separate development. Apartheid and 
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separate development may be said to have laid claim to the 
status of an ideology when some intellectuals substantiated 
it by formulating a coherent programme aimed at providing a 
solution to the race relation problem in South Africa. 
According to Hugo (1982:351), a careful study of the books of these 
intellectuals revealed a fundamental rejection of the individual as 
an appropriate unit of analysis for both scientific and philosophical 
inquiry and national policy formulation (Cf. Cronje 1945 and 1947; Du 
Preez 1959; Coertze 1943 and 1959; and Kotze 1962). 
On the strength of the writings of these early theoreticians of 
apartheid, a practical political solution had to be found and the 
answer was seen to be in the application of vertical apartheid. This 
earliest formulation of apartheid, sometimes referred to as petty 
apartheid, concentrated on separation between White and Black as 
racial groups (Davenport 1989:542). 
However, it was only towards the 1948 general elections, that some 
writers departed from race as the exclusive organizing principle of 
political policy by referring to the ideal solution to South Africa's 
racial problems as being the territorial separation of diverse groups 
including Black communities who were distinguished from each other by 
ethnic difference. Each of these ethnic groupings should, so it was 
felt, be permitted to pursue its own socio-economic evolution and 
develop its own form of government (Cronje 1947:155). 
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This new vision of South Africa formed part of the National Party's 
election manifesto, and an electoral majority of the White people 
shared this view on the eve of the 1948 general election (Rhoodie 
1969:55). The National Party won the election and the stage was set 
for the practical implementation of the apartheid ideology. 
Analysis of "positive apartheid" is complicated by the fact that the 
National Party came to power on the appeal of defensive or "negative 
apartheid". During the first ten years of the National Party's rule, 
most of the apartheid legislation passed by the party involved the 
careful and full legal definition of apartheid which had long been an 
integral part of the South African way of life. These laws set 
specific limits to racial contact in housing, education, employment, 
sport and entertainment, sexual relations and social amenities. 
The ideological principles of this doctrine of "positive apartheid" 
or "the theory of separate development" as Dr. Verwoerd called it, 
were concisely encapsulated in the policy statement of Mr. M.D.C. de 
Wet Nel, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, made 
when he introduced the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill before 
the South African House of Assembly in May 1959 (R.S.A.: Hansard, May 
18, 1959, columns 6001-6002): 
The philosophy of life of the settled White population in 
South Africa, both English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking in 
regard to the racial problem rests on three main basic 
principles. The first is that God has given a divine task 
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and calling to every people in the world, which dare not be 
destroyed or denied by anyone. The second is that every 
people in the world, of whatever race or colour, just like 
every individual, has an inherent right to live and to 
develop. Every people is entitled to the right of self-
preservation. Thirdly, it is our deep conviction that the 
personal and national ideals of every individual and of every 
ethnic group can best be developed within its own national 
community. Only then will the other groups feel that they 
are not being endangered. This is a divine task which has to 
be implemented and fulfilled systematically. 
The ideological context of the revolutionary aspect of apartheid 
theory is, therefore, not simple racism, but ethnic and cultural 
differences, which are so crucial to Afrikaner Christian Nationalism, 
and had a major impact on this ideology (Moodie 1975:266). This 
reflect differences between the old form of apartheid which did not 
envisage any form of self-government or independent states (Prime 
Ministers Malan and Strijdom until 1958) and the new form of apart-
heid (separate development) formulated by Verwoerd. In conclusion, 
Mr. de Wet Nel summed up his statement as follows: "We grant to the 
Bantu, what we demand for ourselves" (R.S.A.: Hansard, May 18, 1959, 
column 6023). In a nutshell, this statement reflect the new inten-
tions and direction of the separate development ideology under the 
leadership of Dr. Verwoerd. 
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In conclusion, apartheid or separate development could be divided 
into petty apartheid and grand apartheid. Petty apartheid was specif-
ically aimed at social segregation in areas such as public amenities, 
education, sexual relationships and residential areas. Grand apart-
heid was the geographical balkanisation of the country into trust 
areas, Homelands and later National States with the aim to redirect 
the political activities and aspirations of Blacks or Africans away 
from the political centre. Lebowa was part of this design. 
In the following sections the creation of grand apartheid is traced 
by focusing on the most important legislation through which it was 
implemented. Two distinct phases can be identified: the first phase 
before 1958, and the second thereafter. During the first phase the 
aim of the policy of apartheid was to create separation within the 
context of one South Africa. The policy of separate development 
since 1958, however, envisaged the separation of South Africa as a 
state and the creation of self-governing Homelands which would later 
become independent Black states. Lebowa was a manifestation of this 
geographical separation which was intended to result in an 
independent state. However, Lebowa opted to remain a self-governing 
territory within greater South Africa. 
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2.4.1 ACTS ON LAND AND BLACK ADMINISTRATION 
2.4.1.1 BLACK LAND ACT,1913 (ACT 27 OF 1913) 
The Black Land Act, 1913 was one of the first steps taken to achieve 
territorial segregation or separation between Blacks and Whites. The 
areas belonging to or traditionally occupied by Blacks in 1913 and in 
subsequent periods were defined in this and a number of subsequent 
Acts. 
This Act made provision for the delineation of the areas occupied 
exclusively by 
of further land 
that no person 
the Blacks as well as for the purchasing and leasing 
for use by Blacks. Section I (1) of the Act states 
who is not a Black can be granted rights in a Sched-
uled Black Area and conversely, that no Black can acquire or obtain 
land outside the areas (Marais 1985:52). 
The Black 
1925), and 
(Act 34 of 
Lands (Natal and Transvaal) Release Act, 1925 (Act 28 of 
the Black Lands further Release and Acquisition Act, 1927 
1927), added or removed certain areas from the already 
scheduled Black areas. 
Although the Act applied to the whole of South Afr~ca, in practice, 
it was relevant only to the Transvaal and Natal. The Free State al-
ready had legislation prohibiting the sale of land to Blacks 
(Ordinance 5 of 1876) and in the Cape property ownership was a quali-
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f ication for Black franchise rights which were entrenched in the 
constitution of the Union, so the Act did not apply there. 
All the Black leaders objected to the Act. The African National 
Congress sent two deputations to the South African government and one 
to the British government protesting the bill, but the British were 
not prepared to intervene (Louw & Kendall 1986:35). 
In protest against this Land Act, Professor Jabavu said the following 
on behalf of the Blacks (Olivier 1927:106): 
This Act satisfied no one. The natives naturally objected to 
the restriction of their right to purchase, and the Europeans 
were unwilling to have their farms set aside for native 
occupation. On the contrary, the evictions of native tenants 
who have nowhere to go have been rigorously carried out by 
the farmers with harrowing results. 
It is important to note that Schedule III (Transvaal) of this Act 
defined Black Areas in the Transvaal that later had a bearing on the 
areas now constituting the National State of Lebowa (Pheme 1983:19). 
These areas are tabulated in Annexure A to this chapter. 
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2.4.1.2 DEVELOPMENT TRUST AND LAND ACT, 1936 (ACT 18 OF 1936) 
This Act provided for the establishment of a South African Develop-
ment Trust and defined its purpose. The Act further envisaged the 
acquisition of an additional 6,2 million hectares for incorporation 
into the Black areas (Section 4). 
The Development Trust and Land Act was supplemented by various amend-
ments and proclamations which enabled the Governor-General to control 
every aspect of the Black economy including business, farming, 
building, townships, land tenure and tribal authorities (Lauw & 
Kendall 1986:41). 
The South African Development Trust represented a merger of the Natal 
Development Trust, the Zululand Development Trust, the Orange Free 
State Imperial Grant-in-Aid and Black Development Account 
(Development Trust and Land Act). All state-owned land in the pro-
claimed Black areas was vested in the Development and Land Trust. As 
the name indicates, the Trust had to acquire land for Blacks and to 
develop it for the benefit of the Blacks in those areas. 
Part III of the first schedule to this Act defined the released areas 
for the Transvaal, and some of these areas form part of the present 
National State of Lebowa. 
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2.4.1.3 BLACK ADMINISTRATION ACT, 1927 (ACT 38 OF 1927) 
The administration of various functions in the areas reserved for 
Blacks was outlined by the Black Administration Act, 1927. The vari-
ous Acts of the colonies, prior to unification, dealing with the 
administration of Blacks were consolidated in this Act. Section I of 
this Act reaffirmed that the Governor-General should be the Supreme 
Chief of all Black tribes and, in terms of Section 3, he could ap-
point or depose a Chief (Traditional Leader) of a Black tribe. Sec-
tion II provided for the appointment of a Chief Native Commissioner, 
as well as Assistant Commissioners. Provision was also made for the 
establishment of a Commissioner's Court, with various criminal and 
civil divisions (Marais 1985:53). 
It was by the virtue of powers vested in the Governor-General in 
terms of Section 3 of this Act, that additional Chiefs (Traditional 
Leaders) were appointed, and this factor had an effect on the crea-
tion of the Lebowa National State later, as will be shown. 
2.4.1.4 BLACK AUTHORITIES ACT, 1951 (ACT 68 OF 1951) 
Venter summarized the intention of the Act as follows (quoted in Bas-
son et al 1988:309): 
The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 is the new approach regard-
ing the government of Blacks in South Africa. The British 
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colonial ideas of inculcating an appreciation for liberal 
democracy in the people of Africa were discarded, and a sys-
tem of self-rule by rural Black communities according to 
their traditional equivalents of public law was taken as the 
point of departure. 
According to Wiechers, this Act provided the necessary foundation for 
the future development of self-governing Black Homelands or National 
States as recommended in 1980, but it is important to note that the 
Act only established a specific management system and that there was 
still no evidence of separate Homelands or even separate ethnic 
groups at the time of its promulgation. Furthermore, this Act served 
to facilitate and place the administration of Black areas as 
determined by the Development Trust and the Land Act of 1936 on 
traditional principles (Wiechers 1985:438). 
The Act also provides for the establishment of different levels of 
government in the Black Homelands, with the aim of providing a core 
of government institutions in these Homelands. The following institu-
tions were created by proclamation for the Black Tribes in South 
Africa: 
(a) A 
ter 
to 
Tribal Authority was established for each tribe to adminis-
the affairs of the tribe, render assistance and guidance 
its Chief or headman, advise and assist the Government and 
the 
and 
Regional Authority, and to perform such other functions 
duties to be determined from time to time by the Gover-
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nor-General prior to 1961, or the State President thereafter 
(Section 4). 
(b) A Regional Authority 
Community Authorities. 
with powers, functions 
(Section 9). 
combining two or more Tribal and/or 
The Regional Authorities were vested 
and duties of a more advanced nature 
(c) A Territorial Authority in respect of any two or more areas 
for which Regional Authorities were established. This is the 
main legislative authority for a particular national unit or 
ethnic group, although with limited legislative powers. The 
Territorial Authority was expected to liaise with the Commis-
sioner-General appointed for each area and to serve the Com-
missioner-General with advice. The Commissioner-General 
represented the South African Government in the area. It 
could generate a revenue fund for that Authority which fund 
was subject to audit by the Auditor General (Section 11). 
2.4.1.5 PROMOTION OF BLACK SELF-GOVERNMENT ACT, (ACT 46 OF 1959) 
• 
In 1954 the Tomlinson Commission of Inquiry into the socio-economic 
development of the Bantu areas within the Union of South Africa, 
identified and recommended to the government that seven Homelands for 
various Black ethnic groups within the borders of South Africa in 
44 
which the different groups are located, had to govern themselves to 
an increasing extent (quoted in Basson et al 1984:310). 
The recommendations were accepted by the government and put into 
practice through an enactment of the Promotion of Black Self-Govern-
ment Act, 1959. 
This Act changed the overall picture and the image of the system of 
traditional government as introduced by the 1951 Bantu Authorities 
Act, and the ethnic diversity of the Black people in South Africa was 
acknowledged. These ethnic groups were divided into eight units 
(Wiechers 1985:438). 
In short, the 1951 Act aimed at placing the administration of Black 
areas on a traditional foundation without any intention of granting 
them any form of self-government, while the 1959 Act laid the 
foundation for the ultimate creation of self-governing Black areas on 
an ethnic basis. These differences reflect the difference in policy 
of the National Party under Malan and Strijdom until 1958 and from 
1958 under Verwoerd as indicated in the discussion of the ideology of 
separate development in this chapter. The Transkei took a leading 
role in this constitutional process of self-government intended to 
lead ultimately to full independence (Wiechers 1985:439). 
This Act provided for the gradual development of self-governing Black 
National States, and it repealed the Black Representation Act of 
1936, thereby removing the last vestiges of the indirect representa-
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tion that the Blacks had in the House of Assembly and Senate of the 
Republic of South Africa. It also amended Acts such as the Black 
Administration Act, 1927, the Development Administration Act, 1936, 
and the Black Authorities Acts, of 1951. 
The objectives of this Act as contained in the preamble thereto, may 
be summarised as follows: 
(a) The Black peoples of South Africa are not a homogeneous race, 
but comprise national or ethnic units on the basis of 
language and culture. 
(b) The welfare of those units is to be sought within each unit 
and a gradual development towards self-government of each 
unit ought to be effected. 
(c) The development of self-government will be stimulated by gran-
ting the Territorial Authorities the right of control over 
the land of their areas. 
(d) Further powers, functions and duties should be extended to 
Regional and Territorial Authorities. 
The Lebowa Territorial Authority consisting of Northern Sotho-speak-
ing tribes was one of the ten National or Ethnic Units identified in 
terms of this Act. 
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2.5 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1961 
The Union of South Africa became the Republic of South Africa on 31 
May 1961 (Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961, 
Section 1). The South African government's policy of separate 
development for Whites and Non-whites was accelerated in the period 
after the formation of the Republic. 
In January 1962, Dr. H.F.Verwoerd, then South African Prime Minister, 
announced in the House of Assembly that a measure of Bantu (Black) 
self-government 
heralded the 
In 1967 the 
in the second 
would be introduced into the reserves, and that this 
start of their future development as separate states. 
South African Parliament approved a record R490 million 
five-year development plan for the ten Bantu (Black) 
Homelands, including Lebowa (Muller 1975:456). 
2.5.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY FOR THE NORTHERN 
SOTHO NATIONAL UNIT 
In terms of the Black Authorities Act, 1951 provision was made for a 
uniform system of local, regional and central government in the form 
of tribal/community, regional and territorial authorities in the 
Black areas. They were administrative bodies based on Western and 
traditional principles. Arising from this, the Lebowa Territorial 
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Authority was established on the 10 August 1962 (Proclamation R224 of 
1962) for the North Sotho Ethnic and Cultural Unit. 
The Territorial Authority consisted of a chairman and one-third of 
the members of the twelve various Regional Authorities within Lebowa 
as follows: 
(a) Sekhukhune Regional Authority with 57 Tribal Authorities. 
(b) Mokerong Regional Authority with 10 Tribal and 2 Community 
Authorities. 
(c) Nebo Regional Authority with 14 Tribal and 1 Community 
Authority. 
(d) Thabamoopo Regional Authority with 13 Tribal and 1 Community 
Authority. 
(e) Seshego Regional Authority with 4 Tribal and 1 Community 
Authority. 
(f) Mapulaneng Regional Authority with 9 Tribal Authorities. 
(g) Bolobedu Regional Authority with 2 Tribal and 1 Community 
Authority. 
(h) Naphuno Regional Authority with 5 Tribal Authorities. 
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(i) Namakgale Regional Authority with 4 Tribal Authorities. 
(j) Sekgosese Regional Authority with 5 Tribal and 2 Community 
Authorities. 
(k) Bochum Regional Authority with 2 Tribal and 1 Community 
Authority. 
(1) Moutse Regional Authority with 3 Tribal and 3 Community 
Authorities. 
On 31 December 1985, the South African government incorporated the 
Moutse Region into KwaNdebele (Proclamation R227 of 1985). The Ap-
peal Court, however, declared this incorporation null and void. 
The powers, functions and duties of the Lebowa Territorial Authority 
were outlined in a set of regulations as provided for in Section 7 of 
the Black Authorities Act, 1951. These regulations were published in 
Proclamation R115 of 1969. 
The Lebowa Territorial Authority was reconstituted on 14 August 1969 
and executive powers were vested in an Executive Council of six 
Councillors. A civil service of six departments was established, 
with each of the Councillors responsible for a government department 
(Proclamations R114 and R115 of 1969). 
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2.5.2 BLACK STATES CITIZENSHIP ACT, 1970 (ACT 26 OF 1970) 
The purpose of this Act was to confine the citizenship rights of all 
Blacks within the boundaries of South Africa to the respective Nation-
al States (Section 3). This Act stipulated that the former Black 
reserves would be referred to as National States. 
According to this Act, every person in the Republic of South Africa 
who was not a citizen of an independent Black state like Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, had citizenship of a National State 
such as Lebowa (Basson et al 1988:340). 
The National States Citizenship, 1970, stipulated the conditions on 
which a Black person could qualify for citizenship of a particular 
National State: 
(a) birth in the area or at least one citizen-parent; or 
(b) five years domicile in the area; or 
(c) language proficiency in the language spoken by the Black 
population of the area; or 
(d) blood relationship with a member of the Black population in 
the area; or 
50 
(e) identification with the part of the Black population of the 
area; or 
(f) association with the part of the Black population in the area 
because of a specific cultural or racial background; or 
(g) a former citizen of one of the independent TBVC countries who 
was also formerly a South African and a Homeland citizen and 
to whom citizenship of a Homeland has been granted by the 
Minister of Cooperation and Development on the recommendation 
of the Homeland government concerned, and this person then 
becomes a South African citizen again by birth (Section 3). 
Use of the term "citizenship" in respect of regions or entities such 
as Lebowa which are not independent states, is not acceptable in a 
constitutional law sense. Citizenship implies the existence of a 
state. Citizenship of a Black National State does not, however, 
entail the loss of South African citizenship (Basson et al 1988:340). 
t2.5.3 BLACK STATES CONSTITUTION ACT, 1971 (ACT 21 OF 1971) q 
Under the premiership of Mr. B.J. Vorster (1966-78), the Black States 
Constitution Act, 1971 was enacted with the aim of providing for the 
establishment of Legislative Assemblies and Executive Councils in 
Black National States. This Act further provided for the powers, 
functions and duties of such Legislative Assemblies and Executive 
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Councils, including the declaration of the territories as self-
governing States. 
The first phase of this process as outlined in chapter I of the Act 
provides for a "system of self-government in Black areas" by creating 
the procedures for the institution of a Legislative Assembly and 
Executive Council in any area that already has a territorial 
authority. 
During this stage of development, certain restrictions were placed on 
the legislative powers of these Legislative Assemblies. The State 
President of the Republic of South Africa received powers to either 
approve or disapprove any Act passed by such a Legislative Assembly 
and such Act was not allowed to be in conflict with an Act of the 
South African Parliament (Basson et al 1988:316). 
The second or developed phase of self-government is outlined in chap-
ter 2 of the Act (Sections 26-36). Provision is made for self-govern-
ment to the same extent as the Transkei had after 1963. The provi-
sions regarding the symbols of statehood like a flag, national 
anthem, official language and the institution of a Cabinet consisting 
of Ministers, are made in this second phase (Wiechers 1985:440). 
The Legislative Assembly of a National State can amend or repeal 
Parliamentary Acts of the Republic of South Africa on subjects within 
its jurisdiction as tabulated in Schedule 1 of this Act, and can 
enact laws with extraterritorial operation (Basson et al 1988:317). 
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Subjects upon which the Legislative Assembly of a National State such 
as Lebowa may legislate are tabulated in Schedule 1 of the Act while 
matters reserved from legislation by such Legislative Assemblies are 
listed in section 4 of the Act. 
This Act also amended the Black Authorities Act of 1951, and certain 
definitions in the National States Citizenship Act, 1970 (Schedule 
2 ) . 
2.5.4 PROCLAMATION OF THE LEBOWA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
On 1 July 1971, the Lebowa Legislative Assembly with limited legisla-
tive powers was established in terms of the provisions of chapter I 
of the National States Constitution Act, 1971, by the State President 
of South Africa through Proclamation R156 of 1971. The Lebowa Legis-
lative Assembly was granted jurisdiction over all the areas of the 
Regional Authorities listed in paragraph 2.4.1 of this chapter. 
2.5.5 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING STATE OF LEBOWA IN ITS 
PRESENT FORM 
The State President, by virtue of powers vested in him in the Black 
States Constitution Act of 1971, declared the area described in the 
schedule to Proclamation R156 of 1971 under the name Lebowa to be a 
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self-governing State within the Republic of South Africa with effect 
from 2 October 1972 (Proclamation R225 of 1972, Section 2). 
The seat of the Lebowa Government was declared to be Seshego until 
such time as the new capital, Lebowakgomo, was fully developed. A 
partially elected, partially designated legislative assembly was 
convened for a period of five years but could be dissolved at any 
time by the State President by proclamation on request of the Lebowa 
Cabinet (Proclamation R225 of 1972, sections 2 and 3). 
Executive 
and eight 
power vested in the Cabinet, comprising the Chief Minister 
Ministers appointed from the ranks of the Legislative 
Assembly. 
each the 
The Cabinet Ministers (including the Chief Minister), are 
political head of one of the following government 
departments: 
(a) Department of the Chief Minister; 
(b) Department of Home Affairs; 
(c) Department of Justice and Police; 
(d) Department of Education; 
(e) Department of Agriculture and Environmental Conservation; 
(f) Department of Works and Public Utilities; 
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(g) Department of Health and Social Welfare; 
(h) Department of Finance and Economic Affairs. 
(Proclamation R225 of 1972, Section 7) 
During the period 1983-1988, the number of government departments and 
Cabinet Ministers was changed. The Department of Police was separat-
ed from that of Justice, and a new Department of Law and Order formed 
with its own Minister. The Department of Economic Affairs was also 
separated from that of Finance. A Minister was appointed for this 
new department. The Lebowa Cabinet, therefore, presently - 1990 -
comprises 10 Cabinet Ministers (including the Chief Minister) and 10 
deputy Ministers. 
Election of members of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly is regulated 
by the provisions of Lebowa Electoral Proclamation, 1972 (Procla-
mation R226 of 1972). The delimitation of constituencies corresponds 
to the magisterial districts of Lebowa (R226 of 1972). 
The National State of Lebowa has its own revenue fund, into which is 
paid all revenue accruing to Lebowa and all grants from the South 
African central government. All revenue is appropriated by the Legis-
lative Assembly for the administration of Lebowa (Act 21 of 1971, 
Sections 6-8). 
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2.6 LEBOWA'S POLITICAL STANDPOINT WITH REGARD TO FUTURE CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The Black States Constitution Act, 1971 (Act 21 of 1971) empowers the 
South African Government to grant full independence to any self-
governing territory within the Republic of South Africa. The Tran-
skei was the first territory to complete the process envisaged in 
this and the other laws referred to above, and achieved independence 
on 26 October 1976. Subsequently, three other self-governing territo-
ries namely, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei also opted for, and 
achieved full independence. 
Like other self-governing territories such as Kwazulu, Qwaqwa, 
Gazankulu, and Kangwane, the Lebowa self-governing territory is 
against full independence as envisaged by the Black States Constitu-
tion Act, 1971. 
The late Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr. C.N. Phatudi, advanced the 
following reasons in support of his stand against the option for full 
independence on behalf of his people: 
(a) The loss of South African citizenship by Lebowans after secur-
ing independence, is unacceptable. "We are in every way 
South Africans as much as any White man - and we simply 
will not reject our birthright. No matter what incentives 
offered to us, there is no way that we will break away from 
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the land of our birth. The issue is simply non-negotiable" 
(Dr. Phatudi quoted in Cooper 1985:40). 
(b) There is no prospect of international recognition for inde-
pendent states within the Republic of South Africa. The 
self-governing States (Homelands) are perceived to be prod-
ucts of the South African policy of separate development 
which is anathema to the international community. Establish-
ing an independent Homeland would, therefore, imply support 
for the separate development policy or apartheid (Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, Volume 19, Part I, 1985 
session, 29 April 1985:14). 
In 1971 a resolution was passed by 110 votes to 2 in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations stating that "the real 
purpose of establishing Bantustans" (Black National States) 
was to divide Blacks, setting one against another with a view 
of weakening the Black front in its struggle for its inaliena-
ble rights. In every subsequent year South African policy 
with regard to Black National States has been condemned by 
the General Assembly (Ciskei Commission, The Quail Report 
1980:120). 
(c) Blacks are not seeking a political system based on tribal or 
racial separation. In the words of the Chief Minister of 
Gazankulu, Professor Hudson Ntsanwesi (Ciskei Commission, The 
Quail Report 1980:116): 
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One of the most frequent delusions to which Afrikaner 
nationalism, as propounded by the present government, 
falls prey, is the belief that the Black man in fact 
welcomes the opportunity of running his own affairs in 
his own Homeland and that he accepts the philosophical 
soundness of apartheid and the concept of the 
"andersoortigheid" (otherness) of the other man. Whereas 
we are all 
differences, 
perpetuation 
proud of our linguistic, culture and ethnic 
the belief that our salvation lies in the 
of those differences defies logic and the 
lessons of history. 
In view hereof, the National State of Lebowa, through its former 
leader, the late Dr. C.N. Phatudi, envisaged a federation comprising 
the self-governing states and the so-called White South Africa, much 
along the lines of the United States of America. This is not 
identical to the concept of a "constellation" of states proposed by 
the former South African State President P.W. Botha in which a number 
of independent satellite states would be centred around a dominant 
White South Africa. 
Dr. C.N. Phatudi proposed a method of powersharing which retained a 
measure of separateness (as sought by the South African government) 
at the lower levels of government, but introduced Black and White 
representation at the federal level. Obviously this federal concept 
needed to be examined in detail by appropriate commissions, possibly 
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by a National Convention, and by political scientists and constitu-
tional experts. Failing this, Lebowa preferred a preservation of the 
status quo in which it would remain a self-governing state within the 
Republic of South Africa. 
A change of policy regarding the constitutional future of Lebowa was 
introduced by the newly appointed Chief Minister of Lebowa Mr. N.M. 
Ramodike after various pronouncements 
African Government, particularly State 
on negotiations by the South 
President F.W. de Klerk's 
opening address in Parliament on February 2, 1990. In response to 
the challenge contained in the State President's address, Chief Minis-
ter Ramodike prepared a working document entitled "Declaration of the 
Black Homeland Leaders-Consultative Forum on the question of Negotia-
tions in South Africa." The Chief Minister tabled the document in the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly for discussion whereafter it was accepted 
with few amendments. It was also the Chief Minister's desire that 
the other independent and self-governing states in the Transvaal i.e. 
Gazankulu, Kangwane, KwaNdebele and Venda should identify themselves 
with the document. Consequently, provision was made in the document 
for the signatures of the leaders of these self-governing territories 
and independent states. 
The first demand contained in the document was that the Bantustans or 
Homeland Legislative Assemblies be dismantled by the South African 
Parliament before the commencement of negotiations. The following 
principles are contained in the document: 
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(a) A single Parliament in a unitary, non-racial and democratic 
South Africa. 
(b) One person one vote on a common voter's roll. 
(c) Equality before the Constitution and the law. 
(d) A multi-party democracy. 
Furthermore, the declaration rejected: 
(a) the tricameral parliamentary system as a failed experiment; 
(b) racism as the corner stone of the Constitution and State; 
(c) any negotiations aimed at giving acceptance to a united mul-
ti-ethnic Black South Africa; 
(d) the notion that South Africa is a country of minorities; 
(e) the notion of own and general affairs as a construct of apart-
heid rammed down Black throats for the benefit of Whites. 
Consequently, the following programme of action was decided upon: 
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Only 
the 
(a) To launch a Black Homeland leaders consultative Forum for the 
coordination of responses to the various efforts to settle 
the South African question. 
(b) To consult with all political organisations regarding the 
question of negotiations. 
(c) To take the constitutional debate and all ANC viewpoints to 
the grassroots, in line with the ANC Leadership statement 
that negotiations should not be conducted behind peoples' 
backs or above the peoples' heads. 
(d) To study all constitutional options. 
(e) That the present Bantustan administrative structures should 
be dismantled and that multiracial regional offices be estab-
lished as an interim arrangement to prevent a vacuum in the 
rendering of services to the people. 
is 
with 
Chief Minister Ramodike's signature appeared on the document at 
time of its presentation to the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. It 
therefore strongly believed that Lebowa's political standpoint 
regard to future constitutional development will be greatly 
influenced by the viewpoints as contained in the said declaration,and 
the final outcome of the negotiations on its contents (author's obser-
vation). 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this historical and constitutional exposition was to de-
scribe the evolution of the administration of Black affairs in South 
Africa from as early 
from the Eastern Cape 
as the days of the migration of White farmers 
to the North and North-East parts of South 
Africa. These events played a significant role in shaping the policy 
of separate development, which ultimately established the Black Na-
tional States in South Africa. 
Because of numerous clashes between Black tribes and White farmers, 
the various Republics in the Transvaal and Orange Free State made 
policies to remedy the highly dangerous and volatile situation. 
Various Acts regarding Black locations and reserves, were enacted 
during the period of the Union of South Africa. These Acts and proc-
lamations defined boundaries for respective Black National States and 
provided for the establishment of governmental institutions for these 
National States. 
The implementation of these various Acts and proclamations took place 
during the republican period. It was this evolutionary process that 
brought about the creation of Tribal and Community Authorities, Re-
gional Authorities, Territorial Authorities, and the Legislative 
Assemblies of self-governing States. 
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Furthermore, it is within this unique political framework that differ-
ent styles of interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-mak-
ing, rule-application, rule-adjudication and political communication 
emerged among the people of the National State of Lebowa. 
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ANNEXURE "A" 
EXTRACT OF ITEMS (1) TO (4) OF SCHEDULE III (TRANSVAAL) OF THE Black 
LANDS ACT, 1913 (ACT 27 OF 1913) 
NAME 
Ki bi 
Legalie 
Maake 
Mabin allias Mamitje 
Machichaan 
Mafef e 
FARM 
(1) ZOUTPANSBERG 
Randolph, Witfontein. 
Bergplaats, Brits, Doornloop, Driehoek, 
Rietfontein, Sterkwater 
Portion of Thabina Valley, Mamatzeeri, 
Marabona, Sunnyside, Rita, Moim. 
Arthursrust, 
Ground. 
Unsurveyed 
Location of Machichaan. 
Government 
Government Ground near Haenertsburg. 
Lots 287 to 294, Horngate, adjoining 
Government Ground. 
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Mogoboya 
Makushane 
Malaboch 
Mole po 
Moletzie 
Mamabolo 
Mashishimala 
Modjadji 
Mathabatha 
Matoks 
Portion Thabina Valley, Yosemite, Long 
Valley, Uplands. 
Makushane's Location. 
Miltonduff, Lomonside, New Jerusalem, 
Millbank, Gallashiels, Blackhill, Udney, 
Leipzig 
Bognafuran. 
Buffelshoek, 
Molepo's Location, Zamenloop. 
Location of Moletjie, 
Eerstgeluk, Opgaaf. 
Syferfontein. 
Mashishimala's Location. 
Modjadji's Location. 
Inveraan, 
Vaalwater, 
Government Ground near Haenertsburg. 
Lots 257 to 260. 
De Kaffersdrift, Portion Matoks, 
Klipbok, uitkyk. 
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Mothiba 
Mphahlele 
Ramokgopha 
Sekororo 
Silwana 
Chuene 
Bakenberg 
Masi bi 
Portion of Onverwacht. 
Location of Mphahlele, Dwaalkop, 
Stofpoort, Vleiplaats, Pramkoppies, 
Portion of Koppieskraal, Doornvlei, S.E. 
portion Molsgat. 
Location of Ramokgopha, 
Matjesgoedfontein. 
Bokhalva, Moltke. 
Silwana's Location. 
Location of Chuene. 
2 . WATERBERG 
Malokong, Malokonskop, Hellem Briksten. 
Vliegekrans, Vogelstruisfontein, 
Vriesland, 
Bellevue, 
Groningen, 
Scoonoord, 
Inhambane, 
South 
Haakdoorndraai. 
Portions 
Mozambique, 
portion 
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of 
and 
of 
Marcus 
Solomon 
Maraba 
Valtyn 
Maka pan 
Zebediela 
Selika 
Shongwane 
Magalie 
Phokwane 
Portions of Groningen, 
Mozambique, Moordkopje, 
Commandodrift, Gezond, 
Sandsloot, and Swartfontein. 
Inhambane, 
Molendraai, 
Knapdaar, 
Kalkspruit, portion "A" of the farm. 
Bergzicht. 
Macalacaskop, Turfspruit, Rietfontein, 
Portions of Sandsloot, Tweefontein, and 
Knapdaar. 
Zebediela's Location. 
Beauty, Lily. 
Pie van Teneriffe. 
3. MIDDELBURG 
Portions of Vlakplaats and Vooruitzict, 
De Oude Stad van Sekwati, Lekkerhand. 
Nebo, Rietfontein. 
67 
Rammupudu 
Sekwatie 
Sekhukhune 
Portion of Rietfontein. 
Mooifontein, 
Masleroem. 
Government 
Hoeraroep, 
Paradys, 
Hoogelegen, Stad van 
Ground, Eersteregt, 
Goedeverwacht, 
Parys, 
Driekop, 
Geensinde, Korenvelden, 
Avontuur, 
Government 
Schoonoord, 
Grounds 
Diamond, Moskow, 
(Magnet Heights), 
Goedgemeend, 
Eenzaam, 
Lordskraal, 
Vrede. 
Greenland, 
Middelin, 
Duizendannex, 
Zoetvelden, 
Vlakplaats, 
Groblers, 
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CHAPTER 3: INTEREST ARTICULATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first functional step in the political conversion function is 
called interest articulation and is defined by Almond and Powell as: 
"The process by which individuals and groups make demands upon the 
political decision makers " (Almond & Powell 1966:73). 
This is the processes by means of which opinions, attitudes, beliefs, 
and preferences are converted into meaningful demands in the politi-
cal system (Roberts 1963:103-104). The following aspects of interest 
articulation with regard to the Lebowa political system will be 
discussed: interest articulation structures; the interest articula-
tion process (that is, the variety of channels through which demands 
are articulated); and factors which influence articulation (that is, 
the environmental factors which shape the channels and means of ac-
cess for interest articulation). 
3.2 INTEREST ARTICULATION STRUCTURES 
There are a variety of structures fulfilling the interest articula-
tion function in any political system. Almond and Powell divide 
these structures according to two important components: the type of 
group that initiates articulation, and the kind of access channel 
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through which groups send their demands. Since there is no clear 
correlation between the two components, each one will be discussed 
separately (Almond & Powell 1966:74). Thereafter, some of the most 
important groups or units which may initiate interest articulation 
will be discussed. 
3.2.1 INDIVIDUAL SELF-REPRESENTATION 
The role and importance of individuals as articulators of their own 
interests should not be underestimated. "Such individual self-
representation, commonly cast in the guise of the articulation of 
more general societal or group interests, is a common feature of 
political systems. It may take the form of seeking to influence 
political decisions for financial or professional gain, or it may 
involve the articulation of interests perceived as more noble in 
scope" (Almond & Powell 1966:75). This type of self-representation 
articulation structure is found at different levels of the political 
process. In the Lebowa political system it is found at the Local 
authority level, the Regional authority level, and the Central 
authority level. 
3.2.1.1 INDIVIDUAL SELF-REPRESENTATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
The tribal system in Lebowa is designed to allow the tribesmen as 
individuals to articulate their own interests relating to the acquisi-
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tion of certain rights and privileges. A good example hereof is the 
procedure leading to the acquisition of trading rights in Lebowa 
tribal areas and the proclaimed towns by individuals or corporate 
bodies. The Lebowa Business and Trading Undertaking Act, 1977, (Act 
6 of 1977), and the Lebowa Intoxicating Liquor Act of 1973, make the 
necessary provision for individual self-representation by business 
applicants at the respective local authority levels. 
In practice, recommendations to the licensing board (the Regional 
Authority), by the local authorities are usually made through individ-
ual self-representation in Lebowa (Seshego Regional Authority (SRA) 
minutes, 1984.02.23:13). In this regard, an individual articulates 
his or her own interests initially at the local level, by consulting 
with a Kgoshi of that tribe or with one of his councillors (SRA min-
utes 81/10/22:1). 
3.2.1.2 SELF-REPRESENTATION AT THE REGIONAL AUTHORITY LEVEL 
In terms of 
the Regional 
districts. 
the Lebowa Business and Trading Undertaking Act, 1977, 
Authorities also act as licensing boards in all 
In the event of objections or disputes arising from 
trading applications at the regional level, the concerned parties or 
individuals usually make self-representation to the Regional Authori-
ty and defend or support their articulated needs. 
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An example hereof is the instance in which the Seshego Regional Au-
thority received a strong objection from one tribesman against anoth-
er tribesman's application for a Cafe business. After having allowed 
both parties to state their views personally, the licensing board 
(Regional Authority) turned the objection down (Seshego Regional 
Authority minutes, 1981.10.22:8). 
3.2.1.3 SELF-REPRESENTATION AT THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY LEVEL 
Appeals against the decisions of local licensing boards on matters 
pertaining to business and trade licenses are lodged with the Minis-
ter of Home Affairs in Lebowa (Act 6 of 1977, section 17 (1) (a)). 
For example, on 20 July 1982, a citizen of Lebowa made self-represen-
tation to the Minister of Home Affairs and appealed against the Seshe-
go Local Licensing Board's delay concerning his application for Cine-
ma and Cafe licenses (Letter to the Home Affairs Minister, 82.7.20). 
In this way he articulated his needs personally and directly to the 
relevant Minister very successfully. 
Another illustration of self-representation at the central level was 
mentioned in his reply to questions raised in the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly on 1 May 1985, by the late Chief Minister of Lebowa Dr. C.N. 
Phatudi. He indicated that a Lebowa citizen from Mokerong district, 
who was not only an ordinary cattle farmer but also a breeder of 
pedigree cattle stock (Brahmans), had approached him personally about 
a dispute regarding his hired farm. The Group Areas Act, 1950 (Act 
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41 of 1950) prohibited the Black farmer from owning or hiring land 
for any purpose in the so called White proclaimed areas. The Chief 
Minister assured the Legislative Assembly that the cattle farmer 
presented his difficulties to him, and that the government was 
attending to these demands (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim 
Report, Volume 19, part I, 1985, 53). This is another good example 
of interest articulation through individual self-representation at 
the central level. 
3.2.2 ANOMIC INTEREST GROUPS 
Anomic interest groups are defined as "the more or less spontaneous 
penetrations into the political system from the society, such as 
riots, demonstrations, assassinations, and the like" (Almond & Powell 
1966:75&76). In the United States, spontaneous political action 
occurred in many black areas after Martin Luther King's assassination 
and on many college campuses after the American invasion of 
Cambodia. Some political systems, including those of the United 
States, Italy, India, and the Arab nations, have been marked by a 
rather high frequency of such violent and spontaneous group 
formation, while others are notable for the infrequency of such 
disturbances (Almond & Powell 1988:68). The extent to which these 
anomic groups are active in the Lebowa will be discussed in section 
3.3.1 of this chapter. 
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3.2.3 NON-ASSOCIATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS 
Almond and Powell (1966:76) refer to non-associational interest 
groups as being "kinship and lineage groups, and ethnic, regional, 
status, and class groups which articulate their interests 
intermittently through individuals, cliques, family and religious 
heads, and the like". 
There are two especially interesting types of non-associational 
groups. One is the very large group that has not become formally 
organized, although its members perceive, perhaps dimly, their common 
interests (Almond & Powell 1988:68). A good example is the consumer 
interest group, such as sorghum beer drinkers in Lebowa. For many 
years sorghum beer was brewed or manufactured by Kudu beer breweries 
situated in Pietersburg (a White Area) and distributed for sale 
freely into Lebowa. For purely economic reasons, the Lebowa Cabinet 
decided to allow the establishment of other sorghum beer breweries in 
Lebowa by other companies, namely: King Food (Lebowa) (Pty) Ltd., and 
the South African Breweries (Chibuku), (Cabinet Memorandum 146 of 
1985 and Cabinet Decision 187 of 1985). Ultimately only the South 
African Breweries (Chibuku) succeeded in establishing a brewery in 
Lebowa. 
The consumers in Lebowa were used to the Kudu product and even in 
favour of it and not the Chibuku product (Sowetan, 15 November 
1989:3). 
the South 
As a result of the very low sales of Chibuku sorghum beer, 
African Breweries successfully requested the Lebowa 
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Government to prohibit the sale of all sorghum beer brewed outside 
the homeland of Lebowa (Sowetan, 15 November 1989:3). 
A notice to 
October 1989 
proclamation 
other than 
this effect was published in a Government Gazette of 27 
and signed by the homeland's Minister of Justice. The 
states that the sale of "mabele beer (sorghum beer) 
mabele beer brewed or manufactured in Lebowa is 
prohibited" (Government Notice R24 of 1989.10.27). The ban simply 
meant that the Lebowa Government deprived the consumers their right 
of choice by permitting only Chibuku, manufactured and distributed by 
a South African Breweries subsidiary in Lebowa to be sold in Lebowa. 
Although the 
ganized and 
about this 
articulated 
sorghum beer consumer interest group in Lebowa is unor-
wi thout leadership base, their demands and complaints 
monopolistic decision of the government were successfully 
through individual consumers to the Minister of Justice 
in Lebowa Government. 
in transmitting these 
Minister (Sowetan, 15 
The local press also played a significant role 
demands to the Government via the relevant 
November 1989:3). The demand was that the 
government should review the ban. 
A second type of non-associational group is the small village, 
economic, or ethnic subgroup, whose members know each other personal-
ly (Almond & Powell 1988:69). The traditional tribal structure in 
the Lebowa political system represents an appropriate example of this 
type of subgroup. The influence and role of traditional tribal struc-
tures in the Lebowa as non-associational groups is further enhanced 
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by the strategic constitutional positions held by their leaders 
(traditional Chiefs) in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. The tradi-
tional villages are administered by the Kgoshi or Chief through his 
Headmen (Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927, Section 2). 
Some of the Magoshi (Chiefs) in Lebowa have more than 60 of such 
villages under their jurisdiction (Kgoshi Moloto of the Moletjie 
Tribe and Kgoshigadi (female Chief) Modjadjie of the Bolobedu Tribe 
are good examples). The tribesmen in these traditional villages 
represent an example of a non-associational interest group. 
The following is an example of this type of interest group function-
ing in Lebowa: 
On the 20 January 1989, the residents of a small village 
called Ga-Makgakga, under Headman Makgakga within the Mo-
letjie Tribe of Kgoshi Moloto, demanded through their village 
Headman, that certain oppressive traditional tribal practices 
be discontinued and reviewed by the Kgoshi and his Tribal 
Authority (Interview with David Makweya, Makgakga Village 
1989.11.15). The main oppressive traditional tribal practice 
to which they objected was one that gives the Kgoshi the 
right to demand from and compel all female subjects within 
his or her area of jurisdiction, to render free unpaid farm 
labour annually to the Kgoshi (Moletjie Tribe; unwritten 
customary tribal laws). Traditionally, this practice is re-
ferred to as "Tshemo ya Moshate". 
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3.2.4 
The hardship and suffering associated with this compulsory 
hard labour by female members of the tribe provoked ill-
feeling among the tribesmen. The villagers further argued 
that it was unfairly exploitative for the Kgoshi to receive a 
monthly salary in terms of the Lebowa Royal Allowance Act 
1984, (Act 3 of 1984), a second monthly salary from the 
R.S.A. Government termed a "Stipend", a third monthly salary 
from the tribe itself derived from individual tribal 
taxpayers, and to enforce compulsory farm labour upon poor 
female subjects of the tribe for self-enrichment (interview 
with Mr. David Makweya, Makgakga village, 1989.11.155). 
These demands were articulated by a non-associational 
interest group composed of residents in a small village, 
through their traditional Headman to the Kgoshigadi and her 
Tribal Authority (interview: Mr. David Makweya, Makgakga 
village, 1989.11.15). 
INSTITUTIONAL INTEREST GROUPS 
According to Almond and Powell (1966:77) institutional interest 
groups .are found in 
organizations [such] as political parties, legislatures, 
armies, bureaucracies, and churches. These are formal organi-
zations, composed of professionally employed personnel, with 
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designated political or social functions other than interest 
articulation. But, either as corporate bodies or as smaller 
groups within these bodies, ••. these groups may articulate 
their own interests or represent the interests of other 
groups in the society. 
The Lebowa Legislative Assembly is an appropriate example of a formal 
institutional structure at the central level comprising 58 designated 
and 38 elected representatives (Lebowa Constitution Proclamation R225 
of 1972, sections 2 & 3). As has been explained, the Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly is not a sovereign parliament, but a subordinate 
regional legislative institution within the Republic of South 
Africa. As a result, this body is sometimes compelled to articulate 
the interests of the Lebowa people to the South African Government, 
and cannot confine itself to legislation. The action taken by the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly on behalf of the people of the Moutse 
district regarding the excision of Moutse from Lebowa is a good 
example. 
When Lebowa became a self-governing territory in 1972, Moutse dis-
trict was an integral part of it. In 1980 Moutse was excised from 
Lebowa and brought under the jurisdiction of central government 
(R.S.A.: Proclamation 210 of 24 October 1980; replaced by section 16 
of 
the 
1985 
R228 
Act 102 of 1983). However, the four representatives of Moutse in 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly remained in office until 31 December 
when this representation was abolished (R.S.A.: Proclamation 
of 31 December 1985 ). On the 31 December 1985, Proclamation 
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R227 was issued by the South African government purporting to 
incorporate Moutse district into KwaNdebele, evidently against the 
wishes of the majority of Moutse inhabitants (Race Relations Survey, 
1985:284-286). 
The people of Moutse and their leaders had consistently voiced their 
opposition to incorporation into KwaNdebele and exhausted all politi-
cal and judicial avenues available to them to avoid such incorpora-
tion (Race Relations Survey, 1986:637). 
It was against this background that the Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
decided to respond to the incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele by 
convening a one-day special session, attended by 18 busloads of 
Moutse villagers (The Star, 17 January 1986). In its attempt to 
articulate the interests of the people of Moutse, the Legislative 
Assembly resolved that: 
(a) The decision by the South African Government to excise Moutse 
from Lebowa and to incorporate it into KwaNdebele be 
rejected; 
(b) the Legislative Assembly demand a referendum to establish the 
wishes of the people of Moutse; 
(c) the Commissioner-General of Lebowa be recalled until the 
Moutse issue had been satisfactorily settled; 
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(d) all public services for the people of Moutse must be provided 
for, that is: the issue of licenses, education services, 
health services, social and agricultural services, Law and 
Order services, justice and royal allowances including all 
subsidies intended for administration; 
(e) the police functions for Moutse be removed from the KwaNdebe-
le Government and revert to the South African Government; 
(f) Godfrey Mathebe, a Moutse representative in Lebowa Legisla-
tive Assembly, be charged or released from detention together 
with Induna Mathebe and youth leader Baroka. 
These demands were articulated and conveyed by the Legislative Assem-
bly through its Speaker to the central South African government. 
Agricultural co-operatives are another example of institutional inter-
est groups in Lebowa. In 1980 the Lebowa government initiated the 
establishment of agricultural co-operatives through the Lebowa 
Co-operatives Act, 1980 (Act 2 of 1980). The object of this Act was 
to provide for the establishment, registration, management and 
dissolution of agricultural co-operatives in Lebowa and matters 
connected therewith (Preamble). Agricultural co-operatives 
established under this Act were granted legal personality to enable 
them to perform legal acts intended for the attainment of their 
objectives, the exercise of their powers and the carrying out of 
their duties and functions (Sections 3 & 4.2). Members of these 
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agricultural co-operatives (mostly farmers) have a very strong 
influence on the Government through their management committees. An 
agricultural co-operative was established in most Tribal Authority 
areas in Lebowa while the Tribal Authorities were also involved in 
their establishment. Agricultural co-operatives are therefore an 
important institutional interest group in Lebowa. 
The Magoshi in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly also form a very sig-
nificant institutional interest group. Of the 96 seats in the Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly, 58 are constitutionally reserved for the desig-
nated Magoshi. Their numerical strength therefore places them in a 
strong position to bargain effectively and to articulate their inter-
ests (author's observation). 
The following incident illustrates this point. On 2 May 1984, the 
Chief Minister of Lebowa introduced the Royal Allowance Bill in the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly for discussion and approval. The main 
purpose of the Bill was to authorise the Lebowa Government to make 
provision for the payment of a monthly royal allowance to all Magoshi 
who are not members of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. The 
intention of the Government was to effect parity between the Magoshi 
serving as members of the Legislative Assembly and these not serving 
as members as the former are paid monthly salaries in terms of the 
Lebowa Payment and Privileges of Members of the Legislative Assembly 
Act, 1973 (Act 2 of 1973) (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim 
Report, volume 18, Part 1, 2 May 1984:53). 
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Nearly all Magoshi serving in the Legislative Assembly (except Cabi-
net members) opposed the Bill arguing that every Kgoshi should quali-
fy for that royal allowance, regardless of whether he or she is a 
member of the Legislative Assembly or not. During the debate they 
proved to be very powerful as a group in articulating their demands. 
Ultimately 
mind the 
the Minister of Economic Affairs and Planning had to re-
Magoshi serving as members of the Legislative Assembly that 
the Rules of Procedure state that a member who has a pecuniary inter-
est in any matter under discussion may not participate in a 
discussion of that matter (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim 
Report, volume 18, Part 1, 2 May 1984:56 - 57). This incident serves 
to illustrate the influence and the role of the Magoshi as an 
institutional interest group within the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. 
3.2.5 ASSOCIATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS 
Associational interest groups are specialised structures for interest 
articulation. 
manufacturers' 
associations, 
They include trade unions, chambers of commerce and 
associations, ethnic 
groups. 
associations, religious 
Associational groups and civic 
characteristically 
group, employ a 
represent 
full-time 
procedures for formulating 
1966:78). 
the expressed interests of a particular 
professional staff, and have orderly 
interests and demands (Almond & Powell 
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According to Almond and Powell (1988:70): 
studies revealed that associational interest groups, 
where they are allowed to flourish, affect the development of 
other types of groups. Their organizational base gives them 
an advantage over nonassociational groups; their tactics and 
goals are often recognized as legitimate in the society; and 
by representing a broad range of groups and interests, they 
may effectively limit the influence of anomic, nonassociatio-
nal, and institutional groups. 
In the Lebowa political system, associational interest groups have 
proven to be more successful than any other type of interest group. 
The following categories are indicative of some of the associational 
interest groups established in Lebowa: Chambers of commerce and indus-
try, trade unions, Civic associations, and Students' Organisations. 
3.2.5.1 CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
While there are splinter traders' organizations confined to small 
villages, tribes and proclaimed towns in Lebowa such as The Seshego 
Traders Association, Molautsi Perekisi Traders Association, and Matla-
la a thaba Traders Association, the Lebowa Chamber of Commerce 
(LEBCOC) is the umbrella body for businessmen in the entire territory 
of Lebowa. 
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LEBCOC is one of the associational interest groups dominating the 
scene in Lebowa. Its President usually serves as a full member of 
the board of directors of the Lebowa Development Corporation, which 
is the economic development arm of the Lebowa Government, in terms of 
the Lebowa Corporations Act, 1984 (Act 16 of 1984 (The Lebowa Develop-
ment Annual Report 1987:2). It is standard practice for the Lebowa 
Government to consult with the Chamber on any important legislation 
or issue affecting its members. The late Chief Minister of Lebowa 
Dr. C.N. Phatudi was even appointed as patron in chief of LEBCOC to 
enhance the chances of LEBCOC of securing direct access to the 
decision makers in the Lebowa Government. In his official opening 
address at the LEBCOC conference held at Mokopane on the 6 July 1985, 
Dr. Phatudi expressed his appreciation of the existing co-operation 
between his government and LEBCOC. He further congratulated LEBCOC 
for its continued struggle to improve the lot of Blacks along the 
difficult path of commercial and economic development. Finally, he 
pledged his government's support to LEBCOC projects including: the 
establishment of a branch of the African Bank in Pietersburg to serve 
the people of Lebowa, and the continuation of the already established 
Dr. A.M. Makunyane Scholarship fund for students in Lebowa. These 
utterances by the then head of the Lebowa Government demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the Lebowa Chamber of Commerce as an associational 
interest group. The articulation of its demands of the Lebowa 
Government is usually achieved through direct communication with 
Government Ministers or through the local press. 
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3.2.5.2 TRADE UNIONS 
The 1979 Wiehahn Report heralded a significant restructuring of 
labour relations in South Africa and the self-governing territories 
such as the Lebowa. Important changes involved the official recogni-
tion of trade union rights for Blacks and the abolition of job reser-
vation (Cooper 1983:104). There were 2 080 000 members in registered 
trade unions in 1988 and about 330 000 members in unregistered unions 
nationally. This represented about 42% of the workforce falling 
under the Labour Relations Act of 1956, or 22% of the economically 
active population in South Africa including the Black territories 
such as Lebowa (Race Relations Survey 1988/89:444). 
Several trade unions operate and perform the interest articulation 
function in the Lebowa political process. These include the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and its affiliates, the Natio-
nal Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) and its affiliates which includes 
the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (CCAWUSA) and its 
affiliates, and the Media Workers Association of South Africa (MWASA) 
and its affiliates. 
The following is an example of how trade unions are instrumental in 
interest articulation in Lebowa. 
On 3 July 1987 the Transport and Allied Workers Union (TAWU) repre-
sented its members - who were employees of the Lebowa Transport Compa-
ny and also citizens of Lebowa - at a meeting held in Seshego, then 
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the capital of Lebowa. Through its representative, TAWU articulated 
the following demands to the transport company stating that no one 
would return to work until these demands were met (Minutes of the 
meeting held at Seshego 3 July 1987): 
1. The unconditional reinstatement of 9 employees discharged 
from central workshops. 
2. Negotiations on a new main agreement with the Transport and 
Allied Workers Union must commence immediately. 
3. A commitment by the company to approach the Minister of Po-
lice and Justice to have all employees who were detained 
released. 
4. An undertaking 
against those 
guaranteed. 
that no disciplinary 
detained and that 
action would be taken 
their jobs would be 
The Lebowa Transport Company is a subsidiary of the Lebowa Develop-
ment Corporation, which is, in turn, owned and controlled by the 
Government of Lebowa (Race Relations Survey 1987/88:86; Minister of 
Home Affairs, Budget and Policy Speech, Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
1990). 
A week long strike by bus drivers of Lebowa Transport was staged in 
March 1990 arising from a dispute that started after employees of the 
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Company did not return to work on March 21 (Sharpeville Day) and a 
court case involving two former colleagues which took place during 
July 1987. All these workers were dismissed (Lebowa Times, 
30.03.1990:3). According to a press release, the Transport and 
Allied Workers Union (TAWU) "confronted the Lebowa Transport 
Management with ten non work related demands as well as unfounded 
accusations of police action" (Lebowa Times, 30.03.1990:3). 
From the above exposition it can be concluded that trade unions do 
play a significant role in the interest articulation function in the 
Lebowa political process. However, the Lebowa Government's attitude 
toward trade unionists is not always conducive to the promotion of 
healthy relations between the Government authorities and the trade 
unions. As a result, demands are not always freely articulated by 
the unions. 
Two incidents which illustrate this state of affairs are described 
below. In June 1988 an inquest magistrate in Potgietersrus (Northern 
Transvaal) ruled that ten Lebowa policemen were responsible for the 
death in detention of a journalist and an active member of the Media 
Workers' Association of South Africa (MWASA), Mr. Lucky Kutumela who 
was killed in April 1986 (Race Relations Survey, 1987/88:632). 
Delegates 
unionism 
Transport 
attending 
from Lebowa Transport also reported alleged opposition to 
by the Lebowa administration: "The general secretary of the 
and General Worker's Union (TGWU) claimed that ten members 
a union seminar in Phalaborwa (North western Transvaal) had 
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been assaulted by the Lebowa Police and many had been detained in 
1986" (Race Relations Survey, 1987/88:635). 
3.2.5.3 CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS 
There are many civic associations performing interest articulation 
functions in the Lebowa political process. In nearly all the pro-
claimed towns in Lebowa, a civic association has been established by 
the residents. These include the Seshego Civic Association, Mankweng 
Civic Association, Mahwelereng Civic Association, Lebowakgomo Civic 
Association and many others. 
The civic associations were, on the whole, established by the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) in pursuance of its policy of making apartheid 
unworkable and of rendering the country ungovernable. The civic asso-
ciations serve as alternative informal structures to township coun-
cils, the councillors of 
tions ranged from crime 
regarding the illegitimacy 
political struggle. They 
which were forced to resign. Their func-
control to the politicisation of residents 
of local authorities and the broader 
did, however, recognise the need for the 
execution of various administrative tasks such as refuse collection 
(Johnson 1988: 183-186). 
In March 1990 the Lebowakgomo Civic Association (LCA) successfully 
organised an indefinite stay-away by Lebowa civil servants and schol-
ars to pressurise the Lebowa Government to meet their demand for the 
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supply of books to all schools in Lebowa, the building of more 
classrooms and the employment of more teachers (Lebowa Times, 
30.03.1990:3). The stay away by civil servants was suspended after 
nine days. An LCA spokesman said: "None of the demands have been 
met. The stay away was called off merely to co-ordinate the whole 
matter in order to affect the whole Lebow a homeland'' (Lebowa Times, 
30.03.1990:3). 
As a result of these actions, ten people including six civic associa-
tion leaders were detained. During a protest march demanding the 
release of those arrested, other civic leaders were detained while 
the first group was released (Lebowa Times, 30.03.90:3). This demon-
strates the Lebowa Government's negative attitude towards the peace-
ful efforts of civic associations to freely articulate the demands of 
their members in Lebowa. 
3.2.5.4 STUDENT ORGANISATIONS 
Student organisations are generally very active in articulating inter-
ests or demands on behalf of students in Lebowa. The South African 
Students Organisation (SASO) (not in operation any more because of 
its banning in 1977), the Students Representative Councils (SRC's), 
the Students Christian Movement (SCM), the South African National 
Students Congress (SANSCO), the Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS) and others are operated effectively in this regard. For pur-
poses of this chapter, the role of the Students Representative Coun-
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cil (SRC) at the University of the North in the interest articulation 
function will be briefly discussed. 
3.2.5.4.1 THE SRC AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE NORTH 
The SRC proved to be an important and effective mouthpiece in articu-
lating the interests and demands of students. In April 1972, Mr. 
O.R. Tiro, President of the SRC and representing the students, made a 
speech after the annual graduation ceremony, in which he sharply 
attackee laws and the local government meets the obligations set by 
its basis of legitimacy. These bases of legitimacy set the rules for 
a kind of exchange in respect of inputs (articulated interests) and 
outputs (rule-making) between tribesmen and Tribal Authorities in 
Lebowa. In this way, the beliefs and attitudes of tribesmen 
influence the interest articulation process (author's observations). 
The legitimacy of the Central Government, that is the Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly, 
reapply for selective 
as reflected by the attitudes ompelled to 
readmission individually on the understanding 
that the SRC committee members including Mr. Tiro would be denied 
The unrest continued and eventually led to the election 
SRC in September 1973 with a revised constitution as 
admission. 
of a new 
insisted upon by the University Council. 
Mr. Tiro departed the University and after teaching for a while in 
Soweto, he made his way to Botswana where he was killed on 1 February 
1974 under mysterious circumstances in a parcel bomb explosion. A 
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memorial service attended by almost all students and black staff 
members was held for him on 17 February 1974 at the University 
(Wolfson 1976:16). 
This 
of 
sequence 
the leaders 
of events which culminated in the loss of life by some 
of the SRC at the University of the North serves to 
illustrate the negative attitude adopted by the authorities towards 
the SRC in its role of performing the interest articulation function. 
In another instance, the SRC organised students into a three day 
boycott of lectures on 9 April 1986 after a peaceful demonstration to 
mourn the death of a fellow student, Miss Josephine Mashobane, was 
broken up by the Lebowa Police who allegedly shot and wounded two 
students and injured several others with sjamboks (Sowetan, 10 April, 
1986). After students had resumed classes for only three days, anoth-
er boycott was staged which lasted for about three weeks to protest 
against the death in detention of Mr. Peter Nchabeleng, president of 
the Northern Transvaal region of the United Democratic Front (Race 
Relations Survey, Part 2, 1986:475). 
During the University holiday in July 1986, the University authori-
ties and the SRC met the Minister of Law and Order in the South Afri-
can government, Mr. 
students in terms 
University reopened 
cott lectures for 
students. 
Louis Le Grange, to discuss the detention of 
of the state of emergency regulations. When the 
on the 21 June 1986, students continued to boy-
four days to demand the release of detained 
91 
Ultimately, the Lebowa Police, the South African Police and the South 
African Defence Force were brought in to patrol the campus at the 
beginning of September 1986 (Race Relations Survey, Part 2, 1986: 
475). The campus was patrolled on a 24-hour basis by the security 
forces, and anyone entering the campus had to produce proof of their 
identity (The Star, 5 March 1987). At the beginning of April 1987 
the University campus was closed after students began to boycott 
lectures to protest against the presence of security forces. The 
campus was reopened on 21 April 1987 for the second semester (The 
Star, 22 April 1987), but at the end of the 1987 academic year, the 
security forces were still present on the University campus (The 
Sunday Star, 8 November 1987). In short, the government of Lebowa 
responded with pressure to the pressure exerted from below by the 
SRC. Inputs do not convert easily into outputs in circumstances such 
as these. It would appear that the SRC at the University of the 
North was considered to be guilty until proved innocent in the course 
of these events. 
In March 1988 the students at the University of the North again 
staged a protest march singing freedom songs against the University 
authorities. The ever present University controllers tried to block 
the marchers. The male students retreated at their hostels and a 
"calm but tense" atmosphere prevailed. According to students, the 
trouble stemmed from the poor quality, cost and state of the food 
dispensed by the catering company at the University. The students 
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alleged that the food was either stale or rotten (Sowetan, 28.03. 
1988:6). 
As a result, 80 per cent of the students were not eating at the Uni-
dining hall but instead preparing their own food in the versity 
hostels. The University was obliged, in terms of the contract 
entered into with students at registration, to refund to the students 
the cost of meals not taken in the dining hall. The students 
continued to use their hot plates for cooking in the hostels. 
Ultimately, the University closed the hostels because they were being 
"abused to disrupt academic programmes" (Sowetan, 28.03.88:6). 
The University further stated in a circular that "the patience and 
flexibility of the University's authorities are being tested to the 
extreme on fictitious issues. This is unacceptable" (Sowetan, 
28.03.88:6). This was the University's response to the manner in 
which students chose to articulate their demands. 
In conclusion, it could be said that, although there are many associa-
tional 
limited, 
dictates 
interests groups 
especially at 
in 
the 
Lebowa, their influence and autonomy is 
tribal level where traditional culture 
once made 
channels of communication. This is in line with the remark 
by Prof. F.D. Holleman (1952:106) that the absence of free 
and unrestricted associational interest groups in tribal areas is 
noticeable. 
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This view is also confirmed by Kotze as follows: "For most tribesmen 
the formation of interest groups and voluntary associations was thus 
rendered unnecessary and superfluous" (Kotze 1968:205). Taking into 
consideration the fact that, in all but one of the districts in 
Lebowa, 75 to 92 percent of the population falls within the rural 
sector (Tribal areas), the effectiveness of associational interest 
groups is, by implication, limited in Lebowa. This tendency by 
tribesmen is observable in all rural areas in which the political 
culture is still of a parochial and subject nature (Department of 
Agriculture, Annual Report, 1981 to 1982:3). 
Having discussed the structures performing the function of interest 
articulation in the Lebowa political system, it is equally noted that 
these structures are not fully identified by merely designating the 
various kinds of interest groups. It is therefore necessary to exam-
ine and determine the extent to which these groups may succeed or 
fail to penetrate the political decision making structure. The ques-
tion of the process of interest articulation shall now be discussed. 
3.3 ACCESS CHANNELS AND MEANS OF ACCESS 
"The nature 
given society 
effectiveness 
of the access channels for interest articulation in a 
are of great importance in determining the range and 
of group demands" (Almond & Powell 1966:81). Because 
the question of channels and 
with political communication, 
means of access is largely connected 
some of the more detailed aspects of 
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these channels and means of access will be considered later in the 
discussion of the communication function. Only some of the most 
important general classes of access channels will be dealt with here 
(Almond & Powell 1966:81). 
3.3.1 PHYSICAL DEMONSTRATIONS AND VIOLENCE 
This section illustrates the activities of anomic interest groups in 
Lebowa and should be seen against the background of section 3.2.2 of 
this chapter. In their latest book: Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View (1988), Almond and Powell discuss physical demonstrations 
separately from violence. They maintain that protests, demonstra-
tions, strikes, and other forms of non-violent, but dramatic and 
direct pressure on government are ways of interest articulation that 
may be legitimate or illegitimate, depending on the political systems 
and the actions of the demonstrators. The two authors further 
observe that the use of peaceful protest is more frequent in 
democratic systems than in non-democratic ones (Almond & Powell 
1988:73). 
They consider both violence and coercion as remaining possibilities 
for individuals and groups who feel that they are otherwise power-
less. Such demonstrations 
taneous actions of anomic 
resort to an unconventional 
Powell 1988:74). 
or violent actions may be either spon-
groups or, more frequently, an organized 
channel by organized groups (Almond & 
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Acts of protest and collective violence are seen by most of the schol-
ars who have written on the subject as closely linked to, and associ-
ated with, the character of a society and the circumstances that 
prevail 
lence 
within it. Theoretically, people will usually resort to vio-
if they believe it to be justified and potentially successful. 
Their propensity for violence increases if they believe their govern-
ment to be illegitimate and the sole cause of their discontent 
(Almond & Powell 1988:75). 
To determine the extent to which physical demonstrations and violence 
are resorted to as channels of access to the decision making bodies 
in the Lebowa political system, some of the incidents which actually 
occurred in Lebowa will be examined and discussed. 
3.3.1.1 THE 1974 STUDENT UNREST AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE NORTH 
Whereas there had previously been signs of student dissatisfaction 
and opposition to government policies and actions of the University 
administration at the University of the North, the events of 25 
September 1974, when a rally was held to celebrate the success of 
Frelimo in Mocambique by students in spite of a banning order, 
resulted in a conflict situation between the police and the students 
which necessitated the appointment of a one man judicial Commission 
of Enquiry (known as the Snyman Commission) (Government Gazette 4481, 
Notice 2051, 1 November 1974). 
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3.3.1.1.1 SYNOPSIS OF THE EVENTS BEFORE THE 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 
An announcement was made by Muntu Myeza, the Secretary General of the 
South African Students Organisation (SASO), on 22 September 1974 in 
Durban, that celebrations would be arranged throughout the country 
(Lebowa included) in honour of, as the Commission put it, "the 
so-called successes of Frelimo in Mocambique". It was further stated 
that Frelimo leaders would be smuggled into the country as speakers 
(Wolfson 1976:26). The celebrations at the University of the North 
were scheduled for 25 September 1974. 
The statement announcing the planned celebrations, which was given 
wide publicity in the press, contained a clear message of defiance of 
the authorities in South Africa with the obvious intention of whip-
ping up the feelings of the nation, Black and White, and of creating 
a climate of confrontation. To prevent this threatening disturbance 
of the public peace, the South African Minister of Justice, by virtue 
of the powers vested in him by Section 2 (3) (b) of the Riotous Assem-
blies Act, 1956, (Act 17 of 1956), prohibited any gatherings 
"convened, supported or approved, or the attendance of which is en-
couraged or promoted, or in respect of which it is intimated or pro-
fessed that it is convened, supported or promoted, by or on behalf of 
the South African Students' Organisation or the Black People's 
Convention", anywhere in the Republic (including Lebowa), up to and 
including 20 October 1974 (Government Native 1769 Of 25 September 
1974). 
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In addition to the above mentioned Government Notice by the Minister 
of Justice, press releases and radio news programmes confirmed the 
prohibition of the gatherings. "In spite of the banning order 
imposed on pro-Frelimo rallies in the country as a whole, the 
students at the University of the North insisted on their right to 
hold such a rally" (Nkondo 1976:7-8). 
3.3.1.1.2 EVENTS ON THE CAMPUS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE NORTH ON 25 
SEPTEMBER 1974 
Liberation 
campus, on 
windows and 
Annexure I 
slogans 
posters 
walls 
of the 
were placed on the road near the entrance to the 
placed on almost all campus buildings, and on 
on the campus (Snyman Report, paragraph 6.3.1.). 
Report lists 31 slogans which were placed on the 
campus. Among them were the following: 
"The dignity of the Black man has been restored in Mocambique 
and so shall it be here". 
"Frelimo fought and regained our soil, our dignity. It is a 
story. Change the name and the story applies to you". 
"Down with Vorster! Up with Samora Machel !!!". 
These slogans were used as instruments to articulate their demands 
not only as students, but also as part of the Black population. 
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On 25 September 1974 at about 14h20, after it was confirmed that the 
students 
campus 
were proceeding 
and arrived at 
with the rally, the police moved onto the 
the hall where the meeting was taking place 
armed with rubber batons, service revolvers, gas pistols, and police 
dogs (Snyman Report paragraph 6.3.11). 
Students were then informed by a police officer by means of a mega-
phone that the rally was unlawful and ordered to disperse within 15 
minutes. According to the Report (6.3.15), the result was 
"pandemonium", with shouting, yelling, bottle and stone throwing at 
the police by the students. Rubber batons were used and tear gas 
cartridges were fired by the police against the students. 
The Rector of the University, after-having been invited to the scene, 
negotiated with the Students Representative Council and the police. 
The latter undertook to withdraw on condition that the students 
dispersed. This was agreed to by the student leaders and the police 
left the campus after releasing two students who had been arrested. 
The students, however, did not disperse, and instead stones were 
thrown at the rector (Snyman Report paragraph 6.3.21). 
The Report further states that, during that confusion, two White 
members of the University staff arrived separately and unwittingly at 
the campus. Their way was blocked by students who damaged both cars 
and injured one of the men (Snyman Report paragraphs 6.3.22 & 
6.3.23). Two White technicians in another car were also attacked. 
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Their car was badly damaged and one man received facial injuries 
which resulted in permanent disfigurement (Snyman Report paragraph 
6.3.25). 
3.3.1.1.3 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE VIOLENT ACTIONS ON 
THE CAMPUS ACCORDING TO THE SNYMAN REPORT 
The causes of the unrest of 25 September 1974 were not simply as-
cribed to allegations that the students were undisciplined, or that 
the Black Academic Staff Association of the University of the North 
was irresponsible, or that the University lacked firmness. The prob-
lem was held to be immensely more complex, originating from the rela-
tionship between White and Black outside the university. It was felt 
to be directly connected to the statutory and traditional restric-
tions imposed on Blacks mainly in the interest of Whites and the 
often unpleasant experiences. Blacks have been in encounters with 
many Whites in public places, which encounters impair their dignity. 
All this contributed towards the unpleasant repercussions on the 
campus (Snyman Report paragraphs 7.5.1, 7.5.2, & 7.5.3). 
3.3.1.1.4 GENERAL COMMENT 
The 1974 rallies at the University of the North by students were 
instrumental in interest articulation because this promoted an atmos-
phere in which the authorities were compelled to give a hearing to 
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the demands of the students. The students were not confined to their 
interests as students, but they also articulated some demands on 
behalf of the Black community in general. As indicated above, they 
utilised instruments such as violence, boycotts, marches and peti-
tions to articulate interests. 
During these rallies two petitions were successfully handed over by 
the students to the police on 15 October 1974, and a letter accompa-
nied by a petition was also handed over by the students to the Rector 
on 17 October 1974 (Wolfson 1986:64-68). The contents of both the 
petitions submitted to the police and a letter accompanied by a peti-
tion handed to the rector by the SRC reflected and summarised the 
interests of the students and read as follows: 
3.3.1.1.5 THE FIRST PETITION TO THE POLICE 
1. Regarding the arbitrary and harassments that the police in 
South Africa are perpetrating against Black students and 
other individuals for holding meetings and legitimate rallies 
in the past months and before, we, the students of the Univer-
sity of the North wish to point out: 
(a) That such violent acts only continue to aggravate the 
already fostered (sic) racial tensions in the country; 
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(b) That other thorny political and even social problems that 
beset this country cannot be solved by police action and 
reactionary clamp downs but by peaceful negotiations and 
reforms with regard to certain laws; 
(c) That these laws, for example the Riotous Assemblies Act, 
Suppression of Communism Act, Terrorist Act and Sabotage 
Act, give the police unlimited powers that make them not 
protectors of the people but their oppressors; and 
(d) That the dignity of a single human life must be held up 
and respected at all times. 
Therefore, in view of the immutable truths above and with the 
expectation that the Minister of Police and Justice would 
respectably administer Law and Justice; We, the students of the 
University of the North, humbly submit their (sic) petition which 
demands the Police Authorities: 
1. to disclose the whereabouts of our President, Mr. G.K. 
Sedibe; 
2. to disclose the nature of the charge laid against him; 
3. to release Mr. G.K. Sedibe as he is in fact, innocent. 
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And we further note: 
1. That according to Colonel Muller's information Mr. Sedibe 
has been detained or arrested in his official capacity as 
President of the SRC, the logical consequence of which is 
that the entire student body is equally guilty if at all 
he is guilty. 
2. That as a necessary corollary therefore it is anomalous 
that the student body should be free when he is detained" 
(The First Petition to the Police, 15 October 1974). 
3.3.1.1.6 THE SECOND PETITION TO THE POLICE 
On 15 October 1974 an extra mass meeting was summoned to inform 
the student body about the detention of the President. After 
deliberation on the issue the resolution was adopted as such. 
Having sat down, deliberated, considered the implications of the 
arrest of our President for his participation in the events of 
Wednesday 25th September, this student body observes: 
1. As Black people, our existence is a pain in the neck of the 
government; 
2. That incidents of cruelty on the Blacks as a result of voic-
ing out their ideals and emotions is very common; 
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3. That the government of South Africa has systematically 
brought into existence many laws that totally exclude the 
Blacks from the country (sic) affairs with the result that as 
Blacks we feel we are foreigners in the land of our birth; 
4. That the government has been responding to the pleas of the 
Blacks with violence; this response is bound to cause counter 
violence; 
5. In conclusion, we further observe that the government has not 
taken pains to try to understand the Blacks as a section of 
the population with the result that Racial hostilities have 
been unduly heightened. 
Thus we therefore resolve: 
1. To register our bitterest dislike of the mass arrest and 
detentions that have arisen as a consequence of a pro-Frelimo 
rally. 
2. To condemn the autocratic and tyrannical actions of the po-
lice and therefore 
3. To demand the release summarily of our president in the form 
of a petition which we shall accompany to the Mankwang Police 
Station. 
104 
4. To inform the police categorically that we are under no illu-
sions about the stand we are taking and are fully aware of 
the violent measures that will be taken against us. 
5. That we assemble in the cinema hall at 7.30 a.m. and move to 
Mankoeng Police Station at 8 a.m. 
6. That the Lieutenant of the said Police Station be informed to 
take the petition and resolution to the Pietersburg Police 
Station and report to us at 11.30 a.m. on the same day, fail-
ing which we come back for a sit in, which will continue 
until such time that the SRC President is released". 
(The Second Petition to the Police, dated 15 October 1974). 
3.3.1.1.7 THE LETTER HANDED TO THE RECTOR 
1. The Black 
point out 
with regard 
students of the University of the North wishes to 
the various observations made by them especially 
to the unrest on the campus for the past months 
and years, and these are: 
(i) the realisation that the collaboration of the Rector 
with the Police as regards the harassment and arrest 
of students like Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa, Phandelane 
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Nefolovhodwe, K.G. Sedibe and other is not going 
unobserved; 
(ii) the University is not in a state of peaceful co-
existence and co-operation primarily because of the 
mistrust, hate, intimidation and oppression existing 
between the Admin, Rectorate, Council, staff and the 
student body and that as a necessary corollary and 
development of this situation we can only envisage 
greater evils and problems. 
We (student body) wish to make the following categorical state-
ments namely: 
(i) that there is a great need to put the situation 
right in this university; 
(ii) that it would be intensely selfish and blind of this 
student body to be satisfied with everything as it 
is in this campus and the country at large; 
(iii) and finally that everything is pointing to an impend-
ing disaster throughout the Black Universities and 
in the country. 
We further wish it to 
this University intends 
be known that the Black student body of 
putting things right regardless of the 
106 
difficulties in view or the hurdles that some conservative per-
sons continue to place in our way towards good, and justice and 
our grievances are the following: 
(i) that the idea of Africanisation of this University 
be sped up in all areas where we the Black students 
feel some Whites are continuing to stifle the 
progress of the Black people academically; 
(ii) that the need to appoint a Black Rector who shall be 
better able to attend to our difficulties and prob-
lems as Black students cannot be overemphasised even 
at this stage; 
(iii) that we be given academic freedom in all its rele-
vant spheres namely: 
(a) freedom to appoint students in the main policy 
making bodies of this university; 
(b) that portfolios such as those held by the stu-
dent's Dean and Hostel Superintendent, be held 
by persons best competent to hold them; 
(c) that students have representation in the commit-
tees responsible for the appointment of both 
lecturing and administrative staff. A body of 
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responsible 
appointed 
people, preferably our parents be 
in consultation with the students to 
seriously investigate the manning of important 
posts in the university by Black people. The 
aim in view will be to facilitate the process of 
Africanisation and to make it as complete as 
possible; 
(d) that students be allowed to hold meetings, 
rallies, etc., freely at any given notice 
without the intimidation and harassment of the 
Police and the Rectorate; 
(e) that the SRC be allowed to release press state-
ments without the sanction of the Rector; 
(f) that the Rector of the University not belong to 
any political body that is not representative of 
Black people, nor should any lecturer, White or 
Black, lecture or work in this University with 
the idea to infiltrate the ranks of the student 
body with their own personal beliefs; 
(g) that the system of communication and dialogue 
between the council, the Rector, staff, 
administration, and student body is in dire need 
for reassessment and correction since the Rector 
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3.3.1.1.8 
and other persons are in the habit of not pre-
senting a true reflection of each and every 
situation in the campus; 
(h) that the accepted system of communication be 
observed at all times by all parties involved; 
(i) that the present Rector and other Rectors still 
to come should always be personally in contact 
with the student body by way of constant address-
es and meetings (Letter to the Rector by the 
Students Representative Council, University of 
the North, 17 October 1974). 
THE PETITION WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE LETTER TO THE RECTOR 
That this student body realising with utter disgust and dissatis-
faction the said diplomatic action of the Rector in selling our 
rightful leaders to the system and after the uttering uncalled 
for and unwarranted irresponsible statements both to the press 
and the student body that he is not aware of current harassment 
of our leaders by his seniors, that is, the system, we, the 
students of this University therefore resolve: 
1. That the fallacy is now revealed that the Rectorate, the 
Admin. and the White academic staff are nothing less than 
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academic Policemen and there is no security so long as those 
Policemen are still in this campus. 
2. That the lectures and all academic activities be boycotted 
until Mr. Ramaphosa, Mr. Sedibe and Mr. Nefolovhodwe are 
unconditionally released and also until such time that the 
"White" ruling party in this University is dethroned. 
3. That it be in the power of the administration only to call 
for police intervention where necessary and to answerable for 
such action when they are taken to task. 
4. That lectures and academic activities shall not be resumed 
until all our needs are met and grievances are redressed. 
5. That there shall be a sit in which will last until the re-
lease of the above said detainees. 
6. That the memorandum containing our grievances be drawn and be 
sent to the administration (Petition to the Rector, 17 Octo-
ber 1974). 
It is evident from the demands contained in these letters and peti-
tions to the Police and the University authorities that the 1974 
rallies at the University of the North were instrumental in articulat-
ing the interests of students, not only as students, but also as 
citizens of both Lebowa and South Africa. The activities of the SRC 
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of the University of the North, especially during the period 1986 to 
1989, is briefly discussed in section 3.2.5.4.1 above. 
3.3.1.2 UNREST IN LEBOWA DURING THE PERIOD 1985 TO 1987 
This section is closely related to, and should be viewed as being 
complementary to sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.1 dealing with anomic inter-
est groups in Lebowa, and physical demonstrations and violent activi-
ties respectively. 
Serious unrest occurred in Lebowa during the period under review. 
This necessitated a special meeting of all members of the Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly and the traditional Chiefs (Magoshi) in Septem-
ber 1985 to discuss the unrest in.Lebowa. They decided, inter alia, 
to call in the South African Defence Force (SADF) to help maintain 
law and order in the region. The Cabinet was also given a mandate to 
forbid civil servants from belonging to those radical organisations 
which opposed the Lebowa Government (Race Relations Survey, 1985: 
293). 
It was further suggested to, and approved by, the meeting that board-
ing facilities at most high schools be closed, to exclude as many 
pupils from urban areas as possible from Lebowa schools in an attempt 
to curb unrest (Financial Mail, 21 March 1986). 
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After March 1986, unrest occurred in several districts in Lebowa, 
including Lebowakgomo, Mahwelereng, Namakgale, and Seshego. Youths 
reportedly waging a concerted intimidation campaign against "colla-
borators", caused widespread damage. By early April 1986, more than 
12 people had died in unrest related incidents (The Star, 10 April 
1986). 
At the beginning of March 1986 students attacked the Chief Minister 
of Lebowa, Dr. C.N. Phatudi, who was traveling in his official car in 
Seshego. He took refuge at a nearby garage (Race Relations Survey 
1986:660). During mid-April of that year, the Mahwelereng home of 
Lebowa's Minister of Education, Mr. S.P. Kwakwa, was destroyed in a 
petrol bomb attack. Attacks were also launched against the education 
circuit office and some villages near Lebowakgomo. Two Lebowa Trans-
port buses were burnt in the Tafelkop district (The Citizen, 12 April 
1986 & The Star, 15 April 1986). 
In January 
the United 
1986, the Sekhukhuneland Youth Congress was formed after 
Democratic Front (UDF) in the Northern Transvaal had de-
clared that a state of civil war had existed for two months between 
the security forces and the people of Sekhukhuneland. The Youth Con-
gress demanded equal and free education and an end to White rule. 
They further demanded that the members of the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly from the Sekhukhuneland constituency resign and that the 
people suspected of practising witchcraft be executed (Race Relations 
Survey, 1986:663-664). 
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In their endeavour to articulate not only their interests and demands 
as the Youth, but also as members of villages, they resorted to vio-
lence which ultimately resulted in many deaths. It is against this 
background that the following description of the killings should be 
seen. 
The Race Relations Survey (1986:663) reports that, during April 1986, 
32 partly decomposed, necklaced bodies were discovered in shallow 
graves, dongas, and bushes in the Sekhukhuneland villages of GaNchabe-
leng and GaNkoane. The dead were allegedly victims of a campaign to 
eliminate those who were suspected of cooperating with the Govern-
ment, or of being perpetrators of witchcraft. The victims were of 
all ages. A further 4 charred bodies were found on 16 April 1986 at 
GaNkoane. By 11 May 1986 a total of 43 bodies had been found (three 
bodies of women had been found trapped in a burnt house at Maifela). 
One man described how he had watched as a group of youths singing 
freedom songs had burnt his wife to death. 
Many youths were arrested by the police and about 300 of them were 
charged with murder as a result of these incidents. 
The containment and management of this type of violent action was 
completely beyond the capabilities of Lebowa Government. Lebowa only 
became less turbulent after the declaration of the National State of 
Emergency by the State President of South Africa on 12 June 1986. 
The State President justified his actions as follows (Bureau For 
Information 1987:3): 
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The occurrence and increase of violence as perpetrated by 
persons and organisations, is in itself in my opinion of such 
a nature and extent that it seriously endangers the security 
of the public and the maintenance of public order. Because I 
am thus of the opinion that the ordinary laws of the land are 
inadequate 
the public 
declare a 
to enable the Government to ensure the security of 
and to maintain public order. I have decided to 
National State of Emergency, including the 
self-governing national states. 
According to the Bureau For Information (1987:8), there was a marked 
decline in unrest related incidents after the introduction of the 
State of Emergency. 
The purpose of citing these two examples, the 1974 students unrest at 
the University of the North, and the unrest in Lebowa, was to demon-
strate the extent to which violent action is resorted to as one obvi-
ous means of articulating demands in the Lebowa political process. 
The 1974 students violent action induced the Government to appoint a 
Commission of Inquiry which presented positive recommendations accom-
modating some of the reasonable demands of the students. Mention was 
made of specific events which occurred during and statistics which 
arose from the 1985/87 unrest in Lebowa to highlight the violent 
attitude adopted by some of the organisations and people in their 
attempt to articulate their interests and demands. Youth organisa~ 
tions played a significant role in most of these events. 
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The most strident and general demands were directed against the poli-
cy of Apartheid, the Bantustan structures, and all the people who 
were thought to have collaborated with the so-called Apartheid 
regime. 
organised 
eradication 
The 
them, 
of 
interest served by these mass killings to these who 
was the attainment of their political objective: the 
apartheid and its structures. The declaration of the 
State of Emergency by the State President can also be seen as a form 
of counter interest articulation by other political organisations 
(ISIZWE, The Nation, Journal of the United Democratic Front, volume 
1, number 1 November 1985:4-18). 
The views of the UDF on the State of Emergency were stated as follows 
(ISIZWE, The Nation, Journal of UDF, volume 1, No.1, November 
1985:9): 
The broad aim of the emergency was to reverse the gains made 
by the democratic movement over the last 18 months, to resus-
citate discredited leaders and to recreate the space for 
puppet solutions and structures. The regime realises that 
only by crushing the uprising and the people's organisations 
can it hope to win a measure of consent and collaboration in 
the revival of apartheid structures. 
Nearly all the Youth Organisations in the Sekhukhuneland district of 
Lebowa, were affiliate members of the UDF in the Northern Transvaal. 
These included Leolo Youth Organisation, Magnet Heights Youth 
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Organisations, Jane Furse Youth Organisation, Mohlaletse Youth 
Organisation, and Nchabeleng Youth Organisation. 
Although the reaction of the Government to the unrest situation in 
Lebowa during 1985 and 1986 was rather negative, the fact remains 
that the articulated demands did attract the Government's attention. 
3.3.2 PERSONAL CONNECTIONS 
One important means of access to political elites is through personal 
connections, 
An excellent 
elite based 
the colleges 
1988:71). 
the use of family, school, local, or other social ties. 
example is the information network among the British 
on old school ties originating at Eton or Harrow or in 
at Oxford or Cambridge universities (Almond & Powell 
These types of contact are commonly used by nonassociational groups 
in Lebowa as indicated in Section 3.2.3 above. 
As shown, personal connections as means of access to political elites 
also play an important role in the Lebowa political system. Through 
personal contacts with the Chief Minister or any of the Cabinet 
Ministers, the traditional Chiefs (Magoshi) usually bargain success-
fully for governmental grants and services for their tribes. They 
consider this personal connection approach to be more effective and 
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convenient than having to formally articulate the demands of their 
tribes through the offices of the district magistrates. 
Members of the public in Lebowa also have personal connections with 
their representatives in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly which pro-
vides the public with a most convenient opportunity to articulate 
their demands (author's observation). 
3.3.3 ELITE REPRESENTATION 
This form of representation consists of direct representation in the 
rule-making structure of an interest group by a group memt.~r or a 
sympathetic representative who is an independent elite figure. Elite 
representation may also serve as a channel for interest groups which 
have no other means of articulation (Almond & Powell 1966:83-84). 
Most of the 38 elected members of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly are 
businessmen who are also members of the Lebowa Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (LEBCOC). The interest of LEBCOC is, therefore, well 
represented and protected by its members in the Legislative Assembly 
(but not at the expense of the voters in general). 
This is also the case with teachers. During the discussions of the 
Policy and Budget speech of the Minister of Education in the Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly on 10 May 1985, a Member of the Assembly from 
the Seshego constituency, Mr. I.K. Moloko, who is a teacher by 
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profession, proved beyond doubt to be a representative of the inter-
ests of teachers. 
Regarding the alleged inefficiency of teachers mentioned by some of 
the members, Mr. Moloko commented as follows (Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly Verbatim Report, volume 19, Part 1, 10 May 1985:227): 
Much has been said about the inefficiency of teachers. In 
other 
of our 
their 
words, we must find a solution to curb the inefficiency 
teachers. First of all, our teachers should improve 
qualifications. They are accommodated in ramshackled 
small houses where they stay with their families. How do you 
expect them to produce good work under such conditions? I do 
not think you can expect a well cooked porridge from a dirty 
pot. For good results proper methods must be applied. We 
are pointing one finger at our teachers while three other 
fingers are pointing at us the accusers. 
Mr. Chairman, please understand me I am speaking from experi-
ence as a teacher. I am here on behalf of teachers. 
About the unfair transfer of teachers, Mr. Moloko further said: 
There is 
Education. 
a lot of discontent about the Department of 
It won't help us to praise the Minister when we 
see mistakes in his Department. 
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Somewhere the Minister speaks about teachers resisting 
transfers. I don't believe that a teacher who has been given 
good and valid reasons for his transfer can resist transfer. 
Most of the transfers are unfair. A teacher is told to 
report at the next school which is some hundred kilometres 
away through a telegram. The regulations put it here clearly 
that when the department transfers a teacher, it should be at 
its own expense to transfer a teacher to another place. 
From this it ought to be evident that elite representation is an 
extremely effective channel of access to the political authorities in 
Lebowa. 
3.3.4 FORMAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANNELS OF ACCESS 
There are numerous formal and institutional channels of access in a 
modern political system. They include the mass media, political 
parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, and Cabinets. These groups are 
formal and have other political and social functions in addition to 
interest articulation (Almond & Powell 1988:70). 
3.3.4.1 THE MASS MEDIA 
While the mass media, including television, radio, and newspapers, 
play an important role as channels of access to convey political 
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demands to decision makers in Lebowa, its effectiveness is reduced by 
the existing censorship regulations, security legislation, and the 
State of Emergency which ended in June 1990. All these restrictive 
measures were initiated by the South African Government, and not the 
Lebowa Government. 
Television has a limited effect in Lebowa. Only a few citizens of 
Lebowa can afford the high cost of television sets. In most of the 
rural areas in Lebowa there is still no supply of electricity servic-
es which further impedes the installation of television sets. Most 
of the citizens residing in proclaimed towns in Lebowa do, however, 
own television sets. Through different programmes and news bulletins 
in Northern Sotho and other Black languages, television plays a 
limited role as a channel of access to political decision makers in 
Lebowa in the articulation of political demands. 
With the expansion of transistor radio broadcasts and the spread of 
radios in the 1960's, most areas in South Africa (including Lebowa) 
came within the reach of broadcast media. Transistors radios are 
sufficiently cheap so that even in rural communities in Lebowa most 
people can afford them. The influence of radio is significant 
because of the diversity of sources of information it gives access 
to. Although the South African Broadcasting Corporation, even 
through Radio Lebowa, does not provide detailed coverage of domestic 
events in Lebowa, use of the radio to convey political demands serves 
as a major channel of access to decision makers. 
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However, it should be mentioned that both the radio and the televi-
sion in 
that it 
In this 
Lebowa are state-sponsored and state-controlled, which means 
cannot function as the mouthpiece of any oppositional group. 
respect, the scope of interest articulation is fairly 
limited. The situation is not necessarily the same with regard to 
the printed media or press (author's observation). 
The press plays an important role as an access channel to decision 
makers with regard to interest articulation in the Lebowa political 
process. With the onset of crisis in South Africa (including Lebowa) 
in 1984, and especially with the application of emergency regulations 
in 1986, the boundaries of freedom of the press were sharply 
reduced. These restrictions limited the effectiveness of press as an 
access channel. 
What is more, newspapers in Lebowa circulate mainly in the major 
proclaimed towns and their immediate surroundings. Their readership 
is restricted by the poverty of the mass of the populace and the 
relatively high 
Lebowa (Botha 
illiteracy rates, especially in the rural areas of 
1983:593). Again, these factors impede the effective-
ness of this access channel. 
However, the influence of the press cannot be underestimated in the 
Lebowa political process. Many interest groups in Lebowa frequently 
use the press as a means of conveying political demands to the rele-
vant Government authorities. Nearly all English newspapers are popu-
lar in Lebowa, especially the Sowetan, City Press, and some local 
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papers such as the Times and the Review. Therefore, the mass media 
in general, serve as an important channel of access to the decision 
makers. 
3.3.4.2 THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
The only established political party in Lebowa, the Lebowa People's 
Party (LPP), is an important institutional means of articulating 
political demands, but a number of factors limit its usefulness. The 
existing undemocratic nature of the Lebowa constitution, especially 
those provisions 
between elected 
entrenching an 
and designated 
unbalanced ratio of representation 
members in the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly, discourage any organized political competition outside the 
framework of the dominant ruling party. 
However, the LPP provides its members with the opportunity to articu-
late political demands at all party levels, that is, branch level, 
divisional level, and congress level. For example, on 28 December 
1986, a meeting was held by the Seshego South Branch of the LPP at 
Makgof e High School and the following demands were articulated by 
individuals 
supply of 
facilities 
1986). 
and interest groups: dissatisfaction about the inadequate 
water and electricity and the non existent health 
in the village (Minutes of the Branch Meeting, 28 December 
122 
Another example is provided by the annual Congress of the LPP held on 
30 March 1986 at Noko-Nkwe-Tlou in Mokerong district at which the 
following political demands were articulated through written and oral 
motions: 
3.3.4.2.1 WRITTEN MOTIONS 
(a) That the Senior Teacher's Diploma be introduced at all Colleg-
es of Education in Lebowa, e.g., Sekhukhune, Modjadji, 
Mokopane, Mamokgalake Chuene and Kwena-Moloto (Mover: Mr. 
R.S. Tladi, Mashabela Lethole Branch, Lefalane). 
(b) That no child from urban areas must be admitted by the Lebowa 
education institutions without the approval of the urban 
Representative for the purpose of tax collections (Mover: Mr. 
H.F. Nkoana, Mamelodi Branch, Pretoria). 
(c) That the Cabinet of Lebowa should include the TBVC states in 
their unity talks with the R.S.A. Government about the estab-
lishment of a Federal Government in South Africa based not on 
ethnicity (Mover: N.D. Lamola, Mamelodi Branch, Pretoria). 
3.3.4.2.2 ORAL MOTIONS 
(a) Mr. Lazarus Moabelo moved that the Government should take 
drastic steps against people killing others on allegations 
that they struck lightening. 
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(b) Mr. S.J. Mashilo moved that applications for old age pensions 
be made at the pay points and not at Magoshi's headquarters 
because applications from people who stay far away from these 
headquarters are often not attended to timeously especially 
applications from those who stay on the trust farms. He 
further moved that the Minister of Agriculture should 
investigate the complaints by the private owners of land and 
communities who were deprived of their ownership rights in 
the Nebo area; and further that the farms Vleischboom, 
Vierfontein, Leeukraal and Driefontein not only be utilised 
for one type of farming, but also for livestock farming. 
(c) Mr. P.C. Mashabela of Sekhukhuneland moved that the relevant 
Department should investigate the wages paid to young Black 
men and women who leave school at early ages to work for 
White farmers (Minutes of The Lebowa People's Party Annual 
Congress, Mokerong District, 30 March 1986). 
Due to a shortage of time, the presiding chairman at the Congress 
ruled that further motions and questions be sent to branches, divi-
sions and Urban Representatives who would, in turn, forward them to 
the General Secretary for distribution to the relevant Cabinet Minis-
ters for consideration (Minutes of the LPP Annual Congress, Mokerong 
District, 30 March 1986). These party activities serve to highlight 
the effectiveness of political parties as formal channels of access 
to decision-makers in the interest articulation process. 
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However, there are no laid down procedures within the LPP in respect 
of matters that are not discussed by congress or which are explicitly 
excluded from the domain of congress. As in the instance described 
above, such matters are usually referred to the relevant Cabinet 
Minister, 
party's 
of the 
who may in turn refer the matter to his Department, the 
parliamentary caucus, or the Cabinet, depending on the nature 
demand or issue. In other instances, these matters are some-
top executive of the party (author's times discussed with the 
observation). 
3.3.4.3 THE LEGISLATURE 
As has already been indicated, the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, like 
any other law-making body, is not only confined to law-making, but 
also undertakes other activities such as the articulation of differ-
ent interests. The effectiveness of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
as a channel of access to the decision makers in the articulation of 
interests has been illustrated by the examples cited in paragraph 
3.2.4 (Institutional Interest Groups) above. 
There are also institutions established specifically to provide oppor-
tunities to the Lebowa Government to communicate with the South Afri-
can Government 
ment Bank of 
establishment 
about Lebowa interests. In this regard, the Develop-
Southern Africa (DBSA) is a good example. Since its 
in 1983 by the South African government, DBSA facili-
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tated development through loan finance and support for projects that 
advance the level of development. The bank also provided technical 
assistance loans and grants for, and advice on, project preparation 
and development planning, and research, training and publications on 
development (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, volume 23, 
Part II, 6 July 1989: 498). 
The Lebowa Legislative Assembly articulated many demands through the 
Department of Economic affairs and Technology to the DBSA. As a 
result, 36 per cent of the total number of projects submitted to DBSA 
for financial assistance by the Lebowa Government were approved. 
These projects were mostly agricultural, industrial and commercial 
(Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, volume 23, Part II, 6 
July 1989:498-499). 
3.3.4.4 THE BUREAUCRACY 
Contacts with the bureaucracy at various levels and the different 
Departments in the Lebowa Government can be particularly important 
and useful in transmitting political demands to the decision makers, 
particularly on issues that are not politically contentious. Depart-
ments like those for education, health, welfare and agriculture, have 
direct contact with members of the public through their representa-
tives and field worker. In this way, they are among the most 
important spokesmen for interest groups. 
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The importance of the bureaucracy as a channel of access in transmit-
ting political demands to the relevant authorities in Lebowa ought 
not to be underestimated. 
3.3.4.5 TRADITIONAL CHANNELS OF ACCESS 
"Traditionally, the constitutional unit of the Northern Sothos (the 
Lebowans) is the tribe. The core members of one tribe are related, 
i.e. they have common ancestors. The central figure in the tribe is 
the Kgoshi" (Letsoalo 1984:47). The tribal structures also serve as 
formal channels of access for articulating political demands in the 
Lebowa political process. 
An illustration of how they operate as such channels, is a meeting of 
the Bakgomana (Traditional Councillors) and Headmen held on 29 June 
1989, at Bakone (Matlala a Thaba). The following demands were articu-
lated by respective tribesmen and Headmen: 
(a) Headman Seopa requested a scraper from the Works Department 
to come and repair some of the eroded streets in his village. 
(b) Headman Nong asked for culverts to be repaired next to the 
local school by the same Department. 
(c) Headman Matlala reminded the Health Department about the need 
for the erection of a clinic building at his village. 
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(d) Headman Seema requested the construction of a bridge over one 
of the troublesome rivers in his village. 
In all these cases the Tribal Authority transmitted the demands to 
the respective departments of the Lebowa Government (Minutes, Bakone 
Tribal Authority Meeting, 29 June 1989)~ 
It is, therefore, essential to include traditional structures as 
channels of access in addition to those provided for by Almond and 
Powell in their model, which was not originally designed for African 
societies such as Lebowa. The pattern or style of articulating inter-
ests as described above, is more or less similar in most tribal struc-
tures in Lebowa. 
Of great significance in this regard is the manner in which members 
of tribes articulate their demands effectively through these tradi-
tional structures. Examples were provided in paragraph 3.2.3 of this 
chapter. 
3.4 FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE INTEREST ARTICULATION 
To focus on interest articulation groups to the exclusion of the many 
environmental and political factors which influence the activities of 
these groups and which shape the channels and means of access for 
interest articulation would be foolhardy (Welsh 1973:128). Almond 
128 
and Powell specifically focused on the following three environmental 
factors: political communication, the political culture, and the 
distribution of resources in the society (1966:91-92). 
3.4.1 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
Jean Blonde! (1972:22) considers communication to be an important 
political function in any political process: "One element that plays 
a large part in developing biases by which the system listens more to 
some hopes and desires than to others, is the communication system". 
While Almond and Powell appreciate the importance of the communica-
tion function, they do not see this function as being inclusive of 
all other political functions. Instead, according to them, it consti-
tutes a necessary prerequisite for the performance of other functions 
(Almond & Powell 1966:165-166). 
The relevance of political communication in the interest articulation 
process is partly highlighted in paragraph 3.3.4.1 of this chapter. 
However, the political communication function in the Lebowa political 
process will be discussed fully in chapter 8 below. 
3.4.2 THE POLITICAL CULTURE 
Political culture is defined as "the pattern of individual attitudes 
and orientations toward politics among the members of a political 
129 
system ... " (Almond & Powell 1966:50). Almond and Verba have identi-
fied three broad types of political cultures: parochial, subject, and 
participant (Almond & Verba 1963:17). 
The present participant political culture prevailing in countries 
such as the United States, and Great Britain is conducive to active 
and organized interest articulation. On the other hand, the 
political culture in Lebowa is best seen as an amalgamation of 
contradictory elements of Western value systems and indigenous 
African cultural orientations. 
The rural sector in Lebowa is much larger than the urban sector, both 
in terms of geographic size and population size. 99 percent of the 
total area is defined as rural, while 90 percent of the population 
lives in the rural areas (De Villiers 1984:15) under the traditional 
leadership of Magoshi (Chiefs). Therefore, Lebowa is predominantly a 
rural area with some elements of traditional lifestyle. Through 
education, employment and urban influence, 
these rural traditional areas are in a 
Christian evangelization, 
the Lebowans residing in 
process of being gradually 
(author's observation). 
assimilated into a Western value system 
These factors have a direct and significant influence on the prevail-
ing parochial or subject political culture in the rural traditional 
areas of Lebowa, which in turn influenced the interest articulation 
process (author's observation). 
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Another durable area of cultural influence in Lebowa is language. 
Retention of European languages in addition to Northern Sotho by the 
Lebowa Government has meant that the business of the Government is 
conducted in a medium poorly understood, if at all, by a large number 
of the citizens of the territory. This cultural factor obviously 
also influences the articulation of political demands. "Only in 
Madagascar, Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya and Egypt are 
indigenous languages primarily used in the daily work of government 
in the mid-1980s" (Almond & Powell 1988:509). 
One way of examining the influence of some aspects of political cul-
ture on the interest articulation process is to describe the atti-
tudes of Lebowa citizens towards the three levels of the political 
system, namely system, process, and policy (Almond & Powell 1988:41). 
3.4.2.1 SYSTEM PROPENSITIES 
At the system level we are interested in the citizens' and leaders' 
views of the values and organizations that hold the political system 
together. How is it and how should it be that leaders are selected 
and citizens come to obey the laws? Perhaps the most important 
aspect of system propensities is the level and bases of legitimacy of 
the government (Almond & Powell 1988:41). 
The basis 
depends on 
of 
the 
legitimacy of the tribal local government in Lebowa 
ruler inheriting of the throne (Chieftainship), and 
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the legitimacy of 
(Botha 1983:432). 
these tribal local governments is generally high 
The effect hereof is that tribesmen obey the laws 
and the local government meets the obligations set by its basis of 
legitimacy. 
exchange in 
(rule-making) 
These bases of legitimacy set the rules for a kind of 
respect of inputs (articulated interests) and outputs 
between tribesmen and Tribal Authorities in Lebowa. In 
this way, the beliefs and attitudes of tribesmen influence the inter-
est articulation process (author's observations). 
The legitimacy of the Central Government, that is the Lebowa Legisla-
tive Assembly, as reflected by the attitudes of citizens, is very 
weak, and has been since the unbanning of anti-apartheid organiza-
tions such as the African National Congress and the release of some 
prominent political prisoners including Dr. Nelson Mandela in 
February 1990. 
Prior to these bold steps by the South African Government, the Lebowa 
Government derived its legitimacy from both traditional Chieftainship 
and competitive elections. 60 percent of the members of the Legisla-
tive Assembly were designated traditional Magoshi (Chiefs). Only 40 
percent of the members were democratically elected (Lebowa Constitu-
tion Proclamation, 1972). The level of legitimacy during this period 
was fairly high, but not conducive to the articulation of radical 
political demands (author's observation). 
As stated above, the unbanning of the anti-apartheid political organi-
sations and the release of long term political prisoners completely 
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affected the attitudes of Lebowans toward the Government of Lebowa 
negatively. The legitimacy of the Government of Lebowa became very 
low in the eyes of the public. 
The Chief Minister of 
follows (Chief Minister 
Policy Speech 1990:2): 
Lebowa confirmed and summed this view up as 
M.N. Ramodike, Lebowa Legislative Assembly, 
I must hasten to point out that in our present capacity we 
are being rejected by our compatriots and fellow countrymen 
in other political organizations as symbols of apartheid. We 
are being shunned by our own brothers and sisters for being 
part and parcel of institutions which were created to further 
the policy that separates people according to race and the 
colour of their skin. Time and fate will one day render us 
irrelevant and obsolete; while on the other hand we are being 
urged to turn our backs on these divisive structures and join 
forces with progressive organizations with the view to form-
ing a united front in our fight against the system. 
This low legitimacy level is not acceptable to the citizens of Lebowa 
which causes them to articulate their political demands in a more 
violent manner. This cultural aspect has an important influence on 
the interest articulation process in Lebowa (author's observation). 
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3.4.2.2 PROCESS PROPENSITIES 
"At the process level we are interested in the individual's propensi-
ties to become involved in the process: to make demands, obey the 
laws, support some groups and oppose others, and participate in vari-
ous ways" (Almond & Powell 1988:41). 
To determine the distribution of orientations towards involvement in 
the political process amongst the people of Lebowa, the following 
ought to be borne in mind. In the first place, the majority of the 
people of Lebowa reside in predominantly tribal rural areas and are 
poorly informed about politics. Secondly, they are generally loyal 
to the traditional leadership and its structures (Bogoshi). As a 
result, their tribal affiliations have a greater influence on their 
participation in politics at the central level than their own 
independent political convictions and opinions (author's 
observation). 
A total of 952 048 votes were cast during the Lebowa General Elec-
tions of 1989 (Minister of Home Affairs, Lebowa Legislative Assembly, 
Policy & Budget Speech 1989:29). This represents almost 50% of the 
estimated population of 1 991 447 in the territory in 1988 (Race Rela-
tions Survey, 1988/89:148) and serves to confirm that the people of 
Lebowa do participate in the political process. The majority of 
citizen's are, however, mobilised as subjects of tribal structures, 
and sometimes even coerced to cast their vote during elections 
(author's observation). 
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According 
culture 
to Almond and Powell, "another relevant feature of process 
is people's beliefs about other groups and themselves as 
members" (Almond & Powell 1988:43). The people of Lebowa, in group 
general, attach great importance to their tribal groupings, but not 
to political organizations or parties. These cultural aspects have a 
tremendous influence on the manner and style in which political de-
mands are articulated by the inhabitants of Lebowa. 
3.4.2.3 POLICY PROPENSITIES 
"At the policy level we want to know what policies citizens and lead-
ers expect from the government. What goals are to be established and 
how are they to be achieved?" (Almond & Powell 1988:41). 
The provision of basic services such as water, roads and bridges, 
schooling facilities, and old age pensions, are considered to be 
important 
culture 
by the people of Lebowa, especially in rural areas. The 
in Lebowa also places greater value on communal ownership of 
land than on private ownership of land. 
The importance attached to various policy outcomes by the inhabitants 
of Lebowa will, therefore, influence the interest articulation 
process. 
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"Political cultures may be consensual or conflictual on issues of 
public policy and on their views of legitimate governmental and polit-
ical arrangements" (Almond & Powell 1988:44). Although there are 
many ethnic groups in the Lebowa territory such as the Pedis, the 
Swazis, the Ndebeles, the Tswanas and the Shangans, no extreme 
conflictual subcultures have emerged in Lebowa (author's 
observation). There 
subcultures between 
South Africa. 
is, however, evidence of extremely conflicting 
the people of Lebowa and the White population of 
The political system of greater South Africa is dominated by a White 
minority constituting only 17% of the entire population of the Repub-
lic of South Africa. The Black majority rejects this minority govern-
ment and demands majority rule as the only legitimate basis of Govern-
ment authority. A further demand of the majority is for participa-
tion in the highest decision making bodies in the State. It is a 
widely held belief that the policy of separate development, which 
gave rise to the homelands, is a sham, as all the homelands together 
cover only approximately one eighth of the total land area of South 
Africa and are scattered across that area (Almond & Powell 1988:46). 
This vast gap between the subcultures in Lebowa and White South 
Africa also influences the articulation of political demands. 
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3.4.3 THE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES 
The third environmental factor affecting the channels and means of 
access for interest articulation, apart from political communication 
and political culture, is the distribution of resources. Almond and 
Powell (1988:123) states that: 
The distributive performance of the political system is the alloca-
tion by governmental agencies of money, goods, services, honours and 
opportunities of various kinds to individuals and groups in the 
society. It 
of whatever 
can be measured and compared according to the quantity 
is distributed, the area of human life touched by these 
benefits, the sections of the population receiving benefits, and the 
relationship between human needs and governmental distributions in-
tended to meet these needs. 
Although Government expenditure does not provide an accurate measure 
for all these distributions, it does provide a limited quantitative 
measure of this distributive effort (Almond & Powell 1988:123). 
Since the inception of Lebowa in 1972, pressure from the citizenry 
for rapid expansion in the supply of public amenities has been 
enormous. The 
budget speech 
the Chancellor 
most important of these demands as reflected in the 
and the Lebowa Appropriation Bill of 1990 presented by 
of the Exchequer were: educational facilities, health 
facilities, roads and bridges, water and electricity supply. In re-
sponse to these demands, an amount totaling more than R1 510 million 
was allocated to the following Departments by the Lebowa Government: 
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Vote 1 Chief Minister R 34 079 000 
Vote 2 Home Affairs R 35 287 000 
Vote 3 Works R 69 698 000 
Vote 4 Education R 720 966 000 
Vote 5 Agriculture R 111 941 000 
Vote 6 Justice R 20 620 000 
Vote 7 Health R 153 294 000 
Vote 8 Finance R 105 272 000 
Vote 9 Law and Order R 57 687 000 
Vote 10 Economic Affairs and Technology R 23 630 000 
Vote 11 Social Welfare and Pensions R 182 804 000 
Total R1 515 278 000 
Less statutory Amount R 5 240 197 
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Amount to be voted R1 510 037 803 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lebowa Appropriation Bill 1990). 
The Department of Education received the largest allocation, followed 
by Social Welfare and Pensions, Health, and Works. This budget re-
flected the Government's sensitivity towards the needs articulated by 
the people. In support of this view, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
stated (Chancellor of the Exchequer, Budget Speech, and The Lebowa 
Appropriation Bill 1990:5): 
This government was put under extreme pressure during the 
year 1989/90. As a result of expenditure exceeding the 
available financial resources of the government at large, 
escalating demands to finance expenditure outside the budget 
and delays in loans applied for, the department was faced 
with threat by its bankers that salary cheques may not be 
honoured when presented. 
The government was forced to use 3 million of its 8 million 
platinum shares to overcome the anticipated shortfall. 
From this it is evident that State expenditure in Lebowa has some 
distributive influence, which, in turn, influences the interest artic-
ulation process. 
139 
Financial backing is 
groups to function 
an indispensable prerequisite for 
or operate effectively in modern 
interest 
political 
systems. The representation of interests on a continuing basis is an 
expensive procedure (Almond & Powell 1966:92). As stated earlier, 
groups such as the Lebowa Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Lebowa 
Liquor Traders Association, and Lebowa Teachers Association do not, 
in general, experience many problems with channels of access. This 
is partly because they are financially better off than other interest 
groups. 
While Almond and Powell discuss the three abovementioned environmen-
tal factors in isolation from one another as independent factors 
shaping or influencing interest articulation, they stress that the 
factors are intertwined in a complex pattern, and therefore interde-
pendent (Almond & Powell 1966:93). 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the important interest articulation structures and 
channels of access, including the factors that influence the articula-
tion function in the Lebowa political process, were briefly outlined 
and discussed. It was shown that individual self-representation oc-
curs at the local, regional, and central authority level and is found 
at different levels of the political process in Lebowa. This is not 
the case with anomic interest groups. Traditional tribal structures, 
sorghum beer consumers and small village residents were cited as 
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appropriate examples of non-associational interest groups in the 
Lebowa. 
Mention was made of the influence and effectiveness of the Lebowa Leg-
islative Assembly as a formal institutional interest group struc-
ture. Associational interest groups were shown to be more successful 
than most other groups. Chambers of Commerce and Industry, trade 
unions, civic associations, and student organisations were used as 
examples of associational interest groups. 
It was shown that physical demonstrations and violence are frequently 
resorted to as means of articulating demands in the Lebowa political 
process. 
sity of 
Various examples from the 1974 student unrest at the Univer-
the North, and the unrest in Lebowa during the period 
1985-1987 were used. Personal contacts between members of the public 
and the elected members of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly and other 
decision-makers play an important role. Professional teachers 
serving as elected members in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly were 
shown to act as elite representatives of teachers associations. 
Formal channels of access were also referred to. The three 
environmental factors that influence interest articulation were also 
discussed. 
In conclusion, it is clear that there are sufficient formal and 
non-formal interest articulation groups at the disposal of the people 
of Lebowa. The existing legal impediments such as the internal 
security laws, and the National State of Emergency (lifted in June 
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1990), however, prevent and restrict the free articulation of 
political demands which do not correspond with government policy. 
It would further appear that the political culture of Lebowa, which 
is to a large extent still parochial in nature, is not conducive to 
active and informed articulation, but that a great deal of seculariza-
tion of political culture is taking place. 
The release of prominent political prisoners and the unbanning of 
anti-apartheid organisations in South Africa since February 1990, 
have stimulated more active participation on the part of interest 
groups in Lebowa. Peaceful marches are staged freely all over Lebowa 
with demonstrators handing over petitions to the respective govern-
ment authorities. 
Lebowa is only a self-governing territory with limited powers 
within the Republic of South Africa. Therefore, the interest 
articulation process in the Lebowa should not be seen in isolation, 
but should rather be viewed and assessed within the broader context 
of South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 4: INTEREST AGGREGATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Almond and Powell call the function of converting demands into 
general policy alternatives interest aggregation (1966:98). The 
concept 
ciated 
"aggregation" refers 
demands or interests 
to a process whereby a series of asso-
on a given subject, be it taxation re-
form, amendments in the electoral system, relations with a neighbou-
ring state or the structure of secondary education, are combined and 
converted from a rather indefinite and diverse composition to a con-
sistent and easily intelligible proposal of policy (Roberts 1971:5-6, 
103). In the present context, the term "interest aggregation" is 
reserved for the more inclusive levels of the combinatory process, 
namely the structuring of major policy alternatives. It should also 
be distinguished from the final process of rule-making (Almond & 
Powell 1966:99). 
The interest aggregation functions can be traced and analysed in all 
political systems, regardless of whether they are modern or 
traditional. Within the same political system, different structures 
may perform the same functions, and the same structures may perform 
different functions. This is often more so in traditional political 
systems, especially at tribal level where the functions of interest 
articulation, interest aggregation and rule-making overlap, or take 
place simultaneously in ~he same structure (Almond & Powell 1966:99). 
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At present, the traditional way of aggregating interest in the Lebowa 
political system is predominantly used at the Tribal and Headman 
levels. In highly developed political systems, however, there are 
distinct, specialised 
the large diversity 
structures which act as intermediaries between 
of articulated interests and the final 
formulation of authoritative decisions. The British political system 
is a good example in this regard (Almond & Powell 1966:103). 
4.2 INTEREST AGGREGATION STRUCTURES 
Although there are 
aggregation function, 
many 
Almond 
structures performing the interest 
and Powell regard the political party 
and the government bureaucracy as the most likely candidates for this 
specialised mediation role between articulation of interest and 
rule-making (Almond & Powell 1966:101). The applicability of 
political parties, the government bureaucracy, and traditional 
structures as aggregation structures in Lebowa will be considered. 
4.2.1 THE BUREAUCRACY 
Almond 
formally 
and Powell describe the government bureaucracy as the group of 
organised offices and duties connected by an extensive 
subsidiary to the formal rule makers. Although the special 
this body is the implementation of rules made by the higher 
hierarchy 
task of 
144 
authorities, the diversity of civil service agencies and informal 
groups within the bureaucracy are involved in many other political 
functions (Almond & Powell 1966:101). This practice is observable at 
all levels or phases of government in the Lebowa political system. 
4.2.1.1 THE LOCAL LEVEL 
Four different forms of settlement may be distinguished at the local 
level in Lebowa: proclaimed townships, closer settlements, community 
authorities and tribal rural villages. The pattern of interest 
aggregation at the three last mentioned types of settlements is 
similar and largely traditional in nature. They will, therefore, all 
be dealt with under traditional structures. Proclaimed townships 
will be discussed separately. 
4.2.1.1.1 TOWN COUNCILS 
The Lebow a Government may by notice in the government gazette 
town council for any proclaimed town. A town council 
of one elected member for each ward elected separately 
of the ward concerned and one or more members 
establish a 
shall consist 
by the voters 
designated by the Lebowa Government. Town councils are represented 
by between six and eleven councillors, depending on the size of the 
town. They hold office for a period of three years. The town 
council's elections in Lebowa were never contested on a party 
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political basis (R.S.A.: Proclamation R293 of 1962 as amended). The 
interest aggregation function can, therefore, be performed by 
independent councillors or by town administrators such as managers 
and superintendents. 
An appointed manager assisted by one or more Superintendents is the 
head of the organization of each town in Lebowa. Depending on the 
nature of the demands, these administrative officials aggregate 
different political demands articulated by individuals or interest 
groups in their towns for submission to either the Town Council or 
the Department of Home Affairs. "The Town Administrators in Lebowa 
serve to aggregate and adjudicate the needs and demands of residents 
in all towns" (Pheme 1988:174). 
Since the unbanning of political organisations at the beginning of 
1990, the residents of many towns in Lebowa have established their 
own informal civic 
significant role 
function. These 
associations which, in most instances, play a 
of the rule-aggregation 
actively aggregated the 
in 
civic 
the performance 
associations have 
demands of the residents in many ways for presentation to the Lebowa 
Government. In this sense, they have taken over the functions and 
the responsibilities of the Town Councils, and to a certain extent, 
those of the Town Managers. 
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4.2.1.2 THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
At the regional level, the Lebowa Government established Magistrates 
offices in each district. These district Magistrates also play a 
very important role in the interest aggregation function in the 
Lebowa political system. In some instances, they act on an agency 
basis for other government departments. Some members of the public 
prefer to articulate their political demands either directly or 
indirectly by way of complaints to the off ices of the District 
Magistrates for submission to higher authorities. For example, all 
applications and suggestions pertaining to social and old age 
pensions are channelled through district Magistrates to the relevant 
Departments (Lebowa Legislative Assembly, Verbatim Report: Volume 21, 
part 3, 1987:455). 
The Minister of Economic Affairs and Planning in Lebowa recently 
established structures called development committees to facilitate 
closer cooperation in respect of development planning and policy 
formulation on local, regional, departmental and ministerial levels. 
These committees serve as effective interest aggregation 
substructures within the bureaucracy of Lebowa (Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly, Verbatim Report: Volume 21, part 3, 1987: 512). 
Most Government Departments have established regional off ices in all 
the districts of Lebowa. The Departments of Education and 
Agriculture will serve as examples hereof. Usually most of the 
demands or interests in respect of educational matters articulated by 
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members of the community as individuals or as members of interest 
groups are channelled through the Circuit or Regional Offices of 
Inspectors of Education, who in turn, aggregate these demands for 
submission to the Department of Education (Interview: April Makgakga 
School Committee Chairman, 15 September 1990). Submissions to the 
Department may be written or verbal (author's observation). 
The Agricultural Regional Offices also serve as important interest 
aggregation structures within the Lebowa bureaucracy. Most of the 
demands and interests pertaining to agriculture articulated by 
interest groups such as agricultural cooperatives, or tribal 
authorities are first aggregated at these regional offices before 
submission to the relevant department (author's observation). 
In chapter 3 {paragraph 3.3.1.1) above, mention was made of the first 
and second petitions from the Student Representative Council of the 
University of the North to the Lebowa Mankweng police station 
containing demands which had to be sorted and aggregated by the 
Station Commander before submission not only to the Department of Law 
and Order, but also to other relevant departments. 
4.2.1.3 THE CENTRAL LEVEL 
Government Departments in Lebowa play a significant role iri perfor-
ming the interest aggregation function at the central level. Al-
though these Departments are there mainly for the implementation of 
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laws made by higher authorities, they also serve as specialized 
structures which act as intermediaries between the large diversity of 
articulated interests and the final formulation of authoritative 
rule-making. 
The initial preparation and the drafting of bills by these 
Departments before submission to the legal section in the Department 
of Justice for further aggregation is a good example hereof. For 
instance, road traffic became a burning issue in Lebowa and the 
public insisted on positive steps on the part of the government to 
address this problem. Ultimately, a departmental draft bill was 
prepared which aggregated all interests related to the issue. The 
draft bill was submitted to the legal section in the Department of 
Justice for further aggregation before final submission to the 
Legislative Assembly via the Cabinet. It was enacted as the Lebowa 
Road Traffic Act, 1973, (Act 8 of 1973). 
4.2.1.3.1 THE PREPARATION OF A BUDGET AS A FUNCTION OF AGGREGATION 
"A budget is the overall plan that identifies the expected resources 
and expenditure for a given period and reflects the nature and source 
of these resources and expenditure" (Esmond 1982:1-2). In its 
simplest form, "a budget is a document or a collection of documents 
that refer to the financial condition of an institution including 
information on revenue, expenditure, activities and purposes or 
goals" (Lee & Johnson 1978:11). 
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A government decides on a programme of action and this programme is 
converted into monetary terms in the budget. This programme consists 
of aggregated demands which are elevated to inputs which the 
government elects to satisfy. From its draft form, the budget should 
be prepared and planned in accordance with predetermined regulatory 
guidelines (Norwick 1973:5). 
In the Lebowa Government, these policy guidelines are determined by 
the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Cabinet, the 
secretary of his own department, financial experts, and the Advisory 
Board on Finance established in terms of the provisions of the Lebowa 
Advisory Boards Act, 1976, (Act 10 of 1976). These policy guidelines 
form the point of departure from which inputs with financial 
implications are considered. 
The budgeting system used in Lebowa for the compilation of the budget 
is called "Budgeting by objectives" (Third Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry into Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South Africa, 
1970:279-283). 
In practice, the preparation of the budget is a process that 
continues throughout the year. The Treasury receives frequent 
requests for funds from Departments for approval to include new 
services and projects in the next budget. These applications are 
considered in the light of the availability of funds and other 
relevant considerations. 
150 
In the middle of each year, the Department of Finance in Lebowa sends 
out what is known as the "estimate circular" to all Accounting 
Officers of Departments requesting the latter to submit, before or on 
a stipulated date, their estimates of total revenue and expenditure 
to be covered by the State Revenue Fund during the following 
financial 
1985:ix). 
year (Lebowa, Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, 
Accounting 
Departments. 
Officers coordinate estimates in their respective 
They should be convinced of the necessity of every 
service provided for, and ensure that all new services have Treasury 
approval for 
the Treasury 
1979:72). 
inclusion in the estimates. Estimates are then sent to 
under cover of an explanatory memorandum (Easton 
The tasks performed by the various government departments in Lebowa 
can be likened to those of subsystems of the political system of the 
territory. These subsystems are the source of most demands that are 
the inputs of the government. In addition, these subsystems serve as 
gatekeepers, that is, they receive expectations, opinions, 
preferences, demands or wants from the members of the political 
system. These demands are subjected to rational analysis and 
aggregation (Pheme 1988:81). 
The ultimate objective of these intermediary processes is to convert 
articulated and aggregated interests and demands into a form that can 
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conveniently be managed through a budget by the political decision 
makers (Pheme 1988:82). 
In this sense, the preparation of a budget by the government 
departments in Lebowa serves as an effective function of aggregation 
because the budget represents the aggregated needs and demands of 
members of the political system in the form of financial estimates. 
When the 
described 
aggregation function of preparing the estimates, as 
above, has been accepted in principle by the Minister of 
Finance and the Cabinet, it does not mean that the funds concerned 
may simply be spent. The collection and expenditure of funds must be 
approved by the Lebowa Legislative Assembly (Black States 
Constitution Act 21 of 1971, sections 6,7 and 8). The process 
whereby the Legislative Assembly approves the budget will be 
discussed under Chapter 4 (Rule-making) below. 
As has been shown, Government Departments in Lebowa perform the 
interest aggregation function reasonably effectively at the central 
level. 
4.2.2 TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES 
Traditional structures, namely the Headman's court and the Tribal 
authority under a Kgoshi (Chief), play a significant role in 
performing the interest aggregation function in the Lebowa political 
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process. In paragraph 3.2.3 of chapter 3 on "interest articulation" 
above, mention was made of demands articulated at Headman Makgakga's 
village court by residents. 
These demands were aggregated and sifted by the Headman and his 
councillors before submission to the Tribal Authority or relevant 
body. 
through 
to the 
At this level, the aggregation process usually take place 
intensive discussions. The aggregated demands are presented 
Tribal authority by either the Headman and some of his 
councillors or his representatives (author's observation). 
Paragraph 3.3.4.5 of chapter 3 above (Traditional channels of access) 
deals with the performance of the interest aggregation function at 
the tribal level. The tribal authority concerned aggregated the 
demands articulated by the respective Headmen before submission to 
different departments of the Lebowa Government (Bakone Tribal 
Authority Meeting, Minutes, 29 June 1989). 
4.2.2.1 TRIBAL AUTHORITIES 
A tribal authority must be established in 
assigned to a Kgoshi (Chief) or a Ntona 
concerned (Act 68 of 1951, Section 2 (3)). 
respect of the area 
(Headman) of the tribe 
The Lebowa Government 
may, with due regard to the law and the custom of the tribe 
concerned, establish a tribal authority in respect of a tribe (Act 68 
of 1951, Section 2 (a)). Only the Chief and some of his councillors 
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and Headman, including such other members of the tribe as the Chief 
may from time to time, with the concurrence of the councillors hol-
ding office, appoint as councillors, constitute a tribal authority 
(R.S.A.: Proclamation R115, 1969, Schedule A, Section 1). There are 
no elected members serving in these tribal bodies in the Lebowa poli-
tical system. 
4.2.2.2 COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES 
A community authority may be established by the Lebowa Government in 
respect of the area or areas assigned to communities or tribes. 
Community authorities are established in respect of independent 
communities, that is, communities without hereditary Chiefs. A 
community authority is composed of a chairman and councillors elected 
by the inhabitants of the area of the community authority. The 
chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and treasurer are the main office 
bearers (Act 68 of 1951). 
4.2.2.3 REGIONAL AUTHORITIES 
The Lebowa Government may, with due regard to indigenous law and 
custom, establish a regional authority in respect of any two or more 
areas for which tribal and community authorities have been estab-
lished. The members of a regional authority shall come from every 
tribal and community authority within the area of the regional 
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authority on the following basis: the Kgoshi of each tribe and one 
tribal representative designated by such tribal authority; and the 
chairman of each community authority and one designated councillor. 
An executive committee consisting of a chairman and three members, 
conducts the business of the regional authority between meetings. No 
popular elections are conducted for membership of these bodies 
(R.S.A. Proclamation R115 of 1969). 
4.2.3 POLITICAL PARTIES 
The political party is regarded as the most specialised aggregation 
structure in modern communities. In the absence of such structures, 
problems may arise, which would result in a breakdown in the 
systematic consideration of the full range of articulated demands. 
In a 
interests 
competitive political system, parties aggregate certain 
in the form of a series of policy proposals. Parties then 
attempt to achieve victories at the polls to place in a position of 
power decision makers who formulate decisions on the strength of the 
preconceived aggregated policy structure. Almond and Powell suggest 
that the party may, or may not, be a major interest aggregator in 
systems. Therefore, parties may fulfil less 
in interest aggregation in such systems (Almond & 
non-competitive 
significant roles 
Powell 1966:102). 
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In analysing the role of competitive parties in interest aggregation, 
consideration should not only be given to the individual parties, but 
also to the structure 
policy making bodies 
The two party system 
of parties, electorates, electoral laws, and 
that interact in a competitive party system. 
is conducive to strong aggregation policy by 
political parties because of the broader scope of responsibility to 
electorates accorded to parties (Almond & Powell 1988:93). 
While the ideas of Almond and Powell are mainly applicable to 
developed political systems, Lebowa is a largely traditional 
political environment. For the purposes hereof, it is, therefore, 
also necessary to examine the position of the Lebowa People's Party 
(LPP) in respect of traditional structures. 
Although Lebowa is constitutionally a multi-party system, only one 
party 
is the 
is presently established and registered in the territory. This 
Lebowa People's Party (LPP). As suggested by the absence of 
other parties, this single ruling political party reigns supreme. 
The structural composition, functions and the aggregation process of 
the Lebowa People's Party at branch, division, National Executive 
Council and Congress level will now be discussed. 
156 
4.2.3.1 THE LEBOWA PEOPLE'S PARTY (LPP) 
4.2.3.1.1 PARTY ORGANISATION 
The nature of the organisational structure of the LPP is designed to 
accommodate not only people within the borders of Lebowa, but also 
people from other parts of the Republic of South Africa such as the 
West Rand, East Rand, Vaal Triangle and Pretoria (LPP Constitution 
1979:11-12). This is achieved effectively through the establishment 
of branches, divisions, the National executive and the annual 
congress. The composition (structural aspects) and the functions of 
these bodies will be discussed to facilitate the understanding of the 
aggregation process within this party. 
4.2.3.1.1.1 BRANCHES AND BRANCH COMMITTEES 
(a) Composition: Not less than 20 members constitute a branch and 
no branch is exclusively established for any 
race, colour or creed. Branches can be 
established in every electoral division and they 
have to confine themselves to the boundaries 
determined by the divisional committee or the 
National Executive Council (N.E.C.). 
For purposes of supervision and control, a 
branch committee consists of 4 members and is 
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(b) Functions: 
elected annually by every branch. It comprises 
a chairman, a vice-chairman, a secretary and a 
treasurer. The constitution empowers the branch 
committee to co-opt a member in case a vacancy 
occurs, subject to approval at the ensuing 
branch meeting (LPP Constitution 1979:5 & 7). 
For purposes of this chapter, only those 
functions related to the interest aggregation 
function will be discussed. The duties and 
functions of branches and branch committees may 
briefly be outlined as follows: to aggregate the 
diversity of interests articulated by branch 
members before submission to the higher bodies. 
They usually consider resolutions emanating from 
motions containing specific demands of the 
branch members during branch meetings. These 
aggregated demands are then submitted to higher 
levels for further consideration, or to recruit 
and to enlist new members from whose ranks party 
leaders usually emerge. Unconditional, active 
and wholehearted support should be given to by 
the branch to the party's candidates during 
elections (LPP Constitution 1979:7 & 8). 
Every branch in so far 
quarterly meetings at a 
as is possible, holds 
suitable place and 
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time. Agenda items for the congress are drafted 
by branches and forwarded to the National 
Executive Council at least six weeks before 
congress. These agenda items represent the 
aggregated interests from the branch level (LPP 
Constitution 1979:6). 
4.2.3.1.1.2 DIVISIONAL COMMITTEES 
(a) Composition: 
(b) Functions: 
A divisional committee is composed of a 
chairman and a secretary from each branch 
within the electoral division concerned. 
The following off ice bearers are elected by 
the divisional committee. The chairman, the 
vice-chairman, the secretary and the 
treasurer. These office bearers together 
with as many additional members as the 
divisional committee may determine, exercise 
the full 
divisional 
1979:9). 
authority and powers of the 
committee (LPP Constitution 
"The duties and functions of a divisional 
committee shall be: 
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(1) to promote effectively the interest of the 
party in its electoral division in consul-
tation where practicable with the branch 
committee; 
(2) to ensure that all branches in the electoral 
division shall hold their annual meetings 
after the annual congress and before the 
30th March; 
(3) to forward to the Head Office not later than 
the 30th April the names and addresses of 
off ice bearers of all branches in the 
electoral division; 
(4) to forward to 
than the 30th 
general report 
the 
of 
of 
Head 
April 
the 
Office, not later 
in every year, a 
activities of the 
divisional committee and on the general 
conditions in the electoral divisions; 
(5) to do every thing in their power to win the 
elections for the party and to assist the 
party candidates in every possible way". 
(LPP Constitution 1979:9 & 10). 
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This 
sift 
body also performs 
through articulated 
an aggregation function because it has to 
interests from the lower bodies of the 
parties before they are allowed access to the National Executive and 
the Annual Congress for final consideration. The divisional 
committee also coordinates diverse aggregated demands received from 
branches before submission to the higher bodies of the party. 
In practice, however, the divisional committees of the LPP have never 
played an active role in this regard as most branches have enjoyed 
direct access to the National Executive Council (authors' 
observation). 
4.2.3.1.1.3 THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (N.E.C.) 
(a) Composition: "The N.E.C. shall consist of: the leader who 
shall be elected by parliamentary party 
caucus, 
LPP and 
Cabinet Ministers, chief whip of the 
his deputy, treasurer-general, 
chairman of congress, organising secretary, 
assistant-organising secretary, secretary 
general, assistant general secretary, one 
kgoshi representative, one member from the 
following constituencies or regions: 
Sekhukhune, Moutse, Mokerong, Naphuno, 
Bolobedu, 
Thabamoopo, 
Nebo, Sekgosese, 
Mapulaneng, West 
Seshego, 
Rand, East 
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(b) Functions: 
Rand, Vaal triangle and Pretoria. One 
member from the following groups: Women 
MP's, Women Commoners, Youth organisation 
and the representative of Chiefs" (LPP 
Constitution 1979:11). 
All other members mentioned above shall be 
elected at an annual conference and shall 
hold office for three years, with the 
exception of Ministers, the chief whip and 
his deputy, the chairman of congress and his 
vice-chairman who are ipso facto members of 
the N.E.C. The chairman and his vice-
chairman, and the secretary of congress 
shall ipso facto hold the same positions on 
the N.E.C. (LPP Constitution 1979:12). 
The duties and functions 
include the convening of 
special congress of the 
of 
the 
party. 
the N.E.C. 
annual and 
It must 
submit a detailed report on its activities 
and party matters, and all items submitted 
by branches for discussion at the congress 
(subject to the N.E.C.'s approval) annually 
to the congress in committee. This body 
shall further supervise all the subordinate 
bodies and committees in the carrying out of 
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their duties. It also regulates all matters 
pertaining to elections. 
Consequently, 
necessary to 
organisation 
supervision 
Constitution 
the N.E.C. must do everything 
promote the interests and 
of the party, including the 
of the Head Off ice (LPP 
1979: 13-1 4) . The final 
aggregation of demands and issues before 
submission for consideration to the congress 
is also the responsibility of the N.E.C. 
4.2.3.1.1.4 THE CONGRESS 
(a) Composition: The congress is the highest authority of the 
party and is constituted as follows: "All 
members of the N.E.C., one delegate from a 
branch with less than 200 members (2 
delegates from a branch with 200 or more 
members), members of the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly and Dikgoshi (Traditional Chiefs) 
of Lebowa who are members of the party" (LPP 
Constitution 1979:15). All these persons 
are entitled to vote on any matter. A 
congress must be held annually in Lebowa at 
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a place and time to be determined by the 
National Executive Council (N.E.C.). 
(b) Functions: The functions of the congress include policy 
making for the party and the election of the 
leader of the party. It is also the duty of 
the congress to consider all reports 
submitted by the National Executive Council, 
e.g. financial and general reports. 
The congress is 
matters appearing 
decisions thereon. 
necessary, amend 
expected to discuss all 
on the agenda and to take 
It must also, where 
the constitution from time 
to time in 
Constitution 
function at 
the interests of the party (LPP 
1979:16). The aggregation 
this level of the party is 
performed on a very limited scale. 
4.2.3.1.2 METHODS OF AGGREGATION IN THE LPP 
As has been shown, the machinery for the aggregation process in the 
Lebowa People's 
at all levels 
enrolled as a 
Party is well entrenched and adequately provided for 
in the party's constitution. Theoretically, anyone 
member of the Lebowa People's Party has the right to 
propose at a meeting of his branch a resolution on any matter 
164 
pertaining to the programme of principles and programme of action of 
the party, on the policy of the government and the decisions of the 
Executive Council or Cabinet to do with any of the existing 
government departments. 
In practice, due to certain limiting factors, this is not always 
possible in Lebowa. The 'prevailing traditional tribal structures 
have for centuries been fulfilling the articulation and aggregation 
functions, long before the introduction of parties into the Lebowa 
political process. The party system is, therefore, still a strange 
phenomenon to the people of Lebowa and the people still resort to 
their traditional tribal structures for the articulation and 
aggregation of their political demands. In some of the districts in 
Lebowa party branches do not exist. 
Often tribesmen join the party solely on the instruction of their 
traditional leader (Kgoshi or Headman). As a result, their 
membership is most often inactive and passive as they are wholly 
unaware of their rights and obligations as party members. It is 
still difficult for the most inhabitants of Lebowa to differentiate 
between the ruling party's activities and those of the government or 
State. 
While the role of the Lebowa People's Party in the fulfilment of the 
interest 
stated 
outside 
aggregation 
clearly that 
the party 
function needs to be acknowledged, it should be 
the aggregation function is performed largely 
machinery. When the party does perform this 
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function, the flow of communication within the party is usually from 
top to bottom, with rank and file members rarely initiating the 
process (author's observation). 
4.3 ELECTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF AGGREGATION 
The structural 
aggregation) has 
aspect of this conversion function (interest 
been dealt with. The Lebowa People's Party was 
discussed as a political party involved in interest aggregation. The 
focus will now shift to the more dynamic aspects of interest 
aggregation, and especially the role of the political party therein. 
In this respect, elections are extremely significant for the 
aggregation of interests by parties and their candidates. 
The first general election in Lebowa in 1973 was not contested on a 
party political basis. "In the Lebowa rationalization of campaigns 
resulted in the formation of groups of candidates, who established 
political parties soon after the first elections in support of the 
new incumbent Chief Minister or the contender for that post" (Kotze 
1978:127). The political parties established shortly after this 
first election were the ruling Lebowa People's Party and the Lebowa 
National Party. The opposition Lebowa National Party voluntarily 
dissolved in March 1974 after the first elections (Kotze 1978:129). 
The 1978 and the 1983 general elections in Lebowa were also not 
contested on party political bases, but the 1989 general election was 
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contested on this basis. 
only registered party, 
The ruling Lebowa People's Party being the 
was challenged by numerous independent 
candidates. The main issues during the election campaign were: 
(a) Participation or nonparticipation in the envisaged National 
Statutory Council. 
(b) Ways and means of scrapping apartheid laws. 
(c) The administrative procedure regarding the supply of books 
and stationery to schools in Lebowa by the government. 
The LPP organized several rallies specifically with a view to 
explaining these issues (see Annexures A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H to 
this chapter). 
During the election campaign all candidates standing for election to 
the Lebowa Legislative Assembly aggregated the articulated interests 
and demands of their voters into a set of policy proposals and a 
programme of action. These were published by the LPP and the 
individual candidates in documents usually referred to as "Election 
Manifestos", with the aim of gaining victory at the polls to install 
decision makers who would use the previously aggregated policy 
structure as a basis for rule making. 
Different election manifestos were distributed by the LPP election 
candidates and the independent candidates. The LPP had no uniform 
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aggregated policy structure or common election manifesto for its 
candidates. Instead, candidates individually worked out their own 
election manifestos according to the needs and interests of their 
particular constituencies (author's observation). 
This lack of uniformity with regard to an aggregated policy statement 
by party members during elections was encouraged by the fact that the 
party leadership at the branch level failed to regulate the 
nomination of candidates for election. As a result, in several 
constituencies, the LPP nominated more candidates than the number of 
seats allocated to those particular constituencies which meant that 
LPP candidates actually opposed each other. This promoted disunity 
and an unhealthy competition between party members (author's 
observation). 
The two different election manifestos prepared and presented by two 
LPP election teams in the constituency of Bochum serve as a good 
example to illustrate this point. The two election manifestos were 
in complete opposition to one another and, therefore, failed to 
advance any uniform aggregated policy statement to the voters on 
behalf of the LPP. For further details see Annexures A and B to this 
chapter. 
In this instance, the party failed to coordinate the aggregation 
process of the party during the election campaign. In many 
constituencies the LPP, however, did not experience this problem. 
Most of the LPP candidates worked out comprehensive and well 
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aggregated election manifestos covering diverse interests and demands 
of the voters. The election manifestos issued by the LPP candidates 
in the Naphuno and Thabamoopo constituencies are examples of such an 
instance. These manifestos are contained in Annexures C and D to 
this chapter. 
The independent candidates in all the constituencies also played a 
significant role in aggregating diverse interests and demands through 
election manifesto documents. Their aggregated policy statements 
lacked uniformity 
membership. The 
because they were not bound by conditions of party 
election manifestos issued by the independent 
candidates in the Sekhukhune and Seshego constituencies are contained 
in Annexures E, F and G to this chapter. 
The contents of all the election manifestos as contained in the 
Annexures to this chapter serve to illustrate the effectiveness of 
elections as a function of aggregation in the Lebowa political 
process. 
4.3.1. ELECTORAL DIVISIONS 
Since Lebowa became a self-governing territory on 2 October 1972 
until the 1983 general election, the 12 magisterial districts or 
regional authority areas within the territory were used as electoral 
divisions. Since then, and particularly after the Moutse electoral 
division was incorporated into KwaNdebele, there are only eleven 
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electoral divisions (Lebowa Electoral Proclamation R226 of 1972 
Section 4). 
There shall be a polling station at the seat of the returning officer 
for each constituency and at such other places within his area of 
jurisdiction as he may deem necessary (Lebowa Electoral Proclamation 
R226 of 1972 Section 6). During the 1989 general election in Lebowa, 
more than 2600 polling stations were established to cater for voters 
inside and outside the boundaries of Lebowa. 
4.3.2 ELECTORAL OFFICERS 
In terms of the Electoral Proclamation, the Minister shall appoint an 
electoral officer for Lebowa who is an officer of the Lebowa 
Government service or an officer of the public service of the 
Republic who 
Black States 
Cabinet of 
has been designated in terms of section 5 (4) of the 
Constitution Act, 1971 (Act 21 of 1971), to assist the 
Lebowa. The electoral 
conduct of the election of members 
(Proclamation R226 of 1972 Section 2). 
officer is responsible for the 
of the Legislative Assembly 
The electoral officer in turn appoints district Magistrates ex-
officio as district control officers and returning officers for the 
areas over which they exercise jurisdiction. A returning officer may 
appoint as many deputy returning officers, polling officers, and 
witnesses as he may deem necessary to assist him during elections 
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(Proclamation R226 of 1972, Sections 3 & 4). During the 1989 Lebowa 
general elections, senior civil servants from both the Lebowa and the 
R.S.A. including school teachers, were engaged as deputy returning 
officers, polling officers and witnesses. 
4.3.3 REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AND THE VOTERS ROLL 
Provision for the registration of voters was made for the first time 
in preparation for the 1989 general election in Lebowa (Lebowa 
General Election Act 7 of 1988). During the 1989 election the 
majority of voters were registered on the day of the election largely 
because the people of Lebowa were not yet acquainted with the process 
of registration. 
in advance. 
As a result, the voters roll could not be compiled 
4.3.4 REPRESENTATION 
Conflict over the delimitation and redelimitation of constituencies 
within a country often has a long history. There are certain factors 
or directives to be considered when the delimitation of 
constituencies is undertaken. In a country such as the Republic of 
South Africa, these factors are clearly stipulated in the Electoral 
Act, 1946 (Act 46 of 1946 as amended). Kleynhans summarised these 
factors as follows (1977: 14-15): 
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(a) Community or diversity of interests. 
(b) Means of communication. 
(c) Physical features. 
(d) Boundaries of existing constituencies. 
(e) Sparcity or density of population. 
(f) Probability of increase or decrease in the population. 
(g) Boundaries of local administrative and magisterial districts. 
In the Republic of South Africa, the task of delimitation or redeli-
mitation is periodically entrusted to a delimitation commission 
consisting of three Supreme Court judges appointed by the State 
President (Constitution and Election Amendment Act 79 of 1973). 
Lebowa is divided into eleven constituencies and has a multi-member 
constituency system. Constitutionally, there are no legal norms or 
rules governing the delimitation or the redelimitation of 
constituencies in Lebowa. No redelimitation of constituencies has 
taken place 
the past 16 
in Lebowa since the first general election in 1973. For 
years Lebowa has had the following electoral divisions 
and representatives per electoral division: 
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ELECTORAL DIVISION 
1. Seshego 
2. Sekhukhune 
3 . Thabamoopo 
4. Mokerong 
5. Naphuno 
6. Namakgale 
7. Bolobedu 
8. Sekgosese 
9. Bochum 
10. Nebo 
11. Mapulaneng 
Total 
NUMBER OF ELECTED 
MEMBERS 
4 
7 
4 
6 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
5 
2 
38 
VOTES CAST IN 1989 
GENERAL ELECTION 
114 805 
188 565 
117 900 
145 395 
50 198 
4 410 
50 745 
43 971 
31 831 
163 571 
40 657 
952 048 
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(Policy and budget speech of the Minister of Home Affairs, 1989, 
Table 3, page 29). 
4.3.5 NOMINATION OF MEMBERS 
4.3.5.1 PARTY NOMINATIONS 
The LPP's 
governing 
task vests 
constitution provides no specific rules or procedures 
the nomination of candidates. The responsibility for this 
in the National Executive Council (LPP Constitution 
1979:14). According to the policy and budget speech of the Minister 
of Home Affairs (1989:30), the party fielded 70 candidates as against 
81 independent candidates during the 1989 Lebowa general election. 
It is interesting to note that the party nominated 32 candidates more 
than the 38 seats available in the Legislative Assembly for elected 
members. This resulted in personal clashes and conflict between some 
of the party candidates in constituencies such as Bochum, Thabamoopo 
and Mokerong (Cf. those Annexures to this chapter that are LPP elec-
tion Manifestos distributed in these constituencies by members who 
opposed each other). 
4.3.5.2 OFFICIAL NOMINATIONS 
The returning officer in charge of an electoral division determines 
the day and the place on which candidates for an election in that 
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division will be nominated in terms of the Lebowa Electoral 
Proclamation (R226 of 1972). The nomination court sits from 09h00 
until 12h00 on the day in question. 
In terms of section 11 of Proclamation R226 of 1972, it is stipulated 
that: 
If at a sitting of a nomination court a greater number of 
candidates than the number of members to be elected for that 
division have been duly nominated, the returning officer 
shall before the closing of the sitting of the nomination 
court require that there be deposited with him, by or on 
behalf of each person so nominated, the sum of R500 in cash. 
During the 1989 
officially nominated 
Lebowa general election 151 candidates were 
to contest the 38 seats available for elected 
members in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. 
4.3.5.6 ELECTION RESULTS 
In terms of section 31 of the Lebowa Electoral Proclamation (R226 of 
1972), the returning officer shall upon completion of the counting of 
votes, forthwith advise the electoral officer by registered post in a 
sealed envelope of the outcome of the election in his district. 
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The electoral officer, upon 
returning officers, proceeds 
presence 
results 
of 
of 
two 
the 
witnesses 
election. 
receipt 
to open 
of these results from all 
the sealed envelopes in the 
who are Magistrates, and determines the 
The electoral officer and such witnesses 
certify in writing the results so determined as correct, and 
forthwith declare the winning candidates elected (Proclamation R226 
of 1972, Section 34). 
A common complaint among voters in Lebowa is that the results of 
elections are announced several days after the polling day. In the 
1989 general election the results were announced seven days after the 
polling day. 
4.4 STYLES OF INTEREST AGGREGATION 
According to 
are at least 
Almond and Powell's structural functional model, there 
three different styles of interest aggregation. These 
are termed pragmatic bargaining, absolute value oriented, and 
traditionalistic interest aggregation (1966:108). These three styles 
of interest aggregation and their applicability to the aggregation 
process in the Lebowa political system will be examined below. 
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4.4.1 THE PRAGMATIC BARGAINING STYLE 
This style of interest aggregation characterizes aggregation in such 
systems as are found in the United States of America and Great 
Britain. A wide variety of interests are brought together and re-
duced to a limited number of policy alternatives in these countries. 
"This aggregation is sometimes guided by more general ideological 
perspectives, but the accommodation of diverse interests is its more 
notable characteristic. Compromise and the 'atmosphere of the 
market-place' dominate the aggregation process, whether the function 
is performed by party, legislature, or cabinet" (Almond & Powell 
1966:108). 
The narrowing down and combining of policy wishes cannot be easily 
discerned in noncompetitive party systems such as that of Lebowa. 
The elements of this style of aggregation are, however, observable 
not only within the Lebowa People's Party, but also at Cabinet and 
legislative level in Lebowa. On the other hand, it should be pointed 
out that "compromise and the 'atmosphere of the market place'" which 
regulate aggregation in countries such as the United States and Great 
Britain, are not yet fully prevalent in Lebowa because of limiting 
factors such as traditionalism and the prevailing parochial political 
culture which have already been dealt with. 
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4.4.2 THE ABSOLUTE VALUE ORIENTED STYLE 
This style of aggregation "refuses to compromise the principles of 
policy for the sake of accommodating diverse interests .... The 
aggregator works out the 'logical' solution to a problem and develops 
policy to correspond to it. Interests are aggregated in strict 
accordance with the theoretically perfect solution" (Almond & Powell 
1966:108). A good example hereof is the National Party of the 
Republic of South Africa and its policy of separate development. 
Elements of this style of aggregation are also observable within the 
Lebowa People's Party, although not in a strong form. There are 
certain policy principles regarding specific sensitive issues which 
the Lebowa People's Party may not compromise for the sake of 
accommodating diverse interests. A good example hereof is "the 
entrenchment and the protection of traditional Chieftainship in the 
Lebowa" (LPP Election Manifesto, 1989). A second example is the 
principle of "non negotiability of the so-called independence for the 
self-governing states as designed by the R.S.A. Government through 
its policy of separate development" (LPP Constitution 1979:3). 
4.4.3 THE TRADITIONALISTIC STYLE 
"Traditionalistic styles of aggregation rely upon the patterns of the 
past in suggesting policy alternatives for the future ...• Such 
aggregation is typical of systems in which the resources and energies 
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of most members of the society are committed by the social and econo-
mic patterns of the traditional culture to long-established and prede-
termined goals" (Almond & Powell 1966:109). 
As has been stated, many of the people of Lebowa still use 
traditional tribal structures for the articulation and aggregation of 
their political demands. The introduction of the party system was a 
recent phenomenon in 
leaders still play a 
the Lebowa political system. Traditional 
significant role within the structures of the 
Lebowa People's Party in respect of the aggregation function. 
From the above, it is evident that elements of all three styles of 
aggregation as described by Almond and Powell, namely, the pragmatic 
bargaining style, the absolute value oriented style, and the 
traditionalistic style are to be found in the Lebowa People's Party's 
aggregation style. The elements of the traditionalistic style are, 
however, stronger than those of other styles. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
From the discussion above, 
and the political party 
it is evident that both the bureaucracy 
regarded by Almond and Powell to be the 
most likely candidates for this specialised role - are to be found as 
aggregation structures in Lebowa, although they do not fulfil this 
function equally. The bureaucracy in Lebowa performs the interest 
aggregation function at the tribal, regional, and central authority 
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levels. The significant and important role played by district 
Magistrates in this regard was emphasised. 
At the central level, the various government departments also perform 
the aggregation function. The preparation of a budget by these 
departments was highlighted as a function of aggregation. 
Elections in Lebowa were also discussed as a function of aggregation. 
In this regard, some election manifestos were briefly referred to. 
The political party is not a major interest aggregator in the Lebowa 
political system at present. The people of Lebowa, to a large 
extent, still understand and use traditional tribal structures for 
the articulation and aggregation of their political demands. Since 
the first general 
People's Party has 
interest aggregator. 
election in Lebowa during 1973, the ruling Lebowa 
failed to make any significant impact as a major 
The organizational structure of this party 
clearly accommodates and provides for channels of communication for 
the articulation and aggregation of interests, but as already 
mentioned, the parochial political culture presently prevalent in 
Lebowa is not conducive to a free and democratic party political 
system. 
In ref erring to several factors which contributed to the decline of 
opposition not only in Lebowa but in all Homelands, Prof. D.A. Kotze 
commented as follows (1978:129): 
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Homeland based pa+ties operating there rely largely on 
existing traditional structures for organization and 
recruitment of support, particularly on the Chiefs and 
Headmen 
one of 
and their councillors. Unsurprisingly, tribalism is 
the greatest divisive influences in homeland 
politics. 
homeland 
government 
status by 
Chiefs and Headmen are totally dependent on the 
governments for their remuneration as minor 
functionaries, for official recognition of the 
which they become eligible for membership of local 
authorities and legislative assemblies, and which entitle 
them to act as the mouthpieces of their communities. Threats 
of withdrawal of scarce resources from communities overtly 
supporting opposition parties, and the allocation of 
resources to communities which support the ruling party, have 
proved to be effective in convincing many rural communities 
to support the governing parties. 
This statement provides support for the point made earlier about the 
role of traditionalism in the Lebowa political process. While the 
interest aggregation function is performed by many structures, the 
traditional structures are still dominant in Lebowa. The next 
chapter will deal specifically with rulemaking. 
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./ 
LEBOWA ELECTIONS 
1989 
BOCH UM 
1. MR. S. MORATA (Independent) 
(a) No experience as a politician 
2. 
3. 
(b) Educational standards - questionable 
(c) His 1.0. must be tested for fitness 
. . 
MR. N.P. CHULA {Home-made L.P.P. member) 
(a) No experience as a politician . 
(b) His 1.0. must be tested for fitness 
(c) Educational qualifications - questionable 
(d) He looks a "Moruti" not a "Politician" 
MR. MOLELE (lndepeLndent) 
(a) No experience 
(b) Standard of education not enough 
(c) Not fit as a politician 
ANNEXURE J. 
---,-... -·--· ·-
4. MR. OLIVER LEBOHO (Independent) 
(a) A born teacher - not a politician 
(b) No previous experience in politics 
• ·- :.-- -,... •·~-•• ---;'- .r•-....••-· f'-~.-·---··-----· .. ---- :t9':1: .,._._..,.._ -- ~- ...... -'"'\,._.. ·-···- ...... ·-· -,... ··----... -......... · ... ~·-----;-· -· ...... ,·.~-~-
5. MR.. TLOUBATLA (Independent) . '.. 
(a) No previous experience , 
(b) Fit as a policeman, not as a politician \ 
' ; 
6. MR. V.B. LETLALO (L.P.P. Member) ·i 
(a) Experienced - Municipal elections t 
(b) An orator by birth - A hard worker ~ .. 
(c) An ex - teacher, wood work instructor f .. 
(d) A senior SANTA Official - Health Educafor 1• .: : · .: 
(e) An ex - municipal clerk · ; .. :;>::.~;- · -
(f) A founder member of L.P.P. - Reef areas , ' 
... 
ELECT THIS MAN AND BOCHUM WILL PROSPER 
7. MR. M.T.D. LEBOHO (L.P.P. Member) f , · 
(a) He has 15 years experience in politics b'ut failed to achieve anything for Bochum 
(b) He was once demoted as Deput'{- speaker because of poor performance · ..... -·-· 
(c) He makes promises which never come true (e.g. railway from Pletersburg to Brompiek) 
(d) He should be asked to step down as a 1989 candidate . 
(e) He should be loyal to his "Kgoshi" (This is a serious state of affairs) . · ... . .. _ : 
- - - ......... _ -~.:-.-~.,-.~. ~\;::~ .. -,"'"'·~- ,.:..:.. __ .,._·.·::-: .. · .. 1.-.;.--~-~·.:"1"•1'· ..... ~·~--.-:··.- .... ~ .... -' ,-.-,. ....... :----~ 
MR. M.D. KOBE (L.P.P. Member, Deputy Minister of transport & traffic) 
(a) Ten years of frultfull service to the Boch um constituency & to Lebowa as a whole 
{b) HERE IS YOUR MAN: VOTE HIM TO PARLIAMENT . · . · 
8. 
(c) He is Bochum's BEST politician. . ii' , ., . .. .· ·.: : 
(d) He posesses the best l.Q. needed for a politician . 
(e) He is presently a Cabinet Minister (Deputy) .·· · , · . 
(f) He has been a Minister less than a year.and he has given Bochum the following: 
1) A college of education ·. 
2) Tarred road from Bochum to Dendron 
3) Improvement of Helen Frans Hospital' 
4) Permits for the Bochum Taxi Association 
5) Improvements to all roads in Bochum 
6) A stadium is on the way : · 
7) To Magoshi: More land is my serious desire and ambition for the Bochum people 
;... ~-
N. 8. MAKE NO MISTAKE, IF so6H.UM IS TO SURVIVE VOTE FO~ . 
M.D. KOBE and V.B. LETLALO 
A. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
B. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
c. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
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KGETHA KGETHA KGETH.:\ Y~ LA 12 APRIL (A) LE (B) 
CHULA NAKED! PHINEAS 
KE SEBOLEDI SE SE WMILENG. 
0 TSEBA DIPOLITIKI TiiWII. . 
0 APOLOIBE ThE KOBE A DI DIRAI\G h.'WA TlKWA. 
LEBOHO MAXWELL TEBELW DA\'IDSON 
KA 1975 KE 11-IOMILE GO BOLELA KA TRAINING COLLEGE GE BETIIESDA E HUDUGA. 
KA 1975 KE BOLETSE KA MEGOLO TA BATSOFADI LE GOREE O~WE. 0 BE A LE KAE? 
KA 1978 KA BA MODULA-SETULO \\'A ADVISORY BOARD YA TSA TEMO GO FIHLELA LEHO NO. 
KA 1983 KA BA MODULA-SETULO \\'A ~A MAPHELO GO FIHLELA LEHONO. 0 TSEBANG? 
KA 1986 KA ROLA MODIRO WA BO-SPEAKARA KA GE KE ~EKE FAHLEGA. 
KA 1989 KA BO ELA KA KGOPELWA GORE KE BEMOTLAIBA SPEAKARA KA BAKA LA BOKGONI 
SEPETLELE SA HELENE FRANZ SE OKEDI~WE KA KGOPOLO YA KA LE TA MOHU DR 
MACHUPYE. 
SEPETLELE SA BLOUBERG LE SONA RE TLA SE OKETSA KA"~ONA DIKGOPOLO TSA RENA. 
SEKONTIRI KE BOL£1SE KA SONA GO TLOGA 1980 ESITA LE KA 1989. 
KE ROM~E BANj:NYANA BA 12 K\\'AJANE FURSE LE MOKOPANE GO ITHUTELA BOOKI. 
KE ROME'fS'E BASIMANE KWA TURFLOOP LE KWA TOMPI SELEKA. 
MOHLAGASE KE BOLElSE KA \VONA GO TLOGA 1980 ESITA LE KA 1989. 
BATiiO BA BA BEGO BA BETIIWA. KE BA RWELE KA KOWI GO BA ISA BOCHUM. 
KOBE DONALD MOLA.MU (GA ROLE MODIRO PELE A MAKALA 
KE MOTHO WA SEKGOSESE GA SE :-.!OTHO WA BOCHUM. 
KE SEBAKA BOGOSI LE SELWELA MAEMO. I 
0 TLOGILE GA RAMOKGOPA A TSHABA KA GORE 0 BE A TSHEPISllSE BATiiO TSOKO GO 
HUDUSA BATLOKWA. 
GE A FIHLA INDERMARK A LWELA BO-NTONA LE MORENA MOSHOKOA. 
0 PALE TS'WE KE GO THU~A BO-RADI TAXI BA BOCHUM KA "DI-CF" 
KE TOHLA. 0 LWESA KGOSI TA BAHANANWA LE BAREKI BA BOCHUM. 
0 THO.MILE LEKGOTLA LA TIKWAA :-.'YAfebRE.QIONALAlITHORI1YYA TIKWA. 
KOBE M.D. GA 1LOGELE GO BAKA BOGOSI: TSA DIPOLITI; LE GO BAKA l\fAEMO. 
SEP0RO GO YAALLDAYS SE TLAA GIWA GE TOROPO YAALLDAYS E FEIA GO AGTWA. 
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THABAMOOPO 
JW! FOR 
Kgethang· Rena KADI 
PEACE-AND PROSPERITY: 
; 
11th APRIL 1989 
MAPUTLE M. MALEKA TLADl T.J.M. MOTHi\PO MNGUNI G.S. PHAMPAN~ 
L BOGOSH! bo tl.1 bewa 10·.1dulong a bjona 
go ya ka melao ya s .. t •o sa rena. 
2. TEMO e t;la kaonafati.wu., e bile e tla 
fiwa sedi e kgolo. 
3. THUTO c tla fiwa Sedi e kgolo lenancong 
la rena, mohlala: TLHATLHO ya kgetho 
ya dithuto. 
4. TSA KGWEBO LE TSWELETSO: Babeeletsi ba 
gae le ba mosetsa ba tla tlhotlheletswa 
go beeletsa ka Lebowa. 
S. TIRELO YA MMUso e tla hlokomelwa go ya 
ka Bokgoni le t§homisano ka moya wa 
setho di tla hlohlelets~a. , 
6. .LEKGOTLA LA BASOMEDI BA MMUSO fe ltla 
tsosoloswa. La f iwa ditikelo tsa mokgatlo 
wa bodiredi bja 11U11uso. 
7. Go tla ba le TOKA go batho ka moka ka 
Lebowa. 
i l. . Dikgoro tsa tsheko di ka sc 
tsenatsenwe kc Dipolitiki. 
ii) Mclao yn noi tnhwnro bj;i m.,phocli n;i 
e tla elwa tlhoko ka mcflo c gofcla. 1 
8. TSA MAPHELO. 
a) DIPETLELE di tla agwa mo di nyakega-
go gona. Dingaka tsa gae le tsa 
mosetsa di tla hlohlelctswa go tlo 
soma Dipetleleng tsa Lebowa. 
b)' HPHIWAFELJ\: Mogolo wa batsofadi le 
digolc o tla kgothaletswa go lefsa 
kgwedi ka kgwedi. 
9. TSA PIBEPO: Di tla hlokomelwa. Borameepo 
ba gae le ba mose - a-mawatle ba tlo 
hlohleletswa go bula mcepo e meswa ka 
Lebowa. 
10. DIPOLEDlsANO LE MMUsO WA GARE: Ka kokctso 
ya naga,kaonafatso, phedisano le khutso di 
tla tswetswa pele bathona. 
11. RE TLA LWELA MOLl\O WA U.1";,.,q:;Lo 'l'sJ\ 
Bl\THO Kl\ MOK/\ Bl\ l\FRIKJ\ Il')RWJ\. 
a) Di toke lo tse swanang bathong -k.a .. 
moka. 
b) Kabagano ya mahumo e lekanago 
bathong ka moka ba Afrika Borwa. 
cl Kabagano ye e lekanago ya naga 
bathong ka moka. 
d) Megolo ya go lekana mesomong e 
lekanago. 
e) Thut· ·· swanang bathong ka moka 
ba Afr _;;.a Borwa. 
f) Basomi ba lokologe go soma mo ba 
ratago. 
12. SELO SEO GO Tffi'lENG KE BOIPUsO GI\ SE 
NYAKEGE: E bile ga re nyake l'e go 
bolela ka sona. 
13. KA LEIHLO LE BOGALE: 
al Re tlo ikgokaganya le mekgatlo ya 
baswa gore re tlo kgona go kgoka-
ganya Dikgopolo tsa batala le tsa 
baswa. 
b) Re tla ilcgokaganya le mekgatlo le 
Mebuso ya dit!;haba tsc dingwc. 
l~.KABO YI\ DIDIRls~I\ mo Magosing c tla 
elwa hloko. 
By T.J.M. Moth.1nn.!Jnx 10(., •1•11r1Tnt\1r:w1.' n·1"·"" 
l. BOGOSlll shall be placed in. its right 
position in terms of BLACK CUSTOMS 
2. AGRICULTURE shall be upgraded and shall 
receive our.utmost consideration. 
3. EDUCATION shall receive ou·r ser"ious con-
sideration on our AGENDA. 
e.g. CAREER GUIDANCE SHALL BE INTRODUCED 
IN LEBOW/\. 
4. COMMERCE and INDUSTRIES: Local and 
overseas investors will be encouraged 
to invest in LEBOWA. 
s. PUBLIC SERVICE~: shall be looked into: 
Efficiency and Workmans spirit shall be 
encouraged. 
6. PUBLIC SERVANTS ASSOCIATION shall be 
revived and given the right of associa-
tion in the.Government Services. 
7. THERE SHALL BE JUSTICE for all in Lcbowa 
i) Judiciary shall: be free of intcr-
ferenc·e by POLITICIJ\NS 
Ii l l'ol icr cocl.- of ••t hirn nl1;111 1u•~ i<>1111· 
ly be considered. 
8. HEALTH: Hospitals shall be provid
1
ed 
where there is a need. 
al Local and overseas noc·rons will be 
encouraged to work in I.1-:BOWI\ HOSP I-
tals. 
bl WELFARI::: Monthly pay for Pensioners 
shall be introduced timeously. 
9. MINING INDUSTRY shall be atlendcd to: 
Local and Overseas mining houses shall 
be encouraged -to explore mineral 
resources in LEBOW/\. 
10. NEGOTIATIONS with the central 
GOVERNMENT for more land 1 better and 
peaceful! future for all S. Africans 
will be continued. 
11. ",>Jc will !ltrivc for the- Bil.I, OF H~Cll'l'S 
- - tor·a1t·s~ 'A"f-rican·s; - - --
al Equal rights for all. 
b) Equal share of wealth in s. Africa 
cl Equal share of land. 
d) Equal pay for equal work. 
· e) Same education. 
(f} Yreedom of labour. 
12. The so called INDEPENDENCF. for National· 
State is :mN-NEGOTIABLE. 
a·) We will seriously consider communi-
cations with youth organisations in 
order ~o bridge ~he Generation gap. 
bl We will consider cummunications with 
other Natoinal States and organisa-
tions. 
14. The provi~ions of infrar.tructure in all 
areas of MJIGOSlfl .,.ill b,., :;criously' 
attended to. 
VOTE FOR 
KGETHANG · 
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LEBOWA GENERAL ELECTION 1989 
Mr. K.A. MARIRI 
"A FREE CANDIDATE" 
MANEFESTO FOR 
MR. KGOBALALE ADAM MARIRI 
OF THE 
SEKHUKHUNELAND CONSTITUENCY 
ELECTION IN LEBOWA 
1. I SHALL STRIVE FOR THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF LEBOWAWITHIN THE CONTEXT 
OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A WHOLE. 
2. I SHALL STRIVE FOR A NON-RACIAL, UNITARY SOUTH AFRICA BASED ON FREE MARKET ECONOMY ANO 
MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY. 
3. I REJECT THE ETHNIC INDEPENDENCE FOR LEBOWA ANO PERPETUATION OF APARTHEID. 
4. I REJECT DETENTION OF PEOPLE WITHOUT TRIAL 
5. I SHALL STRIVE FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS ANO MORATORIUM 
FOR POLITICAL EXILES. 
6. I WILL STRIVE FOR THE BUI LOING OF ADDITIONAL CLINICS ANO HOSPITALS. 
7. I WILL STRIVE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE PENSIONERS PAYMENTS. 
8. I WILL STRIVE FOR THE OFFERING OF BURSARIES TO PROSPECTIVE MEDICAL DOCTORS ANO 
ENGINEERS. 
9. I WILL STRIVE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF ALL THE NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE. 
10. I WILL STRIVE FOR THE BUILDING OF ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOLS AND TRADE SCHOOLS. 
11. I SHALL STRIVE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TECHNICON ANO ADDITIONAL UNIVERSITY. 
12. I SHALL STRIVE FOR THE IMPORTATION OF THE SUITABLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS FOR ENGLISH, 
MATHEMATICS ANO PHYSICS. 
13. THE IMPROVEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION AND FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSE 
SHALL RECEIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY. 
14. I SHALL STRIVE FOR LOWER BANK INTEREST RATES ON BUSINESS ANO HOUSING LOANS. 
15. l SHALL STRIVE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL INDUSTRIES, COUPLED WITH LOCAL 
PROCESSING OF OUR MINERALS. 
16. I SHALL FIGHT AGAINST NEPOTISM, CORRUPTION ANO CRIME OF WHATEVER DESCRIPTION. 
17. I SHALL STRIVE FOR THE KEEPING OF RELIABLE POPULATION STATISTICS. 
18. I SHALL RESPECT TRADITIONAL PRACTICES SUCH AS BOGOSH!, THE IDEA OF CANDLE WIFE AND 
INITIATION. 
19. I SHALL STRIVE FOR NONE INTERFERENCE. BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THE INSTITUTION OF BOGOSH I 
FOR THIS IS THE PREROGATIVE OF BAKGOMA, KGADI, BAKGOMANA ANO THE TRIBE CONCERNED. 
20. I SHALL STRIVE FOR THE FORMATION OF STUDENT REPRESENTATIVE COUNCILS IN OUR SCHOOLS. 
22. I SHALL STRIVE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTENCE OF TRADE UNIONS. 
Compiled by Mr Kgobalale Adam Mariri, P.O. Box 29, Oriekop - Printed by C & F Printers, Box 158, Lydenburg 1120. 
VOTE FOR 
KGETHANG 
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LEBOWA GENERAL ELECTION 1989 
MANEFESTO FOR 
MR TAUMANG PETER MAKOLA 
OF THE 
SEKHUKHUNELAND CONSTITUENCY 
Mr. T.P. MAKOLA 
"A FREE CANDIDATE" 
I STAND FOR THE FOLLOWING: 
1. A UNITARY SOUTH AFRICA 
2. FREE MARKET ECONOMY 
3. MULTI PARTY DEMOCRACY 
4. ABOLITION OF APARTHEID AND THE STATE OF 
EMERGENCY 
5. NON-RACIALISM 
6. FAIR DISTRIBUTION OF LANO 
7. INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY 
8. A BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO SAFEGUARD INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS 
9. CONSOLIDATED LEBOWA . 
10. GEOGRAPHICALLY ENLARGED LEBOW.; 
11. PARDON FOR POLITICAL EXILES 
12. UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS 
13. UNBANNING OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 
14 REPEAL OF ALL THE LAWS OF APARTHEID SUCH AS-
THE GROUP AREAS ACT, THE POPULATION REGISTRA-
TION ACT AND THE SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT 
I STRONGLY REJECT THE FOLLOWING: 
1. ETHNIC INDEPENDENCE FOR LEBOWA 
2. DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL 
3. EXCESSIVE INCOME TAX RATES 
4. EXCESSIVE BANK INTEREST RATES ON LOANS FOR 
BUSINESS AND HOUSING PURPOSES 
5. NEPOTISM AND.CORRUPJ"JON .. _ ... _ -- _ 
6. TRICAMERAL OR WHATEVER FORM OF SEGREGATED 
PARLIAMENT 
IF ELECTED I SHALL STRIVE FOR THE FOLLOWING: 
A. IMPROVEMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE SUCH AS ROADS, BRIDGES, AND SUPPLY OF TELEPHONES AND ELECTRICITY 
TO THE COMMUNITIES. 
B. BUILDING OF ADDITIONAL SCHOOLS, CLINICS, HOSPITALS, TECHNICON AND A SECOND UNiVERSITY IN LEBOWA 
C. IMPORTATION OF SUITABLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS FOR ENGLISH, PHYSICS ANO MATHEMATICS. 
D. ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY FOR DRINKING AND AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES 
E. FORMATION OF WOMENS, YOUTH AND STUDENTS' ORGANISATIONS 
F. FORMATION OF LABOUR UNIONS 
G. LOCAL PROCESSING OF OUR MINERALS 
... ~ .... 
,, . 
Complied by: Taumang Peter Makola, P.O. Box 73, Apel. Sekhukhune1ai:i_d 0739 - Printed by C&F Printers Box 158 Lydenburg 1120 
ANNEXURE G 
LEBOWA GENERAL ELECTIONS 12APRIL1989 J . 
SESHEGO CONSTITUENCY . 
No Indep~nde.nce for Lebowa 
FREE CANDIDATES FOR FREE ELECTIONS 
l.K.MOLOKO 
B.A. (UNISA) 
EX-·SCHOOL. INSPECTOR. 
EX-SPEAKER. 
EX-MINISTER OF 
EDUCATION. MEMBER OF 
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
A. NTJIE 
EX. PRINCIPAL 
SEC. SCHOOL TEACHER 
CHAIRMAN: MAKGABENG 
COMMUNITY AUTHORITY 
We, your free candidates stand for:-
FREEDOM 
1. No Independence for Lebowa. 
2. One Democratic South Africa 
3. Constitutional Protection of basic Human 
Rights 
4. Freedom of Religion 
5. Respect and protection of Bogoshi. 
EQUALITY 
1. Absolute Equality for all people 
2. Abolition of Apartheid ·in all its forms 
3. Equal Educational afld equal medical 
facilities · 
PROSPERITY 
1. A free market Economy 
2. Improved infrastructure for Lebowa 
3. An Administration free of corruption 
FOR A F.UTURE WITHOUT FEAR - VOTE 
FREE. 
BOLOKOLOGI 
1. Independence e a ila Lebowa 
2. Afrika-Borwa e tee ya Demokrasi 
3. Ditokelo tsa Setho-Setho 
4. Tumelo e lokologilego 
5. Tlhompho le tshireletso ya Bogoshi 
TEKANELO 
1. Go lekana ga bathe kamoka 
2. Go fediswa ga Apartheid yohle 
3. Ditlabakelo tse swanago thutong le 
Kalafong 
TSWELO-PELE 
1 . Ekonomi e lokologilego 
2. Metheo-tiro e kaone 
3. Puso e hlokago bohlaswa 
· COMPILED BY IKE MOLOKO BOX 5, 
LONSDALE. 
Printed By: Classmate Printers P.O. Box 2737 Pietersburg Tel. 71686 
ANNEXURE H 
LEBOWA GENERAL ELECTION 
1989 - 04 - 12 
Mr. Sekgopela Winias Mashile Mr. Matsikitsane Laynas Mashile 
MAPULANENG CONSTITUENCY 
-- - -~---- . ---- - ··---·. --
FREE CANDIDATES 
Vootelang Barwa ba Mashile bagale ba pale. Taelo ka 
setshaba magareng ga tse dingwe, re ekemesed.itse 
go Lwela University, Naga le di-intasitiri le tse dingwe. 
Vote for Mashile Brothers.· The true Leaders. 
Mandate from the people, 
amongst others we will fight for . 
Land issue, University, and industries etc. etc .... 
PRINTED BY MINIT PRINT NELSPRUIT 
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CHAPTER 5: RULE-MAKING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
If human beings are to live in close proximity to one another, cer-
tain rules imposing obligations and limiting conflict are inevitably 
needed. It is quite clear, however, that while the differentiation 
and full legitimation of the rule-making function is a relatively 
recent development, rule-making processes are present in some form in 
all political systems (Almond & Powell 1966:129 & 134). 
The importance and indispensability of the rule-making function in 
any political system, be it traditional or modern, is stressed by the 
two authors. They prefer the concept "rule-making" to the term 
"legislation" because the latter seems to connote specialized struc-
tures and explicit processes (Almond & Powell 1966:132). "Thus, the 
problem of identifying the rule-making structures in political sys-
tems is one of specifying the whole set of agencies and institutions 
involved in the process, determining the kind of things they do, the 
way they do them, and how they interact to produce general rules" 
(Almond & Powell 1966:140). 
The composition, functions and processes of the following rule making 
structures in the Lebowa political system will be discussed below: 
town councils, Tribal and Community Authorities, Regional Authori-
ties, the Legislative Assembly, the Cabinet, the bureaucracy, and the 
Central Government. 
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5.2 TOWN COUNCILS 
5.2.1 COMPOSITION 
There are 14 proclaimed towns in Lebowa. In terms of the provisions 
of the Black Local Authorities Act, 1982 (Act 102 of 1982), the Leb-
owa Government may, by notice in the Government Gazette, establish a 
town council for any town. A town council shall consist of one elect-
ed member for each ward. The councillors are elected separately by 
the voters of the ward concerned by secret ballot. In addition to 
the elected councillors, the Lebowa Government may designate one or 
more members, but the total number of members designated by the 
Lebowa Government may not be more than half of the total number of 
elected members. 
Councillors hold office for a period of three years, and may resign 
their seats or cease to be members by virtue of disqualification. A 
chairman and vice-chairman are elected annually at a special meeting 
of the council from the ranks of the councillors. The Lebowa 
Government may, whenever it deems it expedient to do so, abolish any 
town council (Botha 1983:426). 
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5.2.2 FUNCTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
This chapter 
perform the 
is concerned with the extent to which town councils 
rule making function in the Lebowa political system. In 
theory, a town council may issue regulations in respect of its func-
tions and duties. No regulations made, however, are legally enforce-
able until they have been approved by the Lebowa Government which may 
amend or alter any regulations submitted to it for approval without 
referring back to the town council concerned (R.S.A.: Proclamation, 
293 of 1962). 
Town councils, therefore, have no absolutely unfettered legislative 
powers. A town council may make provision for any matter related to 
the exercising of its powers, or execution of its functions and 
duties, including the delegation of powers to a committee or person 
designated by it (Botha 1983:426-427). 
In practice, the legislative powers of a town council are very 
limited. They have no absolute legislative powers, but are 
controlled directly by the Lebowa Government. The Lebowa Government 
must approve any regulations proposed by a town council. The Lebowa 
Government through its Department of Home Affairs actually 
administers the functions and duties of town councils, while the 
councils merely act in an advisory capacity, assisting town managers 
or superintendents. Although regulations exist which provide for 
more powers to be conferred upon town councils, this has not happened 
in Lebowa in practice. The government of Lebowa, through its 
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Department of Home Affairs plays the most important legislative role 
in the governing of towns (Botha 1983:428-429; R.S.A.: Proclamation 
R293 of 1962). 
Although there are no written statutory rules of procedure in respect 
of the meetings of town councils, the chairman of a council, who is 
sometimes referred to as the "Town Mayor", usually presides over the 
council's meetings and is responsible for the maintenance of 
discipline and order in such meetings. For each meeting held by the 
council, minutes are strictly kept (author's observation). 
5.3 TRIBAL AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES 
5.3.1 COMPOSITION 
In terms of the provisions of the Black Authorities Act, 1951 (Act 68 
of 1951), a Tribal Authority is established for a tribe under a 
traditional Kgoshi, while a Community Authority is established for a 
rural community which does not constitute a tribe or for both a tribe 
and a community. A Tribal Authority consists of the Kgoshi or 
headman of a particular tribe and a fixed number of councillors and 
such other members of the tribe as the Kgoshi may from time to time, 
with concurrence of the councillors holding office, appoint as 
councillors. (R.S.A.: Proclamation R115 of 1969, section 1, schedule 
A). 
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Community Authorities 
councillors elected 
consist of a chairman and a fixed number of 
by male taxpayers for a term of five years. The 
chairman is elected by the councillors from their ranks. 
Community 
lines. 
chairman, 
number of 
Authorities are 
The main off ice 
not constituted along traditional tribal 
vice-chairman, 
councillors 
bearers 
secretary 
varies from 
of a Community Authority are the 
and treasurer. Normally, the 
10 to 25 in each Tribal or 
Community Authority depending on local circumstances and the size of 
the population (Freysen 1984:82). Approximately 141 tribal areas 
have been proclaimed in Lebowa and 6 other groups of people have 
already applied to form Community Authorities (Botha 1983:423). 
5.3.2 FUNCTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
No distinction is made between the functions of tribal and Community 
Authorities. Hereinafter, reference will, therefore, be made to 
Tribal Authorities only, although this will also include Community 
Authorities. While section 4 of the Black Authorities Act, 1951, 
indiscriminately lists the functions of Tribal Authorities without 
isolating functions related to rulemaking as such, it does serve to 
provide a general background to the implied width of scope of issues 
upon which Tribal Authorities may directly or indirectly perform 
rulemaking functions. Although some of the functions are related to 
either rule-application or rule-adjudication, Tribal Authorities 
still have to decide on procedural rules. In terms of section 4 of 
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the Black Authorities Act, 1951, the functions of Tribal Authorities 
are stated to be the following: 
(a) to generally administer the affairs of the tribes and the 
communities in respect of which they have been established; 
(b) to render assistance and guidance to its Kgoshi or headman in 
connection with the performance of his functions, and 
exercise such powers and perform such functions and duties 
conferred or imposed upon the Kgoshi or headman under any 
applicable law or custom, or in terms of any regulations 
required to be exercised or performed by such a Tribal 
Authority; 
(c) to advise and assist the government in connection with 
matters relating to the material, moral and social well-being 
of Blacks residing in the area, including the development and 
improvement of any land within that area; 
(d) to exercise or perform the powers, authorities and functions 
assigned to the authority by the Minister such matters as, in 
his opinion, fall within the spheres of tribal administration 
such as hygiene, sanitation, health services, and soil 
conservation. 
In addition 
make by-laws 
to these functions, Tribal Authorities are empowered to 
regulating the proceedings of and preserving order at 
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their meetings. They may even prescribe fees for services rendered, 
or rates in respect of services made available by any authority. 
Generally, they may make by-laws in respect of any matter falling 
within the parameters of the abovementioned functions (R.S.A.: 
Proclamation R114 of 1969 as amended). By-laws are made by Tribal 
Authorities in Lebowa (Interview: Kgoshigadi (Chieftainess) M.C. 
Maraba, 1990). 
At present, the Tribal Authorities in Lebowa provide extremely 
limited services in respect of health, water, schooling and other 
facilities. 
be supported 
still plays 
Authorities, 
does occur. 
Their competency to do so is still low, and they need to 
by the central authority in many ways. Traditionalism 
a large role in the rule-making process of Tribal 
although the process of modernisation in rule-making 
Different types of meetings where resolutions are taken and by-laws 
are made for the tribe in question are held regularly by Tribal 
Authorities. Depending on the size and the customs of a particular 
tribe, the following types of meetings are usually held by Tribal 
Authorities in Lebowa: 
(a) Meetings between the Tribal Authority and all the headmen 
within the area of jurisdiction of that Tribal Authority. 
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(b) Meetings between the Tribal Authority and some organized 
interest groups within the tribal area such as traditional 
healers. 
(c) Meetings between the Tribal Authority and the office of the 
District Magistrate or a senior government official 
representing a Department of the government of Lebowa. 
(d) Meetings between the Tribal Authority and the tribesmen. 
Similar meetings are also held by Community Authorities, although 
Community Authorities often provide opportunities for a community to 
run its affairs on more democratic basis than is the case with Tribal 
Authorities (Botha 1983:424). 
Unlike the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, Tribal Authorities have no 
fixed rules governing the rule making process. Each tribe adopts 
procedural rules according to its customs and traditions. The 
process of modernisation in rule-making has, however, affected all 
tribes in Lebowa (author's observation). 
Traditional Bogoshi remain an important factor in the rule making 
process within Tribal Authorities. No tribal resolution or by-law 
maybe adopted in Lebowa by a tribe without the blessing and approval 
of the Kgoshi of that tribe (author's observation). 
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5.4 REGIONAL AUTHORITIES 
5.4.1 COMPOSITION 
The members of a regional authority come from the Tribal and 
Community 
authority. 
Authorities within the area of jurisdiction of the regional 
They are: the Kgoshi of and one tribal representative 
from each Tribal Authority; the chairmen of the Community Authorities 
within the boundaries of a regional authority each accompanied by an 
elected councillor from their respective Community Authority (Black 
Authorities Act 68 of 1951, section 3). If there is only one Kgoshi 
in the area, that Kgoshi will be the chairman of the regional 
authority, otherwise the members of the regional authority will 
nominate a Kgoshi as chairman. In the event of a deadlock, the 
Cabinet of Lebowa 
of 1969, Section 
nominates the chairman (R.S.A.: Proclamation R115 
3). A regional authority may appoint three of its 
members including its chairman to form an executive committee which 
assumes its responsibilities during the intervals between the 
meetings of such an authority. 
5.4.2 FUNCTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
In terms of section 5 of the Black Authority Act, the powers and 
functions of regional authorities are stated to be the following: 
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(a) to advise and make recommendations to the Government (of the 
Republic of South Africa) in regard to matters affecting the 
general area under their jurisdiction; 
(b) subject to the provisions of any regulations, and to the 
directions of the Minister of Constitutional Development to 
provide for: 
(i) the establishment, maintenance, management and 
conduct of educational institutions; 
(ii) the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, 
drains, dams, furrows and any works it may consider 
necessary for purposes of sanitation; 
(iii) the suppression of diseases of stock; 
(iv) the establishment, maintenance, management and 
conduct of hospitals, and clinics; 
(v) the improvement of farming and agricultural methods 
generally; 
(vi) afforestation; and 
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(vii) generally all such matters as in the opinion of the 
State President are within the spheres of regional 
administration. 
In practice, regional authorities in Lebowa are not charged with the 
functions and legislative powers as provided for in terms of the 
Black Authorities Act. "They basically advise government on all 
matters affecting the general interests of the people in their areas 
and act as local licensing boards" (Freysen 1984:81). Therefore, 
they contribute very little to the rule-making function. 
Although the functions mentioned above are related to the rule-
application 
width of 
regarding 
the listed 
function, it was deemed necessary to demonstrate the 
the scope initially afforded to regional authorities 
the performance of the rule-making function. Very few of 
functions are, however, performed by regional authorities 
in Lebowa in practice (author's observation). 
Meetings of regional authorities are held at least once every two 
months (Lebowa Regional Authorities Regulations, Proclamation R115 of 
1969). There are no laid down rules of procedure regulating the 
deliberations and proceedings in regional authority meetings in 
Lebowa. It is the chairman's responsibility to maintain and enforce 
order and discipline during meetings. All regional authority 
meetings are held at the District Magistrate's Offices in Lebowa 
(author's observation). 
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5.5 THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
5.5.1 COMPOSITION 
Since the Moutse district was excised from Lebowa on 1 November 1980, 
in terms of Proclamation R211 of 24 October 1980, the Lebowa 
Legislative 
and one is 
Assembly has comprised 96 members, 38 of whom are elected 
designated by the Rain Queen of the Bolobedu tribe. The 
remaining 57 members are Magoshi (Chiefs) designated by the Magoshi 
holding office in the respective electoral divisions (Government 
Gazette R225 of 1972, section 3 as amended). 
The term of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly is five years, but the 
State President may, at the request of the Cabinet of the Legislative 
Assembly of Lebowa, dissolve the Legislative Assembly by proclamation 
in the Government Gazette before the expiration of the five year 
period (Government Gazette R225 of 1972, section 7). 
The Lebowa Legislative Assembly is unicameral and is not a sovereign 
legislature. The ratio of designated to elected members in the 
respective electoral divisions is as follows: 
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ELECTORAL 
DIVISION 
1. Sekhukhune 
2 . Thabamoopo 
3. Seshego 
4. Mokerong 
5. Nebo 
6. Naphuno 
7. Sekgosese 
8. Bolobedu 
9. Bochum 
10. Phalaborwa 
11. Mapulaneng 
NUMBER OF DESIGNATED 
MEMBERS 
14 
9 
4 
9 
7 
3 
3 
1 
2 
2 
3 
NUMBER OF ELECTED 
MEMBERS 
7 
4 
4 
6 
5 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
(Government Gazette R225 of 1972, column B of the Schedule). 
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The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa closely resembled that 
of the United Kingdom in its structure, procedures and practices 
before the adoption of the tricameral constitution in 1983. This was 
largely the result of the historical constitutional process that led 
to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, and, 
thereafter, the Republic of South Africa in 1961 with minimal 
constitutional changes (Oliver & Van Wyk 1978:1). The Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa inherited not only the structures and 
the unitary form of government from the British Parliament, but also 
its parliamentary procedures and practices. 
In its 
Homelands 
Government 
inherited 
endeavours to introduce self-governing status to Black 
with limited legislative powers, the South African 
to a large extent transplanted their form of government as 
from the English Parliament to Homeland Legislative 
Assemblies such as the one in Lebowa. 
The first Legislative Assembly was established in the Transkei in 
1963, and this formed the basis for subsequent developments in other 
Homelands including Lebowa (Kotze 1978:118). The most undemocratic 
feature transplanted from the Transkei to other Homelands was in 
respect of the proportion of elected members to designated members in 
the Legislative Assembly. Chief S.S. Majeke who served as a member 
of the Transkeian recess committee which made initial constitutional 
proposals, said (Kotze 1978:118; Transkei Legislative Assembly 
Debates, 5th session, 1966:230 & 237) that: "Dr. Verwoerd was against 
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the Chiefs being in 
Kaizer Matanzima who 
the majority 
demanded that 
in this Assembly. It was Chief 
the Chiefs should come to this 
Assembly, and further proposed that even fewer than 45 elected 
members be allowed." According to Chief Majeke, it was he himself, 
paramount Chief Botha Sigcau, Chief D.D.P. Ndamse, and Mr. P. Jozana 
who opposed Matanzima while Verwoerd supported them and said: " it 
would not be true democracy if the Chiefs should come to this 
Assembly. According to Kotze (1978:118): "It is believed that 
Matanzima successfully stressed the conservatism and stability of the 
Chiefs against the background of the Transkeian disturbances of 1960, 
and so won his argument in favour of an elected minority". 
Unfortunately this precedent affected all Homeland governments 
including that of Lebowa. The parliamentary procedures and practices 
in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly resemble those applicable in the 
South African Parliament. 
5.5.2 
Lebow a 
Republic 
FUNCTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
is a self-governing territory within the borders of the 
of South Africa. Being a subordinate legislature to the 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, it has limited autonomy 
in certain areas of government. Section 4 of the Black States 
Constitution Act, 1971 tabulates matters reserved from legislation by 
Legislative Assemblies. These matters are still the responsibility 
of the South African Government and may be summarized as follows: 
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defence; foreign affairs; internal security; postal services; radio 
and television; telecommunication services; railways; harbours; 
national roads and civil aviation; currency; banking and the control 
of stock exchanges and of financial institutions; customs and excise 
duties; the amendment, repeal or substitution of the aforementioned 
Act. 
On the other hand, Schedule 1 to the Black States Constitution Act, 
1971 enumerates the matters on which the Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
may adopt legislation. These matters are: subordinate courts; 
agriculture; education; welfare services; labour matters; health 
matters; public works; road traffic including the control and 
licensing of vehicles; mining; the collection and the appropriation 
of public funds; control and licensing of business and trading 
undertakings; the division and amalgamation of tribes; and the con-
trol of townships, tribal and regional authorities and other local 
institutions. It is further stipulated that the Legislative Assembly 
may, in adopting 
amend or repeal 
1971, section 30). 
legislation within the parameters set out above, 
an Act of the South African Parliament (Act 21 of 
No law passed by the Lebowa Legislative Assembly in accordance with 
the provisions of Schedule 1 of the Black State Constitution Act has 
any force or effect until it has been approved by the State President 
of the Republic of South Africa and made known by notice in the 
Lebowa Official Gazette. The State President may, before approving 
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any law, refer it back to the Lebowa Legislative Assembly for 
reconsideration (Act 21 of 1971, Section 3). 
All questions (including motions) arising in the Legislative Assembly 
are decided on by a majority of votes of the members present, with 
the exception of the person presiding at a particular sitting, which 
person may exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of 
votes (Government Gazette R225 of 1972, section 11 (1)). Any number 
of members exceeding half the number of members of the Legislative 
Assembly constitute a quorum, and there is freedom of speech and 
debate in the Legislative Assembly (Government Gazette R225 of 1972, 
section 11 (2) & (3)). The Speaker or Deputy Speaker referred to in 
section 25 of the said proclamation presides over all sittings of the 
Legislative Assembly (Government Gazette R225 of 1972, section 11 
(5)). Rule 25 of the standing rules of procedure of the Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly stresses the equality of members in the 
Assembly: 
No Minister or Kgoshi or dignitary, being a member of the 
Legislative Assembly, may claim preferential treatment in the 
Assembly, by virtue of his hereditary or other position and 
such members 
respect and 
order and 
thereof. 
shall set an example to other members in their 
obedience to the chair and in maintaining the 
dignity of the Assembly and the proceedings 
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The proceedings of the Legislative Assembly are, subject to the rules 
of procedure, open to the public (Government Gazette R225 of 1972, 
section 11(4)). Lastly, no member of the Legislative Assembly is 
liable to any legal proceedings by virtue of any matter raised or 
said by him in the Legislative Assembly or a select committee thereof 
(Act 21 of 1971, section 3A). 
5.5.2.1 PROCEDURE IN RESPECT OF LEGISLATION 
5.5.2.1.1 PUBLIC BILLS 
"The object of a public bill (as distinct from a private bill) is to 
alter the general law on a question of public policy" (Kilpin 1955: 
5). It is a bill introduced on behalf of the Government. The 
responsible Minister of the Cabinet gives notice of his intention to 
introduce a bill and in such notice the general object of the bill is 
outlined (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: Standing Rules of Procedure, 
Rule 99 (a)). The passage of the Lebowa Police Act of 1985 through 
the Lebowa Legislative Assembly will be used to illustrate this 
procedure. 
The Minister of Law and Order gave notice of his intention to 
introduce this bill on 21 May 1985 (Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
Verbatim Report, volume 19, Part 2, 1985:362). 
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In terms of the prescribed procedure, he is obliged to hand in a copy 
of the bill in Northern Sotho, English and Afrikaans to the Secre-
tary's table on the following day or as soon thereafter as possible, 
and may then move without notice, that the bill be read for the first 
time (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: Standing Rules of Procedure, Rule 
99 (b)). The bill may be taken through the first and the second 
readings, including the committee stage, even if the bill is only 
available in one official language. 
The Minister of Law and Order moved the first reading of the Lebowa 
Police Bill on 22 May 1985, and on the following day the second 
reading of the bill was moved and conducted. The Minister briefly 
explained the bill and it was opened for debate. After discussion by 
several members of the House, the Bill was accepted and referred to 
the committee stage. The Bill was dealt with clause by clause, and 
accepted by the House. 
Immediately thereafter, the Minister continued with the third reading 
of the bill as follows: "Mr. Speaker and honourable members, it is an 
honour for me to move that the Lebowa Police Bill of 1985 be now read 
a third time. Thank you" (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim 
Report, volume 19, part 2, 1985:453). Finally, the Secretary of the 
Legislative Assembly read the short title of the bill which concluded 
the procedure. 
Although the rules of procedure are usually adhered to when bills are 
piloted through the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, provision is made in 
2-00 
rule 166 for the suspension of rules and orders in cases of urgent 
necessity (of which the Speaker shall be the judge). For example, on 
6 July 1987 the acting Chief Minister moved for the suspension of the 
rules of the House in terms of rule 166 of the Rules of procedure so 
that all the stages of the Lebowa Constitution Amendment Bill of 1987 
could be dealt with in one day. The first, second and third stages 
of the bill were successfully finalised in one day, although some of 
the members of the House were not satisfied. The intention of the 
bill was to give the Lebowa Government the authority to decide when 
elections were to be held in Lebowa. The bill was accepted in full 
without any discussion (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, 
volume 21, Part 3, 1987:606-607). 
5.5.2.1.2 PRIVATE BILLS 
As no private member's bill was ever introduced or passed in the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly before 1990 (author's observation), no 
examples will be cited, and the general procedure will be discussed 
and explained without any practical illustrations. 
The purpose of a private member's bill is "to confer benefits upon or 
to advance the interests of particular individuals or local ties" 
(Kilpin 1955:19). A bill introduced by a private member is termed a 
bill. In his introduction, the private member gives notice private 
of a 
the 
motion asking for permission to table a bill and in such notice 
general object of the bill is stated. After permission has been 
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granted, the member furnishes the Secretary of the Assembly with a 
copy of the bill in Northern Sotho, Afrikaans and English, and may 
then move without notice, that it be read a first time, such a 
request being put without amendment or debate. The Secretary is 
responsible for the printing of the bill and every member of the 
House is supplied with a copy (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: Standing 
Rules of Procedure, Rules 100, 102 & 104). 
During the second reading of a bill, a debate may arise and members 
should confine themselves to the general merits and principles of the 
bill (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: Standing Rules of Procedure, Rule 
106). Procedurally, amendments may be proposed during the second 
reading debate. After the second reading, a bill may either be 
ordered to be considered in committee by the whole House on a day to 
be determined by the member in charge, or be referred to a select 
committee (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: Standing Rules of Procedure, 
Rules 107 & 108). 
After an announcement by the Speaker that the Assembly shall go into 
committee, the Assembly resolves itself into committee, and the 
Deputy Speaker takes the chair (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: Standing 
Rules of Procedure, Rule 110). The principles of a bill are not 
discussed in committee, only its details. Procedurally, certain 
amendments may be proposed during the committee stage (Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly: Standing Rules of Procedure, Rules 112 & 114). 
At the end of the committee stage the Speaker returns to the chair, 
the Deputy Speaker reports accordingly and announces that the bill 
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has been brought 
with or without 
to finality and accepted by the House in committee 
amendments (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: Standing 
Rules of Procedure, Rule 117). 
During the third reading of a bill, the debate, if any, is confined 
to the effects of the amendments which have been adopted by the 
committee of the whole House. In the absence of any amendments,the 
third reading is decided without amendments or debate. No further 
questions are put after the third reading and the bill is deemed to 
have been passed by the Assembly (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: 
Standing Rules of Procedure, Rule 120 & 121). 
5.5.2.1.3 PROCEDURES IN RESPECT OF FINANCIAL MEASURES 
Unlike the position in the South African Parliament during the 
existence of the Senate (before the tricameral Parliament), both the 
elected and designated members of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
participate equally on financial bills, and there are no restrictions 
or limitations applicable to non-elected members. The democratic 
principle of "no taxation without representation" is not contained in 
the Lebowa constitution. 
Any bill 
expenditure 
succeeding 
Legislative 
containing the estimated financial requirements for 
on the services of the Lebowa Government for a current or 
financial year is known as an appropriation bill (Lebowa 
Assembly: Standing Rules of Procedure, Rule 130), and may 
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only be introduced by the Minister of Finance. The Legislative 
Assembly does not pass 
prior recommendation of 
any 
the 
financial motion or bill, without the 
Cabinet (Lebowa Legislative Assembly: 
Standing Rules of Procedure, Rule 129). 
In chapter 4 above, the preparation of the budget as a function of 
aggregation was briefly dealt with. When a budget has been prepared 
and accepted in principle by the Minister of Finance and the Cabinet, 
no funds may be collected or spent before approval by the Legislative 
Assembly by way of an appropriation bill (Black Constitution Act, 
1971, Section 8). 
The 1986 Lebowa Appropriation Bill will be used as an example to 
demonstrate this occurrence of the rule-making procedure. 
On 22 April 1986, the Minister of Finance in Lebowa gave notice in 
the Legislative Assembly, in terms of Standing Rule No.99, of his 
intention to introduce the Lebowa Appropriation Bill of 1986 the 
following day. He further explained that the Bill provided for the 
requirements of Lebowa for the financial year ending 31 March 1987 
(Lebowa Legislative Assembly verbatim Report, volume 20, part 1, 
1986:8). 
The Minister tabled the Lebowa Appropriation Bill of 1986 and the 
estimates containing the details of the said financial requirements 
for the year 1986/87 in terms of Standing Rule 130 on 28 April 1986. 
A broad outline of the proposed spending of the money allocated is 
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usually contained 
are reflected in 
in the schedule to the bill, but full particulars 
the "Estimates of Revenue to be collected and 
Expenditure to be defrayed through the year ending 31 March 1987". 
The bill was then read for the first time (Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly Verbatim Report, volume 20, part 1, 1986:108). 
Procedurally, the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly was requested 
by the Speaker of the House to read the Cabinet's recommendation in 
terms of section 1 of the National States Constitution Act, 1971 and 
Standing Rule No.129(3) (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, 
volume 20, part 1, 1986:109). 
The Minister then proposed the immediate second reading of the bill 
to which the Speaker agreed. Procedurally, the budget speech of the 
Minister during the second reading of a bill is regarded as an 
elaboration and justification of the proposals contained in the 
budget. In his budget speech the Minister reports in broad outline 
on government expenditure over the financial year then ending; he 
also reviews the general economic condition of the country, and 
proposes the new expenditure and revenue and summarises these under a 
number of appropriate headings. 
In the instance under discussion, the Minister furnished the House 
with the following proposed allocations (including loan funds) for 
each Department: 
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Vote 1: Chief Minister 
Vote 2: Home Affairs 
Vote 3: Works 
Vote 4: Education 
Vote 5: Agriculture and Environmental 
Conservation 
Vote 6: Justice 
Vote 7: Health and Social Welfare 
Vote 8: Finance 
Vote 9: Law and Order 
Vote 10: Economic Affairs and Planning 
Subtotal 
Statutory amount 
Amount to be Voted 
R 23 289 000 
R 6 700 000 
R 33 787 000 
R205 303 000 
R 36 738 000 
R 9 134 000 
R140 119 000 
R 61 825 000 
R 17 578 000 
R 15 699 000 
R550 172 000 
R 1 835 520 
R548 336 480 
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(Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, volume 20, part 1, 
1986: 11 3-11 4) • 
After the reading of the whole budget speech by the Minister during 
the second reading stage, the discussion of the budget speech was 
opened to members of the Legislative Assembly and each member 
desiring to participate was allocated thirty minutes (Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, volume 20, part 1, 1986: 116). 
At the end of these discussions the Minister replied to most of the 
questions asked by members. Thereafter, one of the members moved 
that the second reading stage be concluded and the Committee stage be 
resumed. The motion was seconded by another member and carried by 
the Legislative Assembly (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim 
Report, volume 20, part 1, 1986:129). 
The Legislative 
Speaker vacated 
chairman of the 
Assembly then 
the chair. 
met in Committee of Supply and the 
House and 
The 
put 
chairman of Committees acted as 
every budget vote to the House 
separately. The term "in Committee" used in this context should not 
be confused with the meaning attached thereto with reference to the 
meetings of other public bodies such as regional authorities or 
tribal councils. "In Committee" does not mean that the House held 
the meeting in camera. Members of the public, including the press, 
are admitted to the public and press galleries respectively during 
these meetings (Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, volume 
20, part 1, 1986:129). 
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During the Committee Stage, each Minister delivers a Departmental 
Budget and Policy Speech and the Legislative Assembly discusses these 
budget votes seriatim. The Ministers have to defend the policies, 
and shoulder responsibility for the efficiency (or lack thereof), of 
their Departments. They do so by answering questions and responding 
to proposals and suggestions put forward by members of the Legisla-
tive Assembly (author's observation). 
All budget votes in respect of the Lebowa Appropriation Bill of 1986, 
were disposed of by 15 May 1986 and the Speaker resumed his seat. 
The chairman of Committees then reported to the Speaker that all the 
budget votes had been accepted as a whole without any amendments 
(Lebowa Legislative Assembly Verbatim Report, volume 20, part 2, 
1986:398). 
The Minister of Finance then proposed the third reading of the Bill 
and it was accepted by the House without further discussion. The 
Secretary of the Legislative Assembly read the short title of the 
Bill which concluded the process (Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
Verbatim Report, volume 20, part 2, 1986:399). 
5.5.2.1.4 BILLS TO BE PERUSED BY THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL 
Rule 126 of the Standing Rules of procedure stipulates that every 
bill passed by the Assembly and signed by the Speaker must be 
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forwarded to the Commissioner-General to be further dealt with as 
required by law. 
5.5.2.1.5 PROCEDURE WHEN A BILL IS REFERRED BACK 
The State President may refer a bill back to the Legislative Assembly 
(Black Homelands Constitution Act, 1971 (Section 3 (2)), and the 
Assembly may again proceed with such a bill in accordance with the 
provisions of Rules 128 to 134. 
5.5.2.1.6 PROMULGATION AND THE COMING INTO OPERATION OF LAWS 
The Cabinet of a self-governing territory causes every law to which 
assent has been given by the State President to be published in the 
Government Gazette. Such a law comes into operation on the date of 
its publication in the Gazette, unless the law itself provides for 
another date. Only a law assented to by the State President and duly 
promulgated has the force of law (Black Homelands Constitution Act 
(section 32)). 
5.5.2.1.6 SIGNATURE AND ENROLMENT OF LAWS 
After a law has been assented to by the State President, the Cabinet 
of Lebowa causes copies of the law in each of the official languages, 
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to be kept as a record in the off ice of the Registrar of the Supreme 
Court or the highest court having original jurisdiction in the area 
in which the Legislative Assembly buildings are situated. Failure to 
deposit copies does not affect the validity or the coming into 
operation of such a law (Black Homelands Constitution Act (section 
33)). 
5.5.2.2 EVALUATION 
As has 
procedure 
been demonstrated through extensive reference to the rules of 
applicable to the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, the present 
is fully formalised. Through practical examples, it has 
shown that the rule-making process in the Legislative 
of Lebowa is performed strictly in accordance with these 
procedure 
also been 
Assembly 
rules. 
While the procedures outlined above may be assumed to be based on 
democratic principles, it cannot similarly be assumed that the 
majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly understand the 
procedures. 
From the 
Legislative 
understand 
debates contained in the Verbatim Reports of the Lebowa 
Assembly, it appears that most of the members do not 
the rules of procedure applicable to the Assembly. This 
several factors including a low standard of education or 
absence of formal education. It is further doubtful 
is due to 
the complete 
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whether some members of the Assembly are aware of the purpose and the 
value of the different stages of a bill as provided in the procedure 
(author's observation). 
The impression gained from a perusal of the deliberations of the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly is that the elected members participate 
more actively in the discussions and debates than the designated 
traditional Chiefs. Kotze expressed a similar view with regard to 
the Transkei Legislative Assembly (1968:216). Traditionally, it is 
not advisable in terms of the general customary practices of Lebowa 
for a traditional Chief (Kgoshi) to engage in extensive debates with 
his subjects or commoners. 
Contrary 
equality 
members 
Magoshi 
to customary practice, the rules of procedure emphasise the 
of members of the Assembly. At the same time, all elected 
of the Assembly are subjects of designated traditional 
(Chiefs) outside the Legislative Assembly. This can 
sometimes give rise to very embarrassing situations for some of the 
designated members, especially those from tribal areas, and even to 
some of the traditional Chiefs. As a result, the efficient and 
active performance of the rule-making function by the members of the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly is adversely affected (author's obser-
vation). 
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5.6 THE ROLE OF THE LEBOWA CABINET IN THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS 
In this study the term "Cabinet" is taken to mean the head of the 
Government of Lebowa (the Chief Minister) together with his Ministers 
and deputy Ministers. The Cabinet in Lebowa is modeled on the South 
African example, and 
South African Cabinet 
it performs functions similar to those of the 
in accordance with the powers vested in it by 
the Black States Constitution Act. 
The Cabinet in Lebowa serves as the executive committee of the Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly. It is responsible for rule-application, the 
preparation and submission of legislation to that body, and is 
responsible for the administration of the territory (author's 
observation). This is in line with the statement by Almond and 
Powell (1966:138) that: 
In most political systems, but particularly in modern demo-
cratic ones, the performance of rule making, like that of ar-
ticulation and aggregation, will be dispersed and delegated, 
focusing perhaps around the role of the chief executive but 
not residing in it. For various reasons some executive agen-
cies may be able to serve as autonomous participants in the 
rule-making process, initiating and affecting various compo-
nent rules. 
The Chief Minister, being the chairman of the Cabinet, accepts final 
responsibility for the agenda of its meetings. The various Depart-
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ments submit different issues to the Cabinet for consideration. No 
voting takes place during Cabinet meetings and all points on the 
agenda are finalised on the basis of consensus. The Chief Minister 
and his Cabinet may refer controversial matters back to a Minister 
and/or Department for further illumination (author's observation). 
In terms of Cabinet decision 103 of 1986, new procedures regarding 
the secrecy of Cabinet rulings were adopted. These read as follows: 
(1) The Secretary of the Department of the Chief Minister shall 
draw up a document for all public servants to sign as a 
document of secrecy with regard to Cabinet matters. 
(2) All Ministers must have lockers in their off ices for 
safe-keeping of confidential Cabinet documents. 
(3) Secretaries will attend Cabinet meetings at the invitation of 
the Ministers and only for purposes of items affecting their 
Departments on the agenda, and thereafter retire to their 
respective offices. 
(4) Decisions of the Cabinet marked "confidential" will be sent 
to the Ministers only and each Minister is responsible for 
following up any such decision of the Cabinet. 
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Submissions on various issues to the Cabinet are usually made through 
written memoranda. The rulings of the Cabinet on these issues serve 
to illustrate the role of the Cabinet in respect of rule-making 
regarding issues delegated to it by the Legislative Assembly. 
Rulings of the Cabinet are valid and legally binding if they fall 
within the powers delegated to the Cabinet by the Legislative 
Assembly. Verbal submissions are only considered if an issue is of 
an urgent nature (author's observation). 
Of the 
Government 
example. 
provisions 
above. 
many 
of 
Cabinet 
Lebowa, 
rulings 
only a 
made since 
few will 
the inception of the 
be mentioned by way of 
The selection of examples was severely limited by the 
of the Cabinet ruling on confidential matters dealt with 
Cabinet Decision 44 of 1986 was a ruling on a verbal submission and 
led to a circular being issued to all local authorities about unrest 
in the territory. It was taken in response to the 1986 unrest 
situation in Lebowa which resulted in many deaths as indicated in 
chapter 3 above. The circular read as follows: 
The Cabinet made a ruling that as regards the unrest in the 
country, a circular be issued to all Local Authorities that 
every thing be done by them to counter the unrest and the 
tragic events occasioned by the belief in witchcraft. 
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Cabinet Ruling 159 of 1988 was issued in response to specific demands 
made by individual local authorities through their representatives, 
which demands were contained in Memorandum 92/88 submitted to the 
Cabinet by the Department of the Chief Minister in respect of the 
erection of local government offices by the Lebowa Government. The 
ruling read as follows: 
The Cabinet rules that the Lebowa Government henceforth, be 
responsible for the erection of the Local Government off ices 
as recommended in this memorandum. This measure would bring 
about great relief to the Local Governments financially. 
Another example of a ruling on a written memorandum is that taken in 
response to Memorandum 18 of 1986 submitted by the Department of the 
Chief Minister about study leave with retention of salary and other 
service benefits. It read as follows: 
The Cabinet rules that as the Lebowa National State is still 
developing, all these officers and other students who study 
in various academic and professional fields for the sole 
purpose of serving Lebowa Territory on completion of their 
studies be accepted provided: 
(1) A proper and definite contract to be entered into by the 
student/officer and the Lebowa Government be drawn with 
the necessary legal safeguards to close possible 
loopholes. 
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(2) That flowing from the discussion, the Secretary of the 
Department of Education will submit to the Cabinet a 
detailed report showing dissimilarities in benefits 
affecting teachers as against other officers in the 
public service. 
(Cabinet Decision 47 of 1986) 
With this ruling the Cabinet intended to encourage civil servants to 
improve their qualifications and productivity at all levels. This 
ruling was also, in part, a positive response to demands articulated 
by the member of the Legislative Assembly from the Seshego 
Constituency as described in chapter 3 above. 
During May 1990 the Cabinet of Lebowa, through its Cabinet Select 
Committee on constitutional matters, gave the following ruling on 
guidelines for negotiations on a new constitution for a non-racial, 
democratic South Africa (Lebowa Cabinet Ruling, May 1990): 
Our Government of Lebowa noted with appreciation various 
pronouncements on negotiations by the South African 
Government, in particular, President de Klerk's opening 
address in Parliament on February 2, 1990. 
We believe that the efforts of the South African Government 
on the one side and these of the OAU, UN and ANC on the other 
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have opened 
settlement in 
efforts and 
developments. 
a real possibility for a negotiated political 
South Africa. We therefore welcome these 
are continuously monitoring and studying the 
We reaffirm our belief that: 
i. the people of South Africa both black and white are 
one; 
ii. their interests and aspirations are indivisible and 
therefore we reject the notion of rural and urban 
blacks and of own affairs and general affairs of 
population groups; 
iii. South African citizenship is an inalienable right of 
all South Africans; 
iv. the integrity of the South African territory is an 
inalienable right of all South Africans; 
v. the citizens of the so called Homeland are entitled 
to freedom of movement and association throughout 
South Africa. Consequently, we call on the 
government to create the climate conducive to 
negotiations 
South Africa, 
by: 
between Pretoria and all people of 
including the people of the Homelands 
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(a) removing all racial ethnic conflicts; 
(b) removing man-made barriers; 
(c) dismantling 
structures; 
or phasing out the Bantustan 
(d) all people of South Africa to unite and speak 
with one voice; 
(e) removing obstacles to black unity; 
(f) lift the state of emergency; 
(g) releasing political prisoners and detainees; 
(h) redelimitate the provinces into non-ethnic 
electoral divisions, or constituencies. 
On the strength of the views as detailed above, the Cabinet of Lebowa 
adopted the following programme of action (Lebowa Cabinet Ruling, May 
1990) : 
1. To launch 
Constituent 
a leadership campaign for demanding a non-ethnic 
Assembly for the coordination of responses to the 
various efforts to settle the South African question. 
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2. To draw up a joint declaration on negotiations for signature 
by leaders in consultation with their Legislative Assemblies 
or Constituencies who are in agreement with Lebowa's 
proposals on negotiations. Firstly, in the Transvaal and 
lastly in the whole of South Africa, including the TBVC 
states which are prepared to be reincorporated into R.S.A. 
3. To consult with the ANC, PAC, UDF, AZAPO, DP, LP and other 
political organisations regarding the question of 
negotiations. 
4. To study all constitutional models. 
5. The will of the people has to be tested and one of the 
credible ways of doing this is by way of a referendum. The 
form in which Lebowa people should participate in any future 
negotiations should be determined in the proposed referendum. 
6. Lebowa Government Service be phased out gradually so that a 
vacuum should not be created as this may cause anarchy and 
chaos. 
The examples mentioned above, serve to demonstrate the significance 
of the Lebowa Cabinet as the pre-eminent rule making body in the 
Lebowa political process. In Lebowa, the Cabinet has been 
particularly powerful. As has been shown, no public or private bill 
may be presented to the Lebowa Legislative Assembly without the prior 
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approval of the Cabinet. Only Cabinet Ministers may move an 
amendment to a financial bill. In addition, a motion by an ordinary 
member of the Legislative Assembly (even if the motion is approved by 
the House), is regarded as a mere recommendation to the Cabinet and 
not considered to be binding. The number of important Cabinet 
rulings which have been made confirm that the bulk of the rule-making 
function is performed by the Cabinet in Lebowa (author's obser-
vation). 
5.7 THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN THE RULE-MAKING FUNCTION 
Although the primary function of a bureaucracy has traditionally been 
to implement the policy of political rule-makers, its rule-making 
functions have been extended as societies have become more 
sophisticated and complex (Venter 1989:191). The bureaucracy in 
Lebowa is no exception. The framework of Schrire (1978 & 1985) will 
be used to analyse the role of the Lebowa bureaucracy as an actor in 
the rule-making function. The extent and the importance of the 
bureaucracy's own rule-making authority, as well as the extent and 
the intensity of its influence on other rule-making structures in the 
Lebowa political system will be examined. 
The role played by bureaucrats in policy formulation or rule-making 
varies from Department to Department in Lebowa Government. Senior 
civil servants from the level of assistant Secretary upwards play 
vital roles in departmental rule-making. These officials occupy 
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senior positions in Departments and are, therefore, in a position to 
influence policy, or to give rulings on specific important issues 
(author's observation). 
Much depends on the approach and attitude of the senior civil 
servants concerned. Some senior personnel members may take the 
initiative in important policy areas, while others may prefer to 
bring all policy related issues to the attention of their Ministers. 
In part, this will depend on the nature of the relationship between 
the Ministers and the senior bureaucrats. 
The relationship between Ministers and senior civil servants was 
generally more conducive to promoting the active participation of 
these senior officials in rule-making during Dr. C.N. Phatudi's term 
of office as the Chief Minister of Lebowa than it has been since 
(author's observation). Until September 1985, all Departmental 
Secretaries attended Cabinet meetings freely and even participated 
actively at such meetings. They, therefore, contributed indirectly 
to the rule-making process even at the Cabinet level. 
A Departmental Secretary in Lebowa does not only serve as the 
permanent administrative head of a Department, but also as the Chief 
Adviser to the Minister who is dependent upon him for information and 
expert guidance. In this way, an official can have an important 
influence on policy (author's observation). 
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A Departmental Secretary has considerable discretionary power on 
certain important issues. An example hereof are the powers delegated 
to the secretary of the Department of Health in respect of the 
approval of old age pension applications. The Secretary's ruling on 
an application of this kind is final (author's observations). 
The nature of a Department will also influence the scope for 
administrative influence on policy formulation. For example, in 
Departments like that of the Chief Minister, especially the Authority 
Affairs branch, where highly sensitive political issues such as the 
appointment and the administration of traditional leadership are 
dealt with, the minister's direct involvement in rule-making is 
imperative (author's observation). 
In Departments such as Works, Water Affairs, and Agriculture, 
however, policy issues are more technical and less political, as a 
result of which the secretary of a Department may have enough room to 
play a significant role in rule-making (author's observation). 
Finally, it should be stressed that the rule-making or policy 
formulation activities of bureaucrats and politicians are usually 
complementary rather than competitive in Lebowa, and that the Chief 
Minister and his Cabinet are ultimately responsible for all important 
policy rulings. This was also observed by Schrire (1978:183). 
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5.8 THE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE RULE-
MAKING PROCESS OF LEBOWA 
As has been stated, Lebowa is a self-governing territory within the 
borders of the Republic of South Africa as a result of which the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly as a legislature is subordinate to the 
parliament of the Republic of South Africa. The scope of operation 
of the Lebowa as a self-governing territory is outlined in the Black 
States Constitution Act, 1971. In terms hereof, Lebowa may not 
perform the duties outlined in section 4 of the said Act. The South 
African central government performs the rule-making function in 
relation to any subject falling within the following classes of 
matters: 
(a) The establishment, control, entry, movement or operations of 
any full time or part time military unit, quasi military unit 
or organization of a military character, or of any unit, 
branch or service of any military organization within the 
area concerned, or any other military matter of whatever 
nature; 
(b) the registration, establishment and control of factories for 
the manufacture of arms, ammunition or explosives as defined 
in the Explosives Act, 1956 (Act 26 of 1956); 
(c) the appointment, accrediting and recognition of diplomatic 
and consular officers and the recognition, conclusion or 
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ratification 
agreement; 
of international conventions, treaties and 
(d) the control, organization, administration, powers, entry into 
and presence in the area concerned of any police force of the 
Republic charged with the maintenance of public peace and 
order and the preservation of internal security in and the 
safety of the area concerned and the Republic; 
(e) postal, telegraph, telephone, radio and television services; 
(f) railways, harbours, national roads and civil aviation; 
(g) the entry of persons other than citizens into the area 
concerned; 
(h) currency, public loans, banking and the control of stock 
exchanges and of financial institutions as defined in section 
1 of the Inspection of Financial Institutions Act, 1962 (Act 
68 of 1962); 
(i) customs and excise duties and control and management of 
customs and excise; and the amendment, repeal or substitution 
of this Act. 
(Black States Constitution Act, section 4) 
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In addition to these powers, no law made by the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly shall have any force or effect until it has been approved by 
the State President of South Africa, who may even refer it back to 
the Lebowa Legislative Assembly for reconsideration before approval 
(Black States Constitution Act, Section 3). All laws made by the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly must be sent to the State President 
through the office of the Commissioner-General. The Commissioner-
General acts as a link between the South African Government and the 
Lebowa Government. 
In terms of the Black States Constitution Act, 1971 (Section 3), many 
of the laws passed by the Central Government are in force in Lebowa. 
These include: 
(a) The Defence Act, 1957 (Act 44 of 1957). 
(b) The Explosives Act, 1956 (Act 26 of 1956). 
(c) Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1951 (Act 71 of 1951). 
(d) Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act 74 of 1982 ). 
(e) The Public Safety Act, 1953 (Act 3 of 1953). 
(f) Post Office Act, 1958 (Act 44 of 1958). 
(g) Civil Aviation Offences Act, 1972 (Act 10 of 1972). 
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(h) Aliens Act, 1937 (Act 1 of 1937). 
(i) Prevention of Counterfeiting of Currency Act, 1965 (Act 16 of 
1965). 
(j) Customs and Excise Act, 1964 (Act 91 of 1964). 
The National State of Emergency as declared by the State President in 
terms of the Public Safety Act, 1953 (Act 3 of 1953) will be used as 
an example to illustrate the role of the Central Government in 
rule-making. 
5.8.1 THE NATIONAL STATE OF EMERGENCY 
5.8.1.1 BRIEF BACKGROUND 
Between September 1984 and June 1986 South Africa experienced a 
rising spiral of unrest. Some of the incidents that occurred during 
this period were mentioned in chapter 3 above. According to the 
Bureau for Information (1987:2), the consequences of the unrest 
included: 
i. 3477 private Black houses badly damaged or destroyed; 
ii. 1220 Black schools badly damaged or destroyed; 
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iii. over 7000 buses and 10000 other vehicles damaged or 
destroyed; 
iv. large scale intimidation; 
v. consumer and rent boycotts; 
vi. disruption of Black education and democratically elected 
municipal governments; 
vii. the establishment of street committees and kangaroo 
courts; 
viii. 573 deaths due to Black on Black violence, with 295 of 
the victims being killed by way of the horrific 
"necklace" method. 
It was against this background that the State President decided to 
declare a National State of Emergency on 12 June 1986. The State 
President (R.S.A.: Hansard (A) 1986, 9 columns 2688-2689) stated that 
the objectives of the State of Emergency were: 
to create a situation of relative normality so that every 
citizen can perform his daily task in peace, business 
communities can fulfil their role and the reform programme to 
which the Government has committed itself can be continued. 
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I am of the opinion that the ordinary laws of the country 
which are now on the statute book are insufficient to enable 
the government to ensure the safety of the public and to 
maintain public order. I have decided to introduce the State 
of Emergency throughout the entire country, including the 
self-governing states. 
The State of Emergency was declared in Proclamation R108 of 12 June 
1986. Regulations under the State of Emergency were issued by the 
State President in terms of Proclamation 109 of 1986, as amended from 
time to time. 
5.8.2 REGULATIONS 
The regulations which applied during the National State of Emergency 
afforded the South African Police (SAP), the South African Defence 
Force, the Prison Service Department, and the Police Forces in the 
non-independent Homelands such as the Lebowa Police Force, wider 
powers regarding arrests, detentions, search without warrant, 
combating of public disturbance, disorder, riots, or public violence 
(R.S.A.: Proclamation 109 of 986, Regulations 1 to 8). Subversive 
statements were prohibited in terms of regulation 10, while 
restrictions on funerals were imposed in terms of regulation 7. 
An indemnity was granted, in terms of which no civil or criminal 
proceedings could be brought against the State or the administrations 
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of the non-independent Homelands, the State President, any member of 
the Cabinet of South Africa or the non-independent Homelands, any 
member of the forces, any person in the service of the State or the 
administration of a non-independent Homeland, or any person acting on 
direction or with the approval of any of the abovementioned, for any 
act in good faith advised, commanded, ordered, directed, or performed 
by any person carrying out his or her duties in terms of the 
regulations with intent to ensure the safety of the public, the 
maintenance of public order, or the termination of the state of 
any area where the state of emergency existed (R.S.A.: emergency in 
Proclamation R109 of 1986 as amended by Proclamation R110, Regulation 
(3); The Star, 6 February 1986). All these restrictive 16 ( 1 ) & 
measures were fully operative in Lebowa, which serves to demonstrate 
the effective role played by the South African Central Government in 
rule-making in the Lebowa political process. 
The South African judiciary also plays 
function in Lebowa. The Moutse court 
a role in the rule-making 
case between the Central 
Government and the Lebowa Government as mentioned in chapter 3 will 
be used as an example hereof. 
On 28 May 
brought an 
incorporate 
clamation 
1980) was 
had taken 
1986 in the Pretoria Supreme Court, the Lebowa Government 
application seeking an order declaring the decision to 
Moutse into KwaNdebele null and void because the pro-
excising Moutse from Lebowa (R.S.A.: Proclamation R210 of 
invalid on the grounds that no prior proper consultation 
place with the relevant Lebowa Cabinet Ministers. It was 
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further submitted that the excision proclamation amended the wrong 
proclamation, namely Proclamation R156 of 1971 instead of 
Proclamation R225 of 1972. 
The State argued that the 1972 Proclamation only changed Lebowa's 
status, while the 1971 Proclamation was relevant to determining its 
borders. The Supreme Court found that the South African Department 
of Constitutional Development and Planning had amended the correct 
proclamation, and ruled in favour of the validity of the 
incorporation (Race Relations Survey, part 2, 1986:638). This ruling 
by the South African Supreme Court in Pretoria affected many Lebowans 
and serves as an example of the participation of the judiciary in the 
rule-making process in Lebowa. 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has indicated that the rule-making function in Lebowa is 
performed at local, regional and central authority level. Three 
rule-making structures have been mentioned at the local level, 
namely: the tribal, community, and town council authorities. Tribal 
Authorities are based on traditional practices and leadership. 
"As long as 
loyalty from 
Bogoshi (Chieftainship) still commands the respect and 
both young and old, educated and uneducated, this form 
of government will 
apparently understood 
continue to exist. It is the form of government 
and respected by about half of the population 
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in Lebowa" (Botha 1983:432). The rule-making at this tribal level 
follows a rather static approach aimed at maintaining the status quo. 
Community Authorities are organized along similar lines to Tribal 
Authorities, with the exception that Community Authorities are 
premised on more democratic principles than Tribal Authorities. 
Traditionalism does not play any significant role in the rule-making 
process. 
Town councils are also constituted and run democratically without any 
traditional influence, but as has been indicated, most of their 
functions, powers and duties, with regard to the making of by-laws 
and town administration, are exercised by the Lebowa Government 
through its Department of Home Affairs. As a result of this direct 
intervention by the Lebowa Government, town councils are rendered 
meaningless and less effective. 
Regional authorities are found at the second level of government. 
They are not democratically elected institutions. Their main 
function, as indicated, is to advise the Lebowa Government and to 
submit representations in connection with all matters pertaining to 
the people in their area of jurisdiction. Their rule-making function 
is minimal. In fact, the regional authorities appear to have become 
completely powerless since the appointment of District Magistrates 
and district officers representing other Departments. 
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At the highest level of authority, the Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
was discussed. As was pointed out, the Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
is not a fully and popularly elected body of a sovereign state. The 
ratio of elected members to designated traditional Magoshi is 4 to 6. 
The Legislative Assembly has limited rule-making powers in terms of 
the Black Homelands Constitution Act. The State President must 
assent to all bills passed by this body before they enjoy force of 
law. The 
Legislative 
Standing 
Assembly 
Rules 
have 
of procedure 
been inherited 
applicable 
from the 
in the Lebowa 
South African 
Parliament, and are premised on democratic principles. Whether the 
majority of the members of the Assembly understand the purpose and 
the value of these procedures is questionable. 
The importance of the Lebowa Cabinet in the rule-making function has 
been stressed. Cabinet decisions are the main source of rule-making 
in Lebowa. Even the rule-making activities of the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly are subject to the prior approval of the Cabinet, and a 
substantial number of important national issues have been finalised 
through Cabinet rulings. 
The role of the bureaucracy in policy formulation or rule-making has 
been examined. This role varies widely from Department to Department 
in Lebowa, while senior civil servants may play a significant role in 
departmental decision making or in influencing other rule-making 
structures in the Lebowa political process. 
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Finally, the South African Central Government was discussed as a 
major and dominant participant in the rule-making function in the 
Lebowa political process. The Black States Constitution Act grants 
the Central Government through the State President substantial 
rule-making powers in Lebowa. 
In view hereof, it can be concluded that three rule-making 
structures, namely the Lebowa Cabinet, the Lebowa Legislative 
and the Central Government, are the nucleus of rule-making Assembly 
in the Lebowa political process. The next chapter will address 
itself to the manner in which the rule application function is 
performed in the Lebowa. 
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CHAPTER 6: RULE-APPLICATION 
6. 1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the rule-application func-
tion as performed by different structures in the Lebowa political 
system. Rule-application is the function which follows rule-making 
in the conversion process, and its purpose is to implement or carry 
out such rules as are made. 
The concept "rule-application" refers to the implementation of rules, 
and the extent to which a general policy or rules are carried out (Al-
mond and Powell 1966:154). While the legislature and the judiciary 
are responsible for the rule-making and the rule-adjudicating func-
tions, the executive can be described as that cluster of institutions 
or structures responsible for the application of governmental 
decisions (De Crespigny & Schrire 1978:17). 
Almond and Powell (1966:142) describe their perception of the func-
tion and relevance of rule-application as follows: 
The sheer volume of rules to be enforced, resources to be gathe-
red, and information to be processed and transmitted requires the 
rule-making structure, be it monarch, legislature, or common 
assembly, to seek assistance in application. It becomes im-
perative that the system develop capabilities to meet new goals 
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or pressures; effective rule application is a necessary prerequi-
site to such development. 
6.2 THE BUREAUCRACY IN THE LEBOWA POLITICAL SYSTEM 
The characteristics of the bureaucracy were first formulated in a 
systematic manner by the German sociologist Max Weber whose defi-
nition and theories laid the foundations for many subsequent works on 
the topic. Important in any discussion of bureaucracies are: 
(a) the division of labour in the organization; 
(b) its authority structure; 
(c) the position and the role of the individual member; and 
(d) the type of rules that regulate the relations between organi-
zational members. 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, volume 2, 1990:642-643) 
Almond and Powell focus on the bureaucracy because: "In order to un-
derstand the peculiar role of bureaucracy, we have to start with the 
output side of the political system. We would like to argue the 
thesis that bureaucracies tend to monopolize outputs. Only bureau-
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crats enforce laws, policies, or decisions" (1966:153). This state-
ment emphasises the importance of bureaucrats in rule-application. 
The different political cultures prevalent in Lebowa and the United 
States of America make it necessary for the role of the bureaucracy 
in rule-application in Lebowa to be interpreted differently from that 
in America. The bureaucracy should not be seen as comprising only 
the civil servants in government departments, but should include 
other institutions such as parastatals. 
According to Almond and Powell, the concept bureaucracy refers to the 
relatively elaborate organization through which rulers or rule-
makers seek to implement their decisions. Therefore, bureaucracies 
are the structures charged with rule-application (Almond & Powell 
1966:144-145). For the purpose of this discussion of the role of the 
bureaucracy in the Lebowa, it will be deemed to include the Cabinet, 
the various government departments in Lebowa, the South African 
Central government departments, parastatal institutions, the Lebowa 
local authorities, and Tribal and Community Authorities, all of which 
are charged with the rule-application function. 
6.2.1 THE LEBOWA CABINET AND THE RULE-APPLICATION FUNCTION 
Two types of executive branches of government are generally found in 
constitutional states. These are the parliamentary executive which 
is controlled by parliament, and is similar to the Chief Minister and 
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his Cabinet 
such as the 
in Lebowa, and the non-parliamentary or fixed executive 
President of the United States of America (Strong 1972: 
210). The committee system in Switzerland is an exception. 
The administration of Lebowa as a self-governing territory in respect 
of the matters referred to in schedule 1 of the Black States Constitu-
tion Act, vests in the Cabinet (Act 21 of 1971 section 5). The Execu-
tive Council or Cabinet has the power to make provision for the exer-
cise of the powers and the performance of the functions and duties 
conferred or imposed upon it under any law. The members of the 
Cabinet are responsible for the administration of the government 
departments (Act 21 of 1971 section 5(3)). 
In view 
lity for 
hereof, the Chief Minister assigns and allocates responsibi-
the control and administration of the different government 
to the various Cabinet Ministers (R.S.A.: Government departments 
Gazette R225 of 1972, Section 23). In Lebowa, the Cabinet plays a 
both the legislative and the executive branches of 
As is the case in South Africa, all government 
leading role in 
the government. 
departments operate 
the implementation 
ministers who are 
(Pheme 1988:145). 
under ministerial control. The Cabinet ensures 
of rules and government policy through the 
the political heads of the government departments 
Cabinet 
specific 
must be 
Ministers have powers to issue regulations in accordance with 
Acts. It must be stressed, however, that these regulations 
intra vires, i.e. always subject to the provisions of the 
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enabling Acts of Parliament. This norm is also applicable to stan-
ding orders of procedure developed by public institutions with the 
approval of respective Ministers. 
must co-ordinate the actions of 
In addition, the Cabinet in Lebowa 
the ten government departments to 
ensure coherence and efficiency in their rule-application function. 
The Cabinet is collectively responsible to the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly for governing the territory and for implementing the general 
policy of the government. Cabinet Ministers are individually respon-
sible for the execution of particular public activities and the imple-
mentation of specific rules by their departments (author's obser-
vation). 
In this way, the Cabinet performs the rule-application function 
through the bureaucracy. Almond and Powell speak of bureaucracies as 
the relatively elaborate organization through which rulers or 
rule-makers seek to implement their decisions (1966:145). These are 
structures charged with rule-application. The ten government depart-
ments and a few non-departmental institutions constitute the central 
bureaucracy in Lebowa. 
6.2.2. SCOPE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
Government departments 
bureaucracy. It is 
are the second important component of the 
necessary to examine the scope of this part of 
the bureaucracy to appreciate its importance in the rule-application 
function. 
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According to the seventeenth annual report of the Lebowa Public Ser-
vice Commission, the total labour force in all ten departments on 31 
December 1989 was 22 790. The report further states that 13 534 
officers occupied permanent posts, and 9 256 general assistants 
occupied temporary posts (Lebowa Government, Public Service Commis-
sion Report 1989:1). These figures exclude the white officials 
seconded from South Africa who numbered 392. 
6.2.3 GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND THE RULE-APPLICATION FUNCTION 
Almond and Powell provide a general explanation of what the role of 
the bureaucracy through government departments is (1966:154): 
In the modern era most legislation is of a very general kind; in 
order that it may be effectively enforced, administrative offici-
als must work out regulations or regulatory codes elaborating the 
policy which has been adopted by the political branches of govern-
ment. Usually the extent to which a general policy is carried 
out is dependent upon the interpretations which bureaucrats give 
to it, and upon the spirit and effectiveness with which they en-
force it. Thus, much of the substance of policy is a matter of 
decision by bureaucrats, and the effectiveness of policy is the 
consequence of the spirit and the will of bureaucrats. 
Executive activities in the Lebowa public sector are undertaken by 
organisational units which are referred to as institutions or depart-
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ments. Each such a department is responsible for a clearly demarca-
ted field of work (Pheme 1988:168). As indicated previously, these 
government departments and institutions constituting the bureaucracy 
in Lebowa are the operational branch of the executive. "The depart-
mentalisation is primarily according to functions" (Pheme 1988:166). 
The rule-application function in the Lebowa political system is 
performed by ten executive government departments. The main function 
of the Department of the Chief Minister is to promote the efficient 
functioning of government departments and to co-ordinate their activi-
ties. It renders services pertaining to tribal and regional mat-
ters, constitutional affairs, public relations, urban representa-
tives, the Public Service Commission and land matters (Lebowa Govern-
ment, Yearbook 1990:15-21). All laws and decisions in respect of 
these aspects are implemented by this department through its branches 
and substructures. 
The Department of Home Affairs 
population registration, labour 
protection, the administration 
town administration. 
provides services pertaining to 
matters, printing services, civil 
of electoral laws, land survey and 
The Department 
provision and 
for electricity 
of Public Works and Transport is responsible for the 
maintenance of infrastructure in the whole of Lebowa 
supply, building services, roads and bridges, and 
government transport. 
240 
The Department 
Lebow a while 
of 
the 
Education controls the educational sub-system in 
Department of Agriculture and Environmental 
Conservation provides services and guidance pertaining to all aspects 
of the agricultural system. 
The Department of Justice's main objective is to ensure an organized 
and peaceful community within the framework of the relevant Acts, 
legal principles and instructions. 
All health, sports and recreational services, the provision of social 
pensions and population development services are the responsibility 
of the Department of Health and Social Welfare. 
The Department of Finance's main aim is to establish and maintain an 
overall financial policy for Lebowa and to regulate and control its 
finances. 
The economic development of Lebowa, including commerce, industries, 
mining, tourism and manpower, is the responsibility of the Department 
of Economic Affairs and Technology. 
The maintenance and the enforcement of law, order and security within 
the powers as prescribed by the Black States Constitution Act (Act 21 
of 1971) is the responsibility of the Department of Law and Order 
(Lebowa Government, Yearbook 1990). 
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All departments 
different but 
centralised at 
perform the rule-making application function through 
coordinated substructures or branches which are mostly 
the Head Office level. A network of well staffed 
District off ices have been established by some of these departments 
in all 13 magisterial districts of Lebowa to perform the rule-
application function at the grassroot level. The Department of Law 
and Order, for example, has at least one Police Station in each dis-
trict. The Department of Education has at least one Circuit Office 
in each district. The Department of the Chief Minister uses the 
services of all District Magistrate's Offices to implement rules and 
decisions in respect of tribal and community matters. The style and 
pattern in which the rule-application function is performed is 
uniform in all government departments in Lebowa, with the exception 
of the Department of Law and Order where force is sometimes resorted 
to due to the nature of specific rules. Police officers may perform 
the rule-application function through different methods which could 
include: 
(a) the execution of summonses; 
(b) arrests and detentions; 
(c) conducting searches with or without warrants and confis-
cations; 
(d) conducting road blocks; 
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(e) the protection of lives and properties; and 
(f) the general prevention of crime and maintenance of order. 
(The Lebowa Police Act 16 of 1986) 
The Department of Law and Order's pattern or style of performing the 
rule-application function is different from that of the other Depart-
ments in many respects. While other departments largely administer 
the laws functionally relevant to them, and perform law enforcement 
on a fairly limited scale, the Law and Order Department is geared for 
law enforcement rather than ordinary administrative functions. This 
distinction gives the Department of Law and Order a specific charac-
ter. 
An example hereof is provided by the administration of the Lebowa 
Intoxicating Liquor Act (Act 5 of 1975) through the Lebowa Liquor 
Board which is the responsibility of the Department of Justice. The 
enforcement of the law through arrests is, however, the responsibi-
lity of the Department of Law and Order. During the year 1989/1990, 
1835 people were arrested by the Lebowa Police for being engaged in 
the illegal sale of liquor (Minister of Law and Order, N.M. Ramodike, 
Policy and Budget Speech 1990:31). 
In another instance, the electoral laws in Lebowa are administered by 
the Department of Home Affairs, while transgressors of these electo-
ral laws have to be arrested by the Police. The Traffic section is 
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also a branch within the Department of Law and Order. During the 
year 1989/90, 2906 summonses were issued for speed offences, 628 for 
offences under the Motor Transport Act, 22 878 for general traffic 
offences, while 717 summonses were issued against people who contra-
vened the Trade Act. This brings the total number of summonses 
issued to offenders to 27 129 (The Minister of Law and Order, N.M. 
Ramodike, Policy and Budget Speech, 1990:39). 
It should be pointed out, however, that some of the other departments 
are also partially responsible for law enforcement. In certain 
instances they can also issue summonses. This could result in cases 
of administrative judicature or determining of penalties for trans-
gressors as is the case with poaching offences dealt with by the 
Department of Agriculture and Environmental Conservation. 
The style and pattern in which the rule-application is performed in 
the other nine departments in Lebowa is, generally, uniform in the 
sense that they are governed by the same Public Service Act. Their 
administrative and control procedures are also more or less similar 
(author's observation). 
As indicated earlier, cabinet ministers are the political heads of 
the respective departments. Every request for action by a minister, 
and consequently every request for action by the cabinet, will how-
ever, always first be processed by the secretary of the appropriate 
state department. In practice, the link between a department and the 
minister is the secretary (author's observation). 
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6.2.3.1 THE ROLE OF THE TREASURY IN THE APPLICATION OF THE BUDGET ACT 
The sui generis position of the Department of Law and Order has been 
discussed. A branch of the Department of Finance which is signifi-
cantly involved in the rule-application function, is the Treasury. 
The reason for looking at this branch of the Department of Finance 
lies therein that one of the most important tasks of any political 
system is the preparation and implementation of the budget of a 
government. This process entails the making of one of the most 
fundamental rules and its application. 
The chapter on rule-making addressed the procedure for the handling 
of financial bills in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. The 1986 
Lebowa Appropriation Bill was discussed as an example in paragraph 
5.5.2.1.3. The role of the Treasury as a body of control in the 
application of the budget act will be discussed. 
In the Exchequer and Audit Act, 1975 (Act 66 of 1975, section 1) the 
Treasury is described as the "central financial authority" in the 
Public Service. The same section points out that the Treasury exer-
cises powers which have to be exercised by the Minister of Finance or 
a specific officer or officers of the Treasury. As a result, the 
Treasury acts as the secretariat to the Minister of Finance. 
In addition, the Treasury may be described as the department which, 
subject to the control of the cabinet, and the authority of the Legis-
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lative Assembly, is responsible for the administration of the public 
finances of a country (Heath 1927:1). 
function of the Treasury is to co-ordinate and control The primary 
spending by public institutions. It ensures that a proper system of 
administration and accounting is laid down and adhered to by the 
functionaries immediately responsible for the utilisation of public 
funds. The authorisation of expenditure also falls to the Treasury 
(Rogers 1981:26). 
The Treasury in Lebowa is subdivided into the following sections: 
Estimates, Financial Dispensation and Revenue. While it is the res-
ponsibility of the Treasury to co-ordinate and compile final 
estimates for all the departments, it is also its duty to act as 
"watchdog" over the use of government finances. The Estimates 
section further liaises with the South Africa Central Government 
regarding the acquisition of funds (Lebowa, Policy and Budget Speech 
of the Minister of Finance 1989/90:6). 
The Financial Dispensation section is responsible for general finan-
cial control including all loans raised by the government. This 
section is also responsible for the control of the departments' re-
quests to write off losses and damage to government property (Lebowa, 
Policy and Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance 1989/90:7). 
The main function of the Revenue section is to control and record 
all revenue collected by Lebowa government institutions. It is 
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through this section of the Treasury that the Legislative Assembly 
can determine whether the territory's sources of revenue are adequate 
(Lebowa, Policy and Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance 
1989/90:8). Furthermore, it is the duty of this section to see to it 
that money due to the state is properly accounted for (Lebowa, Policy 
and Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance 1989/90:9). 
The three sections described above, are headed by a unit whose duties 
approximate those of a financial critic and banker. It is the duty 
of this unit to curb overexpenditures by departments and to report to 
the Minister of Finance (Lebowa, Policy and Budget Speech of the 
Minister of Finance 1989/90:9). 
The functions and powers of the Treasury are stipulated in the Exche-
quer and Audit Act, 1975 (R.S.A.: Act 66 of 1975, sections 1-39). 
This Act gives the Treasury wide powers to control government expendi-
ture. For example, the expenditure voted by the Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly is a maximum amount. This does not mean that the depart-
ments must, or may, spend the maximum amount. The Treasury as the 
watchdog over the use of government funds, may restrict expenditure 
on a given service or suspend the service (R.S.A.: Exchequer and 
Audit Act 66 of 1975, section 8). 
The Treasury in Lebowa performs the following functions (Lebowa, 
Report on the Organisation and Establishment of the Department of 
Finance 19:1984, Annexure B): 
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(a) the consolidation and control of estimates; 
(b) the granting of approvals; 
(c) the handling of government loans; 
(d) the maintenance of the Exchequer ledgers; 
(e) the approval of the Board of Survey reports on the disposal 
of obsolete and redundant stores. 
The following anecdote is useful to illustrate this supervisory, and 
in some instances, even regulatory, role of the Treasury. During one 
of the meetings of the Sessional Committee on Lebowa Government Pub-
lic Accounts appointed in terms of Rule 148 (b) of the Rules of proce-
dure of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly in 1988, several questions 
were directed by the members of the Sessional Committee to the Treasu-
ry about financial control and administration. One of the questions 
raised was whether the drought relief money received from the South 
African government may be transferred to the following financial year 
without losing the right to ask more in that particular year. 
The Head of the Treasury replied as follows (Lebowa: Report of the 
Sessional Committee on Public Accounts 1988:15): 
We have never picked up problems in this regard because, if for 
example, the South African government allocated R2 million for 
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employment creation or drought relief we cannot spend R1 million 
on that earmarked project and the rest for something else. We 
have to carry the balance over to the next financial year. If we 
have to use it for an emergency, then we will have to get a 
special approval for that because that amount has been earmarked 
for that specific purpose by South African government. 
The Treasury in Lebowa also attempts to enforce and apply financial 
control measures which will eliminate theft in all government depart-
ments and offices. In this regard, the Head of the Treasury remarked 
as follows (Lebowa: Report of the Sessional Committee on Public 
Accounts 1988:21): 
We from the Treasury have appointed a special unit of financial 
inspectors who check all the Magistrate Offices at random. In 
other words, they don't follow a specific programme, they can 
check for example Bolobedu today, the next day Bochum and the 
following day Bolobedu again. They don't follow a specific 
programme. 
These examples illustrate the role of the Treasury in the control and 
application of the Budget Act-in Lebowa. 
6.2.4 THE SESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEBOWA GOVERNMENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 
This is 
Assembly. 
an important supervisory institution of the Legislative 
It demands financial accountability, especially from the 
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responsible Secretaries of departments (Accounting Officers). The 
Committee is, therefore, an important watchdog in the process of 
rule-application. The report of the Auditor-General is usually sub-
mitted to this Committee for debate. The Sessional Committee on Pub-
lic Accounts consists of five members of the Legislative Assembly 
including the chairman (Lebowa: Standing Rules of Procedure, Act 1 of 
1972, section 148). 
The Committee is appointed after the beginning of each session of the 
Legislative Assembly and its terms of reference are to examine and to 
report to the Legislative Assembly upon : 
(a) the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by 
the Legislative Assembly to meet public expenditure; and 
(b) the annual report of the Auditor-General which report shall 
stand referred to the Sessional Committee. 
(Lebowa: Standing Rules of Procedure, Act 1 of 1972, section 148) 
The Lebowa Sessional Committee on Public Accounts has shown itself to 
be very sensitive to irregularities such as unauthorised expenditure 
by government departments. The Committee showed great concern in 
this regard when questioning the unauthorised expenditure of about 
R2 587 881 for the "Motor Financing Scheme" envisaged for members of 
the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. The Committee was perturbed by the 
fact that the aforementioned amount was paid from government funds 
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without provision having been made for the expenditure in the 
Appropriation Act by the Legislative Assembly (Lebowa: Report of the 
Sessional Committee on Public Accounts 1989, part I, page 8). More 
examples of the activities of this Committee are outlined in section 
above. 
6.2.5 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBOWA 
Local government in Lebowa comprises three types of local authori-
ties. These are Tribal Authorities, Community Authorities and town 
councils. The Tribal and Community Authorities are established in 
terms of the Black Authorities Act, 1951 (Act 68 of 1951 Section 2). 
The rule-application function at the tribal and the community level 
is performed by Tribal or Community Authorities through their local 
administrative personnel such as the tribal secretary and the tribal 
police (author's observation). It is the duty of each tribal secreta-
ry to ensure the implementation of all tribal resolutions including 
the collection of tribal levies (Interview: Maraba, Tribal Secretary, 
1990). 
Generally, the functions of the Tribal and Community Authorities are 
to administer the affairs of the tribes and communities in respect of 
which it has been established; to render whatever assistance and gui-
dance to its Chief or Headman in connection with the performance of 
his functions, and exercise of his powers, and to perform such func-
tions and duties including any of the powers, functions or duties 
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conferred or imposed upon its Chief or Headman under any law, as are 
in accordance with any applicable Black law or custom, or in terms of 
any regulations required to be exercised or performed by such Tribal 
or Community Authority (R.S.A.: Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951 
Section 4). 
For effective rule-application at the grassroot level, the Tribal or 
Community Authorities also make use of the services of traditional 
Headmen (cf. Chapter 3 above). 
Whereas town 
South Africa, 
through its 
councils were granted delegated powers elsewhere in 
towns in Lebowa are managed by the Lebowa government 
Department of Home Affairs. The Town Administration 
Division within this department is responsible not only for the formu-
lation of policies on town administration in conjunction with the 
Department of Development Aid of the Republic of South Africa, but 
also for the implementation and application of these policies (Pheme 
1988:174). 
At the head of the organization of a town is an appointed Manager 
charged with the administration of that town in terms of the relevant 
rules and regulations. The Manager may be assisted by one or more 
Superintendents depending on the size of the town. In cases where no 
Manager or Senior Superintendent has been appointed, the Superinten-
dent will perform his duties under the control of the Magistrate of 
the district or under the direct control of the Secretary of the De-
partment of Home Affairs. Their functions and duties are prescribed 
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in the "Regulations for the Administration and Control of Townships 
in Black Areas" (R.S.A.: Proclamation R293 of 1962 as amended by 
Proclamations R111 of 1969, R161 of 1970 and R264 of 1970). 
For some towns, Town Councils are established by the Lebowa Govern-
ment. Town Councils are not autonomous bodies because they are under 
the stringent control of the Lebowa government through its Department 
of Home Affairs. The personnel of town councils are also under the 
control of the Lebowa government, and the people actually performing 
the rule-application function in the towns are personnel of the 
Department of Home Affairs. Town councils largely act in an advisory 
capacity. Although the relevant regulations provide for more powers 
which can be conferred on town councils, in practice, no real 
administrative powers have been conferred on such councils by the 
Lebowa government. Town Managers, Superintendents and Magistrates 
play a significant role in the performance of the rule-application 
function in Lebowa towns. In view of the many rule-application 
functions performed 
Health, and Home 
by departments such as those of Works, Justice, 
Affairs in towns, it is evident that the 
administration of towns in Lebowa is the responsibility of the 
government (Botha 1983:429-430). The government has established 
off ices in all towns throughout Lebowa to provide instant services to 
town residents. 
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6.2.6 THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AS A RULE-APPLICATION STRUCTURE 
The Lebowa Public Service Commission is constituted in terms of the 
National States Constitution Act, 1971 (Act No 21 of 1971). The 
powers, functions and duties of this Commission are stipulated in the 
Lebowa Public Service Act, 1972 (Act No.2 of 1972 as amended). The 
Commission consists of three members appointed by the Cabinet. It is 
a special kind of institution of rule-application and is not part of 
another department. It is responsible for a unique form of applica-
tion because its primary objective is to monitor and establish 
procedural prerequisites for effective rule-application. As a re-
sult, it is primarily responsible for the establishment of a sound 
foundation on which effective rule-application is based. 
The Efficiency Branch of the Commission ensures and promotes the 
efficient functioning of the rule-application structures through the 
rendering of the following services to the departments: 
(a) the provision of organisation and establishment inspection 
services; 
(b) workstudy investigations; 
(c) improvement of procedures and methods and the introduction of 
standard procedures; and 
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(d) the provision of training to the government employees. 
(Lebowa Government, Public Service Commission Report 1989:13-14) 
The Efficiency Branch of the Public Service Commission is also respon-
sible for the performance of the following duties: 
(a) The determination of norms applied to work measurements and 
work sampling studies; 
(b) Compilation of, and alterations to, the filing systems; 
(c) Incentive schemes; 
(d) Form design and form control; 
(e) The promotion of efficiency in general. 
The purpose of the Inspectorate Branch within the Lebowa Public Ser-
vice Commission is to render inspectorate services. It is mainly 
concerned with: 
(a) Carrying out work performance inspection; 
(b) Carrying out special investigations on behalf of the Commis-
sion to identify structural problems and shortcomings and to 
make proposals to rectify such matters; 
255 
(c) Investigating and making proposals regarding the functional 
division of government departments and activities, and also 
matters relating to the post and personnel structure. 
(Lebowa Government, Public Service Commission Report 1989:14-15) 
In this way the Lebowa political system ensures the efficient per-
formance of the rule-application function by government departments 
in an impartial manner. The Public Service Commission plays an imper-
tant role in this regard. 
6.2.7 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
Certain matters are reserved from legislation and administration by 
the Lebowa government in terms of the National States Constitution 
Act, 1971 (R.S.A.: Act 21 of 1971, Section 4). All rule-application 
related to these reserved matters which include defence or military 
services, postal, telegraph, telephone, radio and television servi-
ces, railways and national roads, currency and banking, foreign 
affairs, and the preservation of internal security, is performed by 
the South African government through its State departments. 
The South African Department of Law and Order will be used as an 
example. The application of the Internal Security Act within all the 
self-governing territories in South Africa, including Lebowa, is the 
responsibility of the South African Department of Law and Order. The 
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implementation and application of the National State of Emergency 
rules and regulations as declared by the State President on 12 June 
1986 was carried out by the South African Police in Lebowa (R.S.A.: 
Bureau for Information, 1987:3). 
The South African Defence Force has established regional battalions 
to provide defence and the protection services for the non-
independent homelands. 115 Battalion based at Messina was formed for 
Lebowa (Race Relations Survey, 1988/89:522). It is through this 
regional battalion that the South African Defence Force implements 
protective rules and laws in the Lebowa political system. 
All national roads passing through Lebowa are the responsibility of 
the Central South African government through the Transvaal Provincial 
Administration. The maintenance and enforcement of the road traffic 
laws on these national roads is also in the hands of the R.S.A. 
These examples serve to demonstrate the involvement of the South 
African government departments in the performance of the 
rule-application function in the Lebowa political system. 
6.2.8 PARASTATAL INSTITUTIONS 
Different 
supply a 
control boards, state enterprises and public corporations 
diversity of services to the Lebowa political system. Some 
of the laws, decisions and the development policy of the Lebowa Gover-
nment are administered and implemented by these institutions. 
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The Lebowa Development Corporation and its subsidiary companies, the 
Lebowa Marketing Board, the Lebowa Road Transportation Board, the 
Lebowa Liquor Board, and the Lebowa Tender Board are examples of such 
institutions. For purposes of this study, the rule-application 
function as performed by the Lebowa Development Corporation (LDC), 
and the Lebowa Liquor Board (LLB), will be dealt with. 
6.2.8.1 THE LEBOWA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
The Lebowa Development Corporation was established in terms of 
sections 5(1) and (3) of the Promotion of Economic Development of 
National States Act, 1968 (R.S.A.: Act 46 of 1968, and Proclamation 
R167 of 1976), and reconstituted in 1984 in terms of the Lebowa 
Corporations Act, 1984 (Act 16 of 1984). 
Its main function is to inaugurate, plan, finance, coordinate, pro-
mote, or carry out or assist in the inauguration, planning, finan-
cing, co-ordination, promotion or carrying out of projects which are 
intended to benefit and develop Lebowa and black persons economically 
or which relate to the exploitation, development or utilization of 
natural resources, which in addition to the ordinary meaning thereof 
shall include labour, land, minerals, metals, precious stones, wood, 
water, agriculture, fishing and sea products, methods of transport 
and communication, and methods for the development of power, and to 
provide capital, assistance and specialised advise (R.S.A.: Promotion 
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of Economic Development of National States Act 46 of 1968, Section 
4(1)(b), (f) and (b)). 
The administration and the application of rules and decisions pertai-
ning to these functions is done through different specialised sub-
structures within the Corporation. These include the Industrial 
development branch, Commercial development branch, Housing develop-
ment branch and the Mining branch (Lebowa Development Corporation, 
Annual Report 1987:7-15). These substructures are staffed by an 
efficient, well trained staff under the Managing Director and the 
Board of Directors. 
Through its field officers and a network of geographically dispersed 
offices, the Corporation is able to provide for strategic contact 
with the people of Lebowa and to implement its rules and decisions 
even at the grassroot level (Lebowa Development Corporation, Annual 
Report 1987:5). The LDC is, in essence, the economic arm of the 
Lebowa political system and presents its report to Lebowa Cabinet 
annually through the Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology who 
in turn usually tables it in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly (Lebowa, 
Report on the Organisation and Establishment of the Department of 
Economic Affairs, 1983, Annexure B). The Lebowa government is the 
sole shareholder in the LDC (Lebowa, Policy and Budget speech of the 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology 1990:20). 
It is important to note that the LDC makes and implements its rules 
through its board of directors. 
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6.2.8.2 THE LEBOWA LIQUOR BOARD 
The Liquor Board was established in terms of the Lebowa Intoxicating 
Liquor Act, 1973 (Act 7 of 1973). The Board consists of a chairman 
and two other members appointed by the Lebowa Minister of Justice for 
three years. It is responsible for the execution and the administra-
tion of the Lebowa Intoxicating Liquor Act. 
In terms of this Act, all laws and regulations pertaining to appli-
cations for liquor licences, transfer of licences, removal of licen-
ced business sites to other premises, and the cancellation of licen-
ces are administered and applied by the Board. The Board uses the 
services of the District Magistrate's Offices throughout Lebowa to 
implement rules related to its functions at the grassroot level, such 
as the processing of the liquor licence applications (Lebowa 
Government, Year Book 1990:88). 
In 1989 the 
approved, 45 
Board considered 432 applications of which 67 were 
disapproved and 311 not finalised. This indicates how 
involved this Board is in implementing the rules and regulations 
relating to the liquor trade in Lebowa (Lebowa Government, Budget and 
Policy Speech, The Minister of Justice, 1990:35). 
The rule-application function in Lebowa is also performed by parasta-
tal institutions of the Republic of South Africa whose areas of juris-
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diction transcend borders of the Lebowa political system. The South 
African Broadcasting Corporation and the South African Transport 
Services (Transnet) are examples of such organisations. 
6.3 CLASSIFICATION OF BUREAUCRACIES 
This discussion of the bureaucracy in Lebowa necessitates an evalua-
tion of the role played by the bureaucracy in the political system of 
Lebowa. One method of achieving this is to classify the bureaucracy 
in terms of its main characteristics and functions. 
Almond and Powell use Merle Fainsod's classification which is based 
on different relationship patterns between bureaucracies and politi-
cal agencies. Fainsod suggests five types of bureaucracies (Almond & 
Powell 1966:149; Fainsod 1963:233): 
(a) representative bureaucracies; 
(b) party-state bureaucracies; 
(c) military-dominated bureaucracies; 
(d) ruler-dominated bureaucracies; and 
(e) ruling bureaucracies. 
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6.3.1 REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACIES 
This type of bureaucracy is described "as characteristic of political 
systems in which the ultimate political authority is determined by a 
competitive political process" (Fainsod 1963:233; Almond and Powell 
1966:149). Representative government and the competitive party sys-
tem are necessary prerequisites for this type of bureaucracy. The 
initiatives of representative bureaucracies must be adjusted to an 
underlying political consensus. The dynamics of change are regulated 
by the competitive political process (Fainsod 1963:233). The present 
political party system operating in Britain has resulted in a situa-
tion in which the bureaucracy functions as a relatively effective 
rule-application instrument of the Cabinet, the ruling party, and 
Parliament (Almond & Powell 1966:150). 
6.3.2 PARTY-STATE BUREAUCRACIES 
According to 
totalitarian 
(1963:235). 
functionally 
bureaucracy, 
Fainsod, party-state bureaucracies are by-products of 
regimes and other one-party-dominated political systems 
The superimposition of a political bureaucracy on a 
differentiated and technically competent governmental 
is characteristic of this type of political system. The 
control of the Soviet governmental bureaucracy by the Communist Party 
is a unique example hereof (Almond & Powell 1966:150). 
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6.3.3 MILITARY DOMINATED BUREAUCRACIES 
In this category, Fainsod specifically refers to systems in which one 
component of the bureaucracy and members of the officer corps of the 
security forces, take over the civilian bureaucracy. Historically, 
this is a common pattern in the contemporary world. Depending on the 
training and ideology of the officer corps, these systems may be 
characterized as being either conservative or modernizing (Fainsod 
1963:238; Almond and Powell 1966:152). 
6.3.4 RULER-DOMINATED BUREAUCRACIES 
Fainsod here refers to political systems in which "an autonomous 
ruler imposes his rule through a bureaucracy or officialdom" (Almond 
& Powell 1966:152). There are similarities between ruler- dominated 
bureaucracies and "bureaucratic empires" as advocated by Eisenstadt. 
6.3.5 RULING BUREAUCRACIES 
In this category, the bureaucracy itself provides the ruling element 
in the political system (Almond & Powell 1966:152). Certain cases of 
colonial rule in which the colonial administrators in the remote 
situation with "minimum direction from a metropolitan center and with 
more or less absolute authority over the local inhabitants", are 
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provided by Fainsod as examples of this form of bureaucratic system 
(Fainsod 1963:236-237; Almond and Powell 1966:152). 
In terms of this classificatory framework of political systems pro-
posed by Fainsod, it would appear that the bureaucracy in Lebowa 
displays elements of the representative, ruling, and party-state 
bureaucracies. 
In the first instance, the bureaucracy in Lebowa can be classified as 
representative because the ultimate political authority in the Lebowa 
political system is determined by a competitive political process. 
The Lebowa People's Party (LPP) and many independent candidates have 
been very active in stimulating this competitive political process. 
In chapter 4 (paragraph 4.4) of this study, mention is made of the 
activities of the Lebowa People's Party and some independent candi-
dates. 
Since 
the 
the 
the establishment of the Lebowa government in 1973, it has been 
duty of the bureaucracy to execute and implement the policies of 
ruling Lebowa People's Party. In this sense, the bureaucracy is 
representative. 
It is questionable, however, whether the political process in Lebowa 
can be considered to be competitive while the ratio of 
representatives in the Legislative Assembly is 60 to 40 in favour of 
designated traditional Chiefs as against elected members. In view of 
this constitutional reality, it would be appropriate to conclude that 
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the competitiveness of the 
the 40 seats of popularly 
Assembly. Therefore, the 
partially satisfied by the 
Lebowa political process is confined to 
elected members of the Legislative 
requirements for representativeness are 
bureaucracy in the Lebowa political 
process (author's observation). 
The bureaucracy in Lebowa also displays strong elements of a ruling 
bureaucracy. It should be kept in mind that an important part of the 
bureaucracy in Lebowa consists of white officials seconded from the 
government of the Republic of South Africa. These officials do not 
form part of the Lebowa civil service. They are directly controlled 
and paid by the South African government. Therefore, in practice, 
they are responsible and loyal to the South African government, and 
not the Lebowa government (author's observation). This corresponds 
to Fainsod's examples of colonial rule in which the colonial admini-
strators in the field function with " 'minimum direction from a metro-
politan center and with more or less absolute authority over the 
local inhabitants'" (Almond & Powell 1966: 152). 
Thirdly, features of a party-state bureaucracy are also noticeable in 
the Lebowa bureaucracy. The activities of the independent candidates 
in elections are still too weak for them to function as a de facto 
opposition party. There is, therefore, only one political party in 
Lebowa, and all bureaucratic activities are geared towards the 
implementation of that party's policy. It could therefore be argued 
that it is partially a party-state bureaucracy. The role of the 
Department of Home Affairs in local government supports this view. 
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In view of the facts outlined above, it can be concluded that the 
bureaucracy in Lebowa is partially a representative bureaucracy, but 
that it displays elements of a ruling bureaucracy and a party-state 
bureaucracy. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The main rule-application structures in the Lebowa political process 
were briefly outlined and discussed. It was shown that the Cabinet 
of Lebowa plays an important role in the rule-application function 
through its cabinet meetings and its Cabinet Ministers who serve as 
the political heads of the respective government departments. 
The government departments also featured very prominently as the 
outstanding rule-application structures. For the efficient and 
effective performance of the rule-application function, most depart-
ments have established off ices at the district level throughout 
Lebowa. It was also observed that the style and pattern in which the 
rule-application function is performed, is similar in all departments 
with the exception of the Department of Law and Order. 
Some of the South African government departments also play a signif i-
cant role in the rule-application function in the Lebowa political 
process. 
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The role of the Treasury as a body of control in the application of 
the Budget Act was outlined. It was explained that the Exchequer and 
Audit Act describes the Treasury as the central financial authority 
in the Public Service. 
The Lebowa Public Service Commission was discussed as a special 
example of a rule-application structure. Its composition, functions 
and procedure were explained. 
Parastatal institutions also serve as rule-application structures 
within the Lebow a political system. The Lebowa Development 
Corporation and 
this regard. 
the Lebowa Liquor Board were briefly discussed in 
There are no unique features of style or pattern of 
rule-application in either instance. 
Local authorities, namely Tribal and Community Authorities and town 
councils were also discussed as rule-application structures in the 
Lebowa political process. 
Merle Fainsod's classification based on different relationship pat-
terns between bureaucracies and political agencies was used to ana-
lyse the Lebowa bureaucracy. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the Lebowa political system has 
succeeded in developing effective and efficient rule-application 
structures at all governmental levels. At the tribal and community 
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level, government involvement in performing the rule-application 
function is less than is the case at town council level. 
Although the Department of Law and Order was shown to have a specific 
style and pattern of rule-application, it is not unique as other 
departments are also partially responsible for law enforcement in 
Lebowa. 
There is still room for improvement in respect of the efficient and 
effective performance of the rule-application function in all the 
structures outlined and discussed. 
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CHAPTER 7: RULE-ADJUDICATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Almond and Powell (1966:158-159): 
The primary rules of the political system impose authoritative re-
straints or obligations on individuals .... But in any case, some 
provision must be made for the possibility that the rules will be 
violated. Penalties for violation of the rules and enforcement 
procedures for these in various rule-application roles are common-
ly provided by the rules. However, serious conflict is inevitab-
ly generated over the issue of whether or not a rule has been vio-
lated in any given instance. 
This necessitates the performance of the adjudication function which 
involves the process of making binding decisions as to whether or not 
a rule has been transgressed in a given case (Almond & Powell 1966: 
159). The significance and indispensability of the rule-adjudication 
function in any political system is also emphasised by Almond and 
Powell (1966:158-160). 
In view hereof, this chapter will address the composition, functions 
and processes of the following rule-adjudication structures in the 
Lebowa political system: 
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(a) Traditional courts. Those courts that are legally recognised 
and those that are not, 
courts and tribal courts 
with; and 
(b) Statutory courts. 
such as family courts, Headman's 
(Kgoshi's courts) will be dealt 
A brief discussion of both the general and the appeal procedures of 
traditional as well as statutory courts will be undertaken. 
7.2 TRADITIONAL COURTS OF LAW 
The traditional judicial system of Lebowa is based on the traditional 
social system of the territory. Among the Black peoples of Southern 
Africa, including Lebowa, there is no separation of the judiciary, 
the legislative, and the executive authority. Against this back-
ground, the following traditional rule-adjudication structures will 
be discussed: the family court, the Headman's court, and the tribal 
court (Kgoshi's court). 
7.2.1 THE FAMILY COURT 
7.2.1.1 COMPOSITION, FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURE 
In terms of tradition, the patrilineal descendants over approximately 
five to six generations from an identifiable ancestor are referred to 
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as "leloko". Each "leloko" is divided into a number of smaller 
lineages ("masika") which may ultimately develop into autonomous 
"maloko". The senior male relative in the leloko or lesika is recog-
nised as its leader. With the assistance of other senior relatives 
in the lineage, he adjudicates in quarrels between members and also 
hears complaints lodged from outside against lineage members (Botha 
1983:205). Outsiders have no access to the family court and disputes 
involving its members are settled as quietly as possible. Usually 
this court adjudicates matters related to customary practices, such 
as lobola (author's observation). The family courts hear only civil 
cases. 
More than 80% of all civil disputes in Lebowa are heard and dealt 
with by these courts (Botha 1983:214). The family courts continue to 
perform an important function in promoting order and justice in all 
the tribes of Lebowa. 
The jurisdiction of the family court is confined to members of the 
family. In practice, no person may start civil proceedings related 
to family matters (normally adjudicated by a family court) in a 
higher court without first going to a family court (author's 
observation). 
In practice, there are no formally laid down rules of procedure for 
the handling of disputes at the family court level. Any person who 
is dissatisfied with the judgement of a family court has the right to 
lodge an appeal with the higher courts. The hierarchical sequence of 
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court seniority is: family court; Headman's court; Chief's court 
(tribal court); Magistrate's court (author's observation). 
7.2.2 THE HEADMAN'S COURT 
7.2.2.1 COMPOSITION, FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURE 
The Headman's court is the lowest public court encountered among the 
tribes of Lebowa. Like the Kgoshi, the Headman is also assisted in 
trials by senior relatives and advisors. All adult men may attend 
and take part in the court proceedings. No Headman may hear cases 
outside his area of jurisdiction which is determined through 
customary practices by the Kgoshi (Botha 1983:215). If the Headman 
is recognised and appointed in terms of the Black Administration Act, 
1927 (R.S.A.: Act 38 of 1927), however, his jurisdiction will be 
determined by the Lebowa Government. As with family courts, 
Headman's courts hear only civil cases (author's observation). 
7.2.3 THE CHIEF'S COURT (TRIBAL COURT) 
7.2.3.1 COMPOSITION, FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURE 
Provision is made in terms of the Black Administration Act, 1927 
(R.S.A.: 
Kgoshi 
Act 38 
(Chief) 
of 1927, section 12), for the authorisation of a 
or Headman who is appointed or appointed under 
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section 2(7) or (8) of the Act, to hear and determine civil claims 
arising out of the Black Law and custom brought before him by Black 
persons against Black residents within his area of jurisdiction. In 
this sense, the Headman's courts and the tribal courts are legally 
recognised. It should be noted, however, that not all Headmen are 
recognised by the Lebowa Government. 
The tribal court in Lebowa exercise such powers, and performs such 
duties 
as may 
Kgoshi, 
reason 
and functions in connection with the administration of justice 
be assigned to it by law and custom. No judgement given by a 
Headman, or deputy of a Kgoshi is deemed to be invalid by 
of its having been given or made by such Kgoshi, Headman or 
deputy acting on advice, or with the consent, or at the instance, of 
a tribal authority or any committee or councillor thereof. In 
effect, this means that the diKgoshi (Chiefs) are granted civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over their subjects in respect of less serious 
crimes (R.S.A.: Act 38 of 1927, sections 12 and 20). 
A basic traditional rule of procedure upheld in all civil cases by 
Black communities is that no complaint can be brought in the absence 
of a complainant. One of the rare exceptions to this rule is crimi-
nal cases in which a subject transgressed or disobeyed a Kgoshi's or-
der. Every complainant and defendant must appear in court personal-
ly, and no legal representation is allowed (Botha 1983:215). 
Legal proceedings 
damages submitted 
are normally started in the form of a claim for 
to the court of the lineage head of the defendant. 
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If the demand is not met satisfactorily, the case goes on appeal to 
the court of the Headman (or sub-Headman), and from there to the 
tribal court (Kgoshi's court). 
Among the Northern Sotho tribes a system known as the Batseta system, 
is in operation and popular between the lower and the higher 
traditional courts. In terms of this system, a litigant may approach 
the tribal court only through a succession of intermediaries (Botha 
1976:189). These intermediaries may individually attempt to settle 
the dispute which can lead to a situation where a case may be judged 
twice or three times before being formally brought before the tribal 
court ( Monnig 1967:311). 
The procedure at the trial is usually in accordance with the recog-
nised law and customs of the respective tribes in Lebowa. After a 
short interrogation, and on payment of the prescribed fees, the 
tribal or Headman's court will issue a summons for delivery to the 
defendant by the messenger of the court (Motseta wa Moshate). 
Magoshi (Chiefs) may, in their capacity as commissioners of oaths, 
administer the oath, and witnesses may be called upon to testify 
under oath. This practice is, however, not often used by the Magoshi 
in Lebowa (author's observation). 
It is usual for the plaintiff to present his evidence and that of his 
witnesses first, after which the defendant and his witnesses will 
testify. 
not yet 
To guard against distortion of evidence, witnesses who have 
given evidence are, as a rule, not present while other 
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witnesses of the same party are giving evidence (Lebowa, Department 
of Justice, Guide on Chief's Courts 1973:4). Some of the tribal 
courts in Lebowa allow cross-examination of witnesses, while others 
do not allow this practice (author's observation). Any councillor, 
Headman, or the Chief himself, may also cross-examine the parties and 
the witnesses. 
After the complainant has started his case, and before any evidence 
is led, the defendant is usually asked if he acknowledges his liabili-
ty. If the answer is in the affirmative, he may submit a plea in 
mitigation. Traditionally, the defendant is never asked to plead 
guilty or not guilty, and it is the task of the court to decide 
through cross-examination whether he is culpable or not (Botha 
1983:216). 
After having heard the parties and their witnesses, the Chief or 
Headman in consultation with his councillors, gives judgement in 
accordance with the recognised laws and customs of the tribe on the 
points in dispute. If the dispute is not covered by traditional law 
or precedent, the Chief in consultation with his councillors, uses 
his common sense in coming to a finding and passing judgement. Judge-
ment is usually given at the conclusion of the trial (author's obser-
vation). 
The judgement debtor delivers the restitution ordered by the court 
to the court, which in turn hands it to the judgement creditor before 
witnesses (Botha 1983:216). In the event of reluctance to surrender 
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the goods in question, the tribal court may take the matter up with 
the Magistrate's court. This is necessary because the tribal courts 
in Lebowa are not accorded full powers of seizure by force (Lebowa, 
Department of Justice, Guide on Chief's Courts 1973:9). 
In a case where a person is charged with having disobeyed a Kgoshi's 
order, or having transgressed any tribal rule, and is tried and found 
guilty, a fine may be imposed against him. At present, all fees and 
fines are deposited into the tribal treasury (Botha 1983:215). This 
procedure is applicable to both civil and criminal cases. 
7.2.4 APPEAL PROCEDURES 
Any person who is dissatisfied with the judgement of a particular 
traditional court in Lebowa, has the right to lodge an appeal to a 
higher court, up to the Magistrate's court. There are more than 130 
tribes in Lebowa, and each tribe has its own appeal procedure. The 
only uniform appeal procedure which is observed in Lebowa, is that 
procedure governing appeals from the tribal court to the Magistrate's 
court. It is applicable to both civil and criminal cases (author's 
observation). 
is dissatisfied with the judgement of a tribal court Any person who 
(Chief's court) 
that district 
appeal lies 
has the right to appeal to the Magistrate's court of 
within two months of the date of the judgement. No 
against a default judgement unless and until an appli-
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cation for rescission has been refused (Lebowa, Department of 
Justice, Guide on Chief's Courts 1973:9). 
The Clerk of the Magistrate's court 
noted, notifies the relevant tribal 
with whom an appeal has been 
court of this fact, and calls 
upon the Chief to furnish his reasons for judgement without delay. 
The Chief must respond within fourteen days. In the event of a delay 
by the Chief, the Magistrate is entitled to proceed with the appeal 
without the Chief's reasons for judgement (Lebowa, Department of 
Justice, Guide on Chief's Courts 1973:9-10). 
On the day fixed for the appearance of the parties, the Magistrate's 
court proceeds to re-hear and re-try the case as if it were a court 
of the first instance, and may give such judgement or make such order 
as provided for in Act 38 of 1927. The result of the appeal is 
conveyed by the Clerk of the Court to the Chief concerned immediately 
after the appeal has been heard (Lebowa, Department of Justice, Guide 
on Chief's Courts 1973:8). 
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7.3 STATUTORY COURTS 
7.3.1 MAGISTRATES COURTS 
7.3.1.1 COMPOSITION, FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURE 
In addition to indigenous traditional courts, Lebowa has its own 
Magistrate's courts established in terms of the Lebowa Establishment 
of Magistrate's Courts Act, 1973 (Lebowa: Act 5 of 1973) in the 
following districts: 
(a) Seshego; 
(b) Thabamoopo; 
(c) Nebo; 
(d) Sekhukhuneland; 
(e) Naphuno; 
(f) Bolobedu; 
(g) Bochum; 
(h) Mokerong; 
( i) Sekgosese; 
(j)Namakgale; and 
(k) Mapulaneng. 
These Magistrate's courts are administered by the Lebowa Department 
of Justice. According to the Lebowa Establishment of Magistrate's 
Courts Act, every Magistrate's Court in the Lebowa political system 
shall be: 
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1. a Magistrate's Court for the purpose of the Magistrate's 
Courts Act, 1944 (Act 32 of 1944) and the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 1955 (Act 56 of 1955); 
2. a Children's Court under the Children's Court Act, 1960 (Act 
33 of 1960); 
3. a Maintenance Court for the purpose of the Maintenance Act, 
1963 (Act 23 of 1963); and 
4. empowered in so far as any law confers on a Magistrate's 
Court any jurisdiction or power in relation to matters in 
respect of which a Magistrate's Court for the purpose of such 
law established by or under the Lebowa Establishment of Magis-
trate's Courts Act, has jurisdiction. 
(Lebowa Establishment of Magistrate's Courts Act 5 of 1973, 
section 3(1)) 
One of the main 
Magistrate's court 
latter, while it 
courts. 
differences between the traditional courts and the 
is that legal representation is allowed in the 
is not part of the procedure in the traditional 
Magistrate's courts can, broadly speaking, try all civil and criminal 
cases excepting treason, rape and murder, but can only impose limited 
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punishment. In civil cases, limits to claims for damages are deter-
mined by statute, and in recent times have had to be readjusted 
continuously to meet the rate of inflation (Venter 1989:65). 
As is the case in the Republic of South Africa, Magistrates in Lebowa 
are civil servants appointed by the Minister of Justice. The Mini-
ster may not interfere with the proceedings or judgements of a court. 
In Lebowa there are no courts of a higher grading than Magistrate's 
courts. The Supreme Courts are administered by the Department of 
Justice of the Republic of South Africa outside the borders of Lebowa 
(Pheme 1988:209). 
The Lebowa Magistrate's courts, like those of the Republic of South 
Africa, follow the English adversarial procedure in both civil and 
criminal trials. In this process, each of the parties to a dispute 
is given the opportunity to present its case to the court by evidence 
and argument, and by cross examining witnesses. The court hears and 
considers only evidence presented to it, and cannot rule on hearsay 
evidence (Venter 1989:68). 
In criminal cases, the state has to prove its case against the 
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is, therefore, innocent 
until proven guilty. In civil cases, the case for the claimant 
against the respondent has to be proven on a preponderance of 
probability. The presiding officer reaches a decision by applying 
what he considers to be the appropriate rule of law to what he has 
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decided to be the correct version of the facts (De Crespigny & 
Schrire 1978:34). 
An important characteristic of the judicial process is the doctrine 
of stare decisis or precedent. In terms hereof, lower courts are 
bound by earlier decisions of all superior courts. If a conflict 
exists between the judgements of superior courts, the Magistrate must 
follow the judgement of his own Provincial Division. As a result, 
the Magistrate's courts in Lebowa are bound by the decisions of the 
Transvaal Provincial Division and the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of the Republic of South Africa. In general, one 
Magistrate is not bound by the judgements of another, mainly because 
the judgements of Magistrate's courts are not reported (Hosten, 
Edwards, Nathan and Bosman 1977:224-226; Lebowa, The Minister of 
Justice, Policy and Budget Speech 1990:23). 
The right to legal representation is regarded as fundamental in the 
Magistrate's courts of Lebowa, but the costs are very high as is the 
case in the Republic of South Africa (De Crespigny & Schrire 
1978:35). The judicial oath or affirmation requires every Magistrate 
to administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or 
prejudice (R.S.A.: Act 32 of 1944, Section 9). 
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7.3.2 THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
7.3.2.1 COMPOSITION, FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURE 
Presently, Lebowa does 
judicial authority in 
not have its own Supreme Court. The highest 
Lebowa is constitutionally vested in the 
Supreme Court of South Africa, which is hierarchically organised into 
an Appellate Division in Bloemfontein, six Provincial Divisions 
(Cape, Eastern Cape,Northern Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and 
Transvaal) and three Local Divisions (Durban Coastal, Witwatersrand 
and South-Eastern Cape) (Venter 1989:64). 
The Provincial and Local Divisions of the Supreme Court are all 
courts of first 
criminal case, 
Provincial and 
instance, which means they can try any civil or 
regardless of its magnitude. "The purpose of the 
local Divisions is to ensure that there are supreme 
courts permanently located in each province and in each of the main 
population centres of each province" (De Crespigny & Schrire 1978: 
33). As Lebowa is situated in the province of Transvaal, the 
jurisdiction of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme 
Court also embraces the entire territory of Lebowa. 
The Appellate Division consists of a Chief Justice and twelve 
Justices of Appeal. In appeals, three Judges form a quorum, but the 
Chief Justice may appoint a larger bench. Each Provincial Division 
consists of a Judge President and a number of ordinary judges. The 
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Local Divisions are manned by judges from the respective Provincial 
Divisions (Venter 1989:64). 
The Appellate Division in Bloemfontein only hears appeals, which 
means that it can only take into consideration evidence which has 
already been submitted to a lower court. No trial witnesses appear 
before this court, only advocates who present their arguments on 
behalf of their clients. The Provincial Divisions can hear appeals 
from lower courts and specialised courts (Venter 1989:64). 
Like the Magistrate's court, the Provincial and Local Divisions of 
the Supreme Court of South Africa also follow an adversarial pro-
cedure. Each of the parties to the dispute is given an opportunity 
to present its case (by evidence and argument), to test the 
opposition through cross-examination, and to argue the relevant law. 
An important characteristic of the judicial process is the doctrine 
of stare decisis or precedent as was indicated earlier. 
The Supreme Court is staffed by judges drawn from the ranks of 
practising advocates. They are expected to be impartial in all cases 
(De Crespigny & Schrire 1978:35). The Supreme Court of South Africa 
presently renders a significant rule-adjudication function to the 
Lebowa political system. Some of the cases that have been heard by 
this court are mentioned elsewhere in this study (cf. chapters 3 and 
8). 
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Any party dissatisfied with a judgement of the Magistrate's court in 
Lebowa, has the right to direct an appeal to the Transvaal Provincial 
Division of the Supreme Court of the Republic of South Africa. As 
indicated before, these Superior courts fall outside the jurisdiction 
and control of the Lebowa Government (Lebowa, Minister of Justice, 
Budget and Policy Speech, 1990:24). 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
The composition and functions of the different rule-adjudication 
structures in Lebowa such as traditional and statutory courts were 
discussed in this chapter. Family courts were mentioned as the only 
non-public courts in the sense that outsiders have no access to their 
sittings. On the other hand, both the Headman's court and the tribal 
court are public courts. 
Since the Magoshi (Chiefs) and some of the Headmen in Lebowa are 
authorised in terms of an Act of Parliament to hear civil disputes 
through their tribal or Headman's courts, these courts may be 
classified as both traditional and statutory courts. The 
Magistrate's courts are the only statutory courts within the Lebowa 
political system, apart from the traditional courts which are legally 
sanctioned. The Supreme Court of South Africa is a statutory court 
serving the Lebowa political system from outside the territory of 
Lebowa. 
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Attention was also given to the judicial process in the Lebowa 
political system, and the procedures of the traditional courts and 
the statutory courts were outlined. Legal representation is allowed 
in the statutory courts, but not in traditional courts. 
As was shown, appeal cases from Magistrate's courts in Lebowa are 
directed to the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of 
the 
(in 
that 
Republic of South Africa. The Appellate Division in Bloemfontein 
the Republic of South Africa) hears only appeals, which means 
it can only take into consideration evidence already submitted 
to a lower court. The Appellate Division also serves Lebowa. 
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CHAPTER 8: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The sixth 
model is 
processes, 
process of the conversion function in Almond and Powell's 
political communication. Referring to the other five 
the authors justify the inclusion of the communication 
process as follows (1966:29): "these various activities are communi-
cated both within the political system, and between the political 
system and its environment ... ". 
The basis of all social interaction is communication. To interact 
with one another, human beings must be able to communicate. Concer-
ned citizens must be able to communicate their needs and desires to 
their government and political leaders must be able to communicate to 
the citizens the reasons for their decisions to provide some basis 
for public support. Communication occurs in many different forms 
such as the spoken or written language, music, gestures, facial 
expressions, and even physical violence. Political communication is 
the transmission of politically relevant information through one or 
more of these means (Rush & Althoff 1971:402). 
Lucien Pye regards communication as a basis for all political pro-
cesses. "Of all the basic functions which underlie the political 
process it is appropriate to single out for special treatment the 
communications function ... " (1965:153). He further states that there 
"is a peculiarly intimate relationship between the political process 
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and the communications process. For within the domain of politics the 
communication process has a fundamental function" (Pye 1965:153). 
Consequently, it is not surprising that some students of politics 
feel that the most useful way to understand the basic features of 
political activity is to conceptualize that activity as a series of 
communicative acts (Welsh 1973:69). 
Almond and Powell (1966:165-166), on the other hand, believe that: 
Rather than recasting all political thought in communication 
terms or only considering communication activity as a factor in 
understanding other political functions, it seems most useful for 
our purposes to take a middle road. We can attempt to focus on 
the most general and significant flows of information in 
political systems. The structures performing these communication 
activities can be analyzed and compared The performance of 
the communication function does not include all the other 
political functions, but it constitutes instead a necessary 
prerequisite for performance of other functions. 
The following aspects of communication as a function in the Lebowa 
political system will be discussed: 
(a) the various types of communication structures;and 
(b) the differentiation and autonomy of the media of communi-
cation. 
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Almond and Powell also mention a third aspect - the implications of 
communications patterns for the performance of other political 
functions - but it will not be dealt with. 
8.2 TYPES OF COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES 
Almond and Powell distinguish five types of structures: 
(a) informal face-to-face contacts; 
(b) traditional social structures; 
(c) political "output" structures; 
(d) political "input" structures; and 
(e) the mass media. 
8.2.1 INFORMAL FACE-TO-FACE CONTACTS 
Almond and Powell maintain that the role and importance of informal 
face-to-face contacts in any political system should not be under-
estimated. "Modern social science research has emphasized the degree 
to which informal channels pervade the most developed communications 
systems" (Almond & Powell 1966: 167). They further state that 
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certain persons or individuals who, for one reason or another, have a 
greater interest in following political events, and who communicate 
information and opinions to friends, neighbours, relatives and 
co-workers, serve as opinion leaders. On their own, these people 
interpret the information they receive through the media and other 
contacts, and they directly shape the knowledge and beliefs of others 
(Almond & Powell 1966:167). 
As mentioned in paragraph 3.3.2 above, personal connections as a 
means of access to political elites plays an important role in the 
Lebowa political system. What is more, this type of contact is 
commonly used by non-associational groups. This section should, 
therefore, be read in conjuction with paragraphs 3.3.2 and 3.2.3 of 
chapter 3. 
A further illustration of the effectiveness of this communication 
structure in the Lebowa political 
behaviour of the electorate during 
Lebowa in 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1989. 
to effective political communication 
system is to be found in the 
the general elections held in 
One of the important obstacles 
was the high rate of adult 
illiteracy. At the family level, school children and other literate 
members of the family played an important communication role in 
shaping the voting attitudes of the illiterate members of the family 
through informal face to face discussions. Some of the elderly 
voters could hardly remember the names of the candidates on the 
election day and had to be helped by their children, relatives, 
friends or neighbours (author's observations). 
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This type of personal contact may occur in various situations such as 
at social gatherings, in taxis or buses, at schools and in work 
situations inside or outside Lebowa author's observation). 
8.2.2 TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
Traditional social 
in traditional 
structures play a significant communication role 
and developing societies. Tribal leaders and 
councils, the extended family, and religious leaders can play a 
powerful role as initiators and transmitters of information for large 
sections of the nation (Almond & Powell 1966:168). 
The role of Chiefs (Magoshi), Headmen and Tribal Authorities is 
prominent in the Lebowa political process. As mentioned previously, 
Chiefs (Magoshi) serve in many public institutions in the Lebowa 
Government such as the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, the Lebowa Regio-
nal Authorities, the Lebowa Licencing Boards and various advisory 
boards attached to the . Lebowa government departments (author's 
observation). 
This supports the statement by Almond and Powell that: "The traditio-
nal community leaders stand between the national elite and the 
people, and may hinder or ease the transition to national unity" 
(1966:168). 
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The general practice in Lebowa is for most of the Magoshi (Chiefs) to 
use the services of their Headmen for effective communication between 
themselves and their subjects. Each Kgoshi organises regular 
meetings with his Headman and councillors, who are in turn expected 
to report back to their respective Headman meetings. In this way, 
the Kgoshi, Headman and councillors have the opportunity to shape the 
general attitudes of tribesmen on political and social issues 
(author's observation). 
While Magoshi (Chiefs) serve as the leaders of their tribes, some of 
them also have a seat in the Legislative Assembly which has a control-
ling function over the whole of the Lebowa government. Serving in 
these strategic positions, Magoshi play an important communication 
role between the Lebowa Government and their tribesmen (author's 
observation). 
All Magoshi in Lebowa serve as members of the Regional authorities in 
their respective districts. The Regional authorities deal with 
matters pertaining to the allocation of school bursaries, and regio-
nal matters. The decisions and directives of these bodies are 
usually communicated to the rank and file by the Magoshi and Headmen 
(author's observation). 
The family is also an important social communication structure in the 
Lebowa political system. Of special importance are those members of 
families who work in metropolitan or urban areas such as Johannesburg 
and Pretoria, and who visit their families and relatives in Lebowa 
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regularly. These people are exposed to a totally different political 
culture from the one encountered in Lebowa, a political culture that 
is very much the product of a Western value system. As a result of 
these contacts between family members, these western values are 
communicated effectively in Lebowa (author's observation). 
8.2.3 POLITICAL OUTPUT STRUCTURES 
The formal governmental structures such as legislature and bureaucra-
cy in a political system constitute a particularly important channel 
of information. The bureaucracy in particular, "make it possible for 
the political leaders to communicate directions for rule implemen-
tation to various political officeholders in an efficient and unambi-
guous fashion. The lifeline of communication holds the entire govern-
mental structure together and makes possible coordinated implementa-
tion of laws and the mobilization of societal resources" (Almond & 
Powell 1966:168). 
Those aspects of communication which are related to the bureaucracy 
as a formal channel of access in the Lebowa political system are 
discussed in paragraph 3.3.4.4 in chapter 3. The Lebowa Legislative 
Assembly is addressed in paragraphs 3.2.4 and 3.3.4.3 of the same 
chapter. The courts and various governmental agencies are the major 
agencies through which redress of grievances or registration of 
demands is undertaken (Almond & Powell 1966:169). The Magistrate's 
Courts and the traditional courts in Lebowa provide examples hereof. 
Their activities are outlined in chapter 7. 
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According to Almond and Powell, "Not only is information regarding 
the formal laws, such as social security regulations, disseminated 
through special agencies, but news releases from governmental 
agencies constitute one of the chief information sources for the mass 
media in most societies" (Almond & Powell 1966:169). In this regard, 
some of the Lebowa government departments have appointed public 
relations officers to handle news releases and to act as links 
between their departments and the mass media and the public. The 
Department of Education, the Department of the Chief Minister and the 
Department of Law and Order were the first to do so (Lebowa Govern-
ment, Yearbook 1990 :17; Lebowa Government: Budget and Policy Speech 
of the Minister of Education 1990 :11). 
To facilitate the performance of this communication function, some 
departments in the Lebowa Government have established special 
branches to address the question of public relations. These branches 
serve to keep the general public informed of the activities of the 
Government and its departments. 
In Lebowa, the government structures, such as the bureaucracy, 
provide the public with general information pertaining to formal 
rules, regulations, decisions, the general policy of the Government 
on some important issues, and the day to day activities of the 
Government (author's observation). 
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Different departments in the Lebowa Government use the weekly Lebowa 
Government Gazette to publish official information for public 
consumption. The Government Gazette is produced by the Lebowa 
Government Printers attached to the Department of Home Affairs 
(Lebowa Verbatim Report, Lebowa Legislative Assembly volume 23 part 1 
1989:134). The Lebowa Government Gazette is, therefore, also an 
important communication media between the government departments and 
the general public. 
The Verbatim Reports of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly also serve to 
communicate decisions and the general policy of the Government on 
various issues to the general public. These Verbatim Reports are 
also available at some of the public libraries in Lebowa. 
The public courts of law also play a significant communication role 
in the Lebowa political system. In their performance of the rule-
adjudication function, different types of rulings and judgements are 
communicated to the members of the public. In this sense, the Courts 
as political output structures also contribute to facilitating the 
communication process in the Lebowa political system (author's 
observation). Generally speaking, an effective communication link 
exists between the different political output structures and the 
general public in Lebowa (author's observation). 
However, there is also an internal communication process between the 
government departments, and between political leaders and their re-
spective subordinates. Departmental meetings, internal circulars, 
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verbal and written instructions or regulations are used as means of 
communication (author's observation). 
8.2.4 POLITICAL INPUT STRUCTURES 
Input structures such as interest groups, trade unions and political 
parties constitute another significant information channel. These 
groups are engaged in transmitting popular and special-interest 
demands to the political decision-makers (Almond & Powell 1966: 169). 
The important role played by the Lebowa People's Party in the communi-
cation function is discussed in paragraph 3.3.4.2 above while the ac-
tivities of trade unions in the Lebowa political system are referred 
to in paragraph 3.2.5.2. The Lebowa People's Party uses its branch 
meetings, annual congresses, caucus meetings, and executive meetings 
as a means of communication. Trade unions use mass mobilisation 
strategies, work stoppages and consumer boycotts as means of communi-
cation. The activities of other types of interest groups are also 
dealt with in chapter 3, and it should, therefore, be read in conjunc-
tion with this section. 
Since the unbanning of political organisations and the release of 
prominent political prisoners in South Africa on 2 February 1990, the 
role of the Lebowa People's Party as a communication link between its 
members and the Lebowa Government has weakened significantly. People 
prefer to communicate their political demands through the existing 
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progressive movements such as trade unions and civic associations 
which are affiliates or supporters of the African National Congress, 
Pan Africanist Congress, United Democratic Front, or Azapo (author's 
personal observation). These progressive movements tend to use 
protest marches, consumer boycotts, mass mobilisation, stay-aways or 
strikes as means of communication. 
The view stated above is supported by the actions of a newly estab-
lished union for public servants in Lebowa which emerged as an impor-
tant channel for disseminating information and communicating politi-
cal demands to the Lebowa Government. In support of a demand for the 
recognition of the Northern Transvaal Public Service Workers Union 
and other grievances, an illegal strike by public servants in all 
Government departments in Lebowa excepting the Department of Law and 
Order was successfully staged from 19 September 1990 until the Lebowa 
Government concluded an agreement with NOTRAPSU, in terms of which 
the employees returned to work on 11 October 1990. 
The Union and its members subsequently demanded payment for duration 
of the strike, but the Lebowa Government decided to stick to a policy 
of "no work, no pay" which provoked another illegal strike that 
commenced on 25 October 1990. The Lebowa Government sought and obtai-
ned . an urgent interdict from the Supreme Court in terms whereof 
NOTRAPSU and Cosatu are prevented from promoting further illegal 
strikes or work stoppages by public servants in Lebowa (Times; 2 
November 1990:2). 
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These incidents serve to demonstrate the importance of the communi-
cation role played by Unions. In their endeavours to communicate 
their demands to the Lebowa Government, NOTRAPSU did not confine 
themselves to formal meetings, they also promoted strikes, which 
compelled the Government to resort to the Court for relief. 
As indicated earlier, different interest groups use different means 
to communicate their demands. It has been shown, for example, how 
anomic interest groups use riots, demonstrations and violence as 
means of communication. Institutional interest groups such as the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly use their resolutions and debates to 
communicate with higher bodies such as the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa. Associational interest groups such as the Chamber 
of Commerce, trade unions, civic associations and student organisa-
tions also communicated their demands. The 1974 rallies by student 
organisations in Lebowa, as discussed in chapter 3, serve to 
illustrate one of the means of communication used. 
8.2.5 THE MASS MEDIA 
The concept "mass media" includes newspapers, television, radio, 
magazines and books, and constitute the last category of communi-
cation structures according to Almond and Powell. 
They are the most specialized and differentiated of such struc-
tures, existing primarily for the purpose of communication rather 
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than depending upon it in the course of other activities. Given 
appropriate conditions of technical development and literacy (in 
the case of the press), the mass media are capable of transmit-
ting information to very large numbers of people at low cost and 
with minimum distortion. 
(Almond & Powell 1966:169-170) 
Constitutionally, 
relating to the 
the Lebowa Government has no authority to make laws 
establishment or control of radio and television 
services. These powers are vested in the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa (R.S.A.: Black States Constitution Act 21 of 1971, 
Section 4(e)). Control of television and radio are highly 
centralized under the South African Broadcasting Corporation. 
8.3 THE AUTONOMY OF COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES IN LEBOWA 
According 
is free 
interests 
to 
of 
in 
Almond and Powell, "an autonomous structure is one that 
domination either by political leaders or by particular 
the society" (Almond & Powell 1966:170). The autonomy 
of the respective communication structures in Lebowa was discussed in 
chapter 3 (Interest articulation). The mass media as a channel of 
communication is discussed in paragraph 3.3.4.1. 
English 
Citizen 
daily newspapers 
are popular in 
such as the Sowetan, the Star, and the 
Lebowa. The Lebowa Times which is a weekly 
newspaper is also popular, but it has a severely limited circulation 
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in Lebowa. As mentioned previously, the mass media serve as an im-
portant channel of access to decision makers in the Lebowa political 
process. 
It should be reiterated, however, that interest groups in Lebowa and 
South Africa attained a greater degree of freedom after the intro-
duction of major reform measures by the State President on 2 February 
1990. The lifting of the State of Emergency in 1990 also affected 
the autonomy of communication structures positively. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that communication constitutes a necessary prere-
quisite for the performance of the other functions. Communication 
performance can either hinder or enhance the development of other 
political functions. Important communication structures were briefly 
outlined and discussed. As previously stated Almond and Powell 
distinguished five types of communication structures: 
(a) informal face-to-face contacts; 
(b) traditional social structures; 
(c) political "output" structures; 
(d) political "input" structures; and 
(e) the mass media. 
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The extent to which all these structures exist in the Lebowa politi-
cal system was discussed. 
Through various examples, it was shown that informal face-to-face 
contacts play a significant role as a means of access to political 
decision makers in the Lebowa political process. Although this type 
of contact is usually used by non-associational interest groups, 
individual members of the public also consult with political leaders 
to articulate their personal interests or demands. 
Mention was also made of traditional social structures as important 
communication structures. The role of traditional Chiefs (Magoshi), 
Headmen and Tribal Authorities was highlighted. The strategic 
positions occupied by Chiefs (Magoshi) in the government institutions 
of Lebowa enhance the status of the traditional leaders that stand 
between the national elite and the people (Almond & Powell 1966:168). 
The formal governmental structures such as the bureaucracy and the 
legislature as formal channels of access were shown to be effective 
in the Lebowa political process. Some of the Lebowa Government 
Departments have appointed public relations officers to facilitate 
this communication process. 
The activities of the Lebowa People's Party and other interest groups 
including trade unions in Lebowa were outlined and discussed. These 
communication structures also constitute a significant information 
channel. Various examples were cited. 
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The mass media as a channel of communication was discussed as well as 
the role of newspapers, television, and radio. Several factors which 
impede the effectiveness of the mass media in the Lebowa political 
process were highlighted. 
In conclusion, it is important to keep in mind that communication 
structures can only function autonomously when they are free of 
domination by either political leaders or particular interests in the 
society. "The freedom of the press has long been held to be integral-
ly linked to the maintenance of free government" (Almond & Powell 
1966:170). Since the introduction of fundamental reforms by the 
South African State President Mr. F.W. de Klerk on 2 February 1990, 
interest groups and other communication structures in Lebowa are, to 
a large degree, free from political control by the government 
(author's observation). 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the political system of 
Lebowa. The method of the study is, therefore, descriptive and analy-
tic. It was necessary, however, first to outline the historical 
background to the establishment of the self-governing territory of 
Lebowa. 
The study was introduced by an historical investigation into the 
origin of Lebowa. To achieve this objective, a short exposition of 
apartheid as the ideology which provided the framework for the 
establishment of Lebowa, was provided. It comprises a description of 
the evolution of the administration of the affairs of Black people in 
South Africa, including constitutional developments from as early as 
the days of the migration of White farmers from the Eastern Cape to 
the interior of Southern Africa. 
As a result of this process of penetration into the interior, the 
White Voortrekkers who left the Cape Colony in and after 1836, 
founded the independent republics of the Orange Free State, Transvaal 
and Natal. 
Although the government and the opposition parties of the four 
colonies (Orange River Colony, Cape, Transvaal and Natal) were 
represented at the National Convention in 1908 - 1909, no Blacks, 
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Coloureds or Indians were present. Consequently, the restrictive 
Non-white franchise provisions of the former colonies and Republics 
were incorporated into the new constitution of the Union of South 
Africa. 
Since the formation of the Union in 1910, various proclamations and 
Acts on land and Black administration were adopted by the South 
African Government with the sole purpose of entrenching apartheid -
or the separate development ideology as it became known. Some of 
these legislation's objectives were to create Black "locations" and 
"reserves" which were geographically demarcated for the exclusive use 
of Blacks. In addition to the definition of these territorial 
boundaries, government institutions were also devised to be respon-
sible for the governing and administration of these areas. 
The policy of separate development since 1958, however, envisaged the 
division of South Africa as a state and the creation of self-
governing homelands which would ultimately attain full independent 
status. Lebowa is, therefore, a direct product of this policy of 
separate development. Lebowa, however, opted to remain a self-
governing territory within the borders of the Republic of South 
Africa. 
The method of this study was descriptive and analytic. Interviews, 
Acts of Parliament, proclamations, and various other sources have 
been used to formulate and construct a description of the political 
process in Lebowa. The conversion function of the structural-
303 
functional model of Almond and Powell was used to analyse this 
political process in Lebowa. The emphasis of this study was 
primarily the Lebowa political process, and not the approach as such. 
The conversion function of the structural-functional model of Almond 
and Powell was used to analyse the Lebowa political process. The 
premise on which structural-functional analysis is based is to pro-
vide a consistent and integrated theory from which can be derived 
explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects of a given political 
system. 
The conversion function which is internal to the system was used to 
analyse how the Lebowa political system transform inputs into 
outputs. This involves the ways in which demands and support in the 
political system of Lebowa are transformed into authoritative deci-
sions, and are implemented. 
Using the sixfold conversion function described by Almond and Powell, 
research was conducted into how the people of Lebowa articulate their 
needs and demands (interest articulation); how these demands are 
sifted and combined to form alternative policy statements (interest 
aggregation); how these aggregated demands are processed into authori-
tative rules (rule-making); how these binding rules are applied and 
enforced (rule-application); how the application and enforcement of 
rules are adjudicated (rule-adjudication); lastly, research was also 
conducted to establish how communication takes place in the six 
processes of the conversion function in Lebowa between members of the 
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system and the system's environment which includes the communication 
system. 
A brief summary of the application of the conversion function to 
Lebowa will be provided below, with special emphasis on structures, 
functions and procedures. 
9.2 APPLICATION OF THE CONVERSION FUNCTION TO LEBOWA 
9.2.1 INTEREST ARTICULATION 
The most important interest articulation structures and channels of 
access, including those factors which influence the articulation 
function in the Lebowa political process, were researched and 
discussed. 
Self-representation articulation structures are found at different 
levels of the political system in Lebowa. These are the local 
authority level, the regional authority level, and the central 
authority level. The effectiveness of this type of articulation 
structure was demonstrated through practical examples drawn from 
Lebowa. 
Anomic interest groups and their activities were investigated. To 
determine the extent to which these anomic groups are active in 
Lebowa, some of the practical incidents which occurred in Lebowa were 
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examined. The unrest in Lebowa during 1985-1987, and the student un-
rest at the University of the North were used as examples. Traditio-
nal tribal structures, sorghum beer consumers and village residents 
were cited as appropriate examples of non-associational interest 
groups in Lebowa. The influence and role of traditional tribal 
structures 
enhanced by 
in the 
the 
Lebowa as non-associational groups is further 
positions held by traditional leaders in the Lebowa 
Legislative Assembly. 
Mention was also made of the influence and effectiveness of the 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly as a formal institutional interest group 
structure. Associational interest groups have proved to be more 
successful than most other types of interest groups. Several asso-
ciational interest groups such as Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 
trade unions, civic associations, and student organisations were 
discussed. 
It was shown by way of various examples that the process of interest 
articulation in Lebowa is frequently characterised by physical 
demonstrations and violent means of articulating demands. Personal 
contacts between members of the public and their representatives in 
the Lebowa Legislative Assembly and other decision makers play a 
significant role in interest articulation in Lebowa. Former profes-
sional teachers serving in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly were cited 
as appropriate examples of elite representatives of the teacher's 
associations in Lebowa. Formal channels of access were also 
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discussed. Finally, the three environmental factors which influence 
interest articulation were briefly referred to. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that there are sufficient formal and 
non-formal interest articulation groups operating in Lebowa. Legal 
impediments such as the internal security laws, and the National 
State of Emergency regulations, (lifted in June 1990) restrict the 
free articulation of political demands (as discussed in chapter 3). 
The release of prominent political prisoners, the introduction of 
fundamental reforms by the State President, and the unbanning of 
anti-apartheid organisations in South Africa since February 1990, 
has, however, encouraged more active participation on the part of 
interest groups in Lebowa. 
This new era is also characterised by a change in the attitudes of 
people in Lebowa in respect of the popularity and effectiveness of 
certain interest articulation structures in Lebowa. An example of 
this tendency is the increased acceptance enjoyed by the civic 
associations at the expense of traditional structures such as tribal 
authorities. Town councillors have been forced to resign in favour 
of civic associations. The interest articulation process in Lebowa 
should not be seen in isolation from the rest of the Republic of 
South Africa, and it should be assessed within that context. 
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9.2.2 
Almond 
likely 
INTEREST AGGREGATION 
and 
to 
Powell 
fulfil 
singled out two 
this specialised 
aggregation structures as most 
role: the bureaucracy and the 
political party. Both of these aggregation structures are present in 
the Lebowa political process although they are not equally effec-
tive. Examples were provided to demonstrate that the bureaucracy 
performs the interest aggregation function at the tribal, regional, 
and central authority levels in Lebowa. 
Government departments were highlighted as important performers of 
the interest aggregation function in the Lebowa political system. 
Although political parties do perform an interest aggregation func-
tion in Lebowa, their role is not as significant as that of other 
institutions. This corresponds with the views of Almond and Powell, 
and could be ascribed to the fact that, to a large extent, the people 
of Lebowa understand and still prefer to use their traditional tribal 
structures for the articulation and aggregation of their political 
demands. The only political party in Lebowa, the Lebowa People's 
Party, has failed to make any significant impact as the major inte-
rest aggregator for reasons stated in chapter 3 of the study. It can 
be concluded that the parochial political culture of Lebowa is not 
conducive to a free and democratic political party system. 
Elections in Lebowa were also discussed as a means of aggregation. 
An examination of some of the election manifestos of candidates in 
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Lebowa general elections revealed that the aggregation function at 
the political party level is not properly coordinated. As a result, 
candidates belonging to the same party engaged in personal attacks 
against one another. 
While the interest aggregation function is performed by many struc-
tures as indicated, traditional structures still dominate the scene 
in the Lebowa. On the other hand, the process and forces of moderni-
sation are fast diminishing the influence and effectiveness of tradi-
tional structures in their performance of the interest aggregation 
function. 
9.2.3 RULE-MAKING 
The rule-making function in Lebowa is performed at local, regional 
and central authority level. Three rule-making structures were iden-
tified at the local level: tribal authorities, community authorities, 
and town councils. 
Although tribal authorities are based on traditional practices and 
leadership, their effectiveness and influence is obvious and felt 
throughout the Lebowa political process. The Kgoshi (Chief) and his 
tribal council play a significant role in rule-making at the local 
level of government. Because of traditional and customary practices 
and procedures adhered to by tribal councils and their respective 
Magoshi (Chiefs), the rule-making at this level follows a less 
dynamic approach which seeks to preserve the status quo. 
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Community authorities are based on more democratic principles than 
tribal authorities in the sense that members, including the chairman 
are elected periodically. Traditionalism plays a minor role in the 
rule-making process. 
While Town councils are 
without any traditional 
also constituted and run democratically 
influence, it has been shown that the 
performed by the Lebowa Government through 
Affairs on their behalf. As a result, the 
rule-making function 
the Department of 
role of the Town 
is 
Home 
councils in the rule-making process is rendered 
almost meaningless. In this sense, the rule-making process flows 
from the top down. General administration including budgeting and 
the implementation thereof is done by the Department of Home Affairs. 
At the second level of government are the regional authorities which 
are not democratically elected institutions. Their rule-making 
function is minimal. 
At the highest level the Lebowa Legislative Assembly was discussed as 
the most important rule-making body within the self-governing 
territory of Lebowa. The Lebowa Legislative Assembly has limited and 
conditional rule-making powers in terms of the provisions of the 
Black Homelands Constitution Act. The South African State President 
has to assent to all bills passed by this Legislative Assembly of 
Lebowa before they have the force of law. As described, the ratio of 
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elected members of the Legislative Assembly as opposed to designated 
traditional Magoshi is 4:6. 
Unlike the rule-making structures at the local and the regional 
level, the Lebowa Legislative Assembly has statutory standing Rules 
of Procedure governing the general procedure in the Assembly. These 
rules are, to a large extent, based on democratic principles and all 
members of the Legislative Assembly are, consequently treated 
equally. 
The role of the Lebowa Cabinet, the bureaucracy and the South African 
Central government in the rule-making function was highlighted. It 
was demonstrated that both the Lebowa Cabinet and the Central Govern-
ment play a dominant role as rule-makers. From this, it can be con-
eluded that the major rule-making structures in the Lebowa political 
process are the Lebowa Cabinet, the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, and 
the Central Government of the Republic of South Africa. 
9.2.4 RULE-APPLICATION 
Provision is made in the Lebowa constitution for the establishment of 
numerous rule-application structures in the Lebowa political process. 
The rule-application functions of the following structures were 
-
highlighted: the Lebowa Cabinet, the Lebowa Government Departments, 
the South African Government Departments, the Lebowa Treasury, the 
Lebowa Public Service Commission, Lebowa parastatal institutions, and 
local authorities. 
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While all these structures play a meaningful role, the ten Government 
Departments under the respective Lebowa Cabinet Ministers feature are 
the outstanding rule-application structures in the Lebowa political 
process. 
Merle Fainsod's classification based upon different relationship 
patterns between bureaucracies and the political agencies was used to 
analyse the Lebowa bureaucracy. It was concluded that the bureaucra-
cy in Lebowa is partially a representative bureaucracy, but that it 
manifests certain elements of a ruling bureaucracy. The representati-
veness of the Lebowa bureaucracy is derived from the extent and 
nature of the Lebowa Government and the competitiveness of the party 
system in Lebowa. 
White officials seconded from the Government of South Africa play a 
major role 
controlled 
responsible 
as part of the bureaucracy in Lebowa. They are directly 
and paid by the South African Government, and even 
and loyal to that Government. This resembles the cases 
cited by Fainsod as examples of indirect rule by colonial powers. 
It was been observed that there is still room for improvement in the 
performance of the rule-application function by all the structures 
mentioned above. 
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9.2.5 RULE-ADJUDICATION 
There are two types of rule-adjudication structures in the Lebowa 
political system: 
(a) Traditional courts: family courts, headman's courts and 
tribal courts (Kgoshi's courts); and 
(b) Statutory courts: Magistrate's courts in Lebowa and the 
Supreme Court of South Africa. 
The family court is the only non-public institution amongst the 
traditional and 
are the only 
statutory courts in Lebowa. The Magistrate's courts 
statutory courts within the physical borders of the 
Lebowa political system, while the Supreme Court of South Africa is a 
statutory court serving the Lebowa political system from outside the 
territory. 
There is no uniform general legal procedure governing all traditional 
courts within the Lebowa political system, but all the Magistrate's 
courts are governed by a set general legal procedure. Legal repre-
sentation is allowed in the statutory courts, but not in traditional 
courts. 
Appeal cases from the headman's court are directed to the tribal 
court, from a tribal court to the Magistrate's Court, then to the 
Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
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South Africa. 
the Republic 
Finally, the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein (in 
of South Africa) hears cases on appeal from the 
different Divisions of the Supreme Court. 
9.2.6 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
Almond and Powell distinguish five types of communication structures: 
informal face-to-face contacts, traditional social structures, politi-
cal input structures, political output structures and the mass media. 
The effectiveness of each communication structure ought not to be 
underestimated. In the context of the Lebowa political system it 
would appear, however, that informal face-to-face contacts and 
traditional social structures play a significant role as means of 
access to political decision makers in the Lebowa political process. 
The autonomy of the communication structures in Lebowa improved with 
the intensification of the reform process by the President of South 
Africa Mr. de Klerk on 2 February 1990. The conversion process of 
the Lebowa political system may, as a result, function with less 
disturbances, especially in terms of communication in future. 
9.3 EVALUATION OF ALMOND AND POWELL'S MODEL 
In his discussion of Almond and Powell, A.M. Faure had the following 
to say: "Hierdie skrywers se konseptuele raamwerk is sander twyfel 
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een van die meer bekende, en ook gekritiseerde, teoretiese bydraes 
wat in die afgelope paar jaar verskyn bet" (Faure 1975:80). 
Faure substantiates this point of view by referring to two con-
flicting statements about the conceptual framework of Almond and 
Powell. Firstly, he quotes one writer as having said: "The most 
widely heralded and best known structural-functional paradigm in 
political science is that one developed by Almond and Powell" (Nettl 
1966:319). 
He also quotes another writer who proposed that: "Opponents to the 
systemic approach to politics have homed on Almond and Powell like 
migratory 
statements 
birds on 
clearly 
a lighthouse" 
demonstrate the 
(Faure 1975:80-85). 
divergent views of 
These two 
different 
writers about Almond and Powell's conceptual framework or model. 
The structural-functional approach adopted by these authors regards 
the whole political system as the unit of analysis with certain 
specific functions being identified as essential for the maintenance 
of the system. The focus is on the interdependence of the consti-
tuent structures of the system. 
The major shortcoming of the model under review is probably the 
authors' failure to define, or question the validity or precision of 
several of the key concepts they use in the model. For example, 
nowhere do Almond and Powell offer a specific definition of 
"function". They do not even explain the criteria or yardstick used 
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in 
and 
choosing 
Fogelman 
or preferring certain functions above others. Flanigan 
contend that: "Until precise criteria are established 
for the identification of functions and a theoretically sophisticated 
argument is made for a particular set of functions, functionalism as 
an approach, will be severely limited" (Flanigan & Fogelman 1967: 
81 ) . 
A further disappointment in the work under review is that, although 
their "functional categories" were developed to analyse or compare 
all political systems, that is, western and non-western, modern, 
transitional, 
functions are 
and traditional, it 
highly ethnocentric 
would 
in 
appear, however, that the 
their derivation (Bill & 
Hardgrave 1973:212-213). 
Almond and Powell's model also has positive points, however. Accor-
ding to Faure, the model is exceptionally rich in individual concepts 
and broad conceptual schemes that focus on the process by which poli-
tical development takes place. A number of examples are given: 
"rule-making", 
culture" and 
"political system", "political structure", "political 
"communication". "Die meerderheid van hierdie konsepte 
word op eksplisiete wyse omskryf of gedef inieer alhoewel sommiges in 
terme van mekaar verreken word wat tot 'n afname in hulle teoretiese 
gebruikswaarde lei" (Faure 1973:187-188). 
These statements serve to confirm that, although there are short-
comings in Almond and Powell's conceptual framework, as has been 
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indicated, the model is still regarded as an important contribution 
to the study of comparative politics. 
9.4 EVALUATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONVERSION PROCESS TO 
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF LEBOWA 
The following observations were made in respect of an evaluation of 
the applicability of the conversion function of Almond and Powell's 
model within the context of Lebowa: The tacit assumption underlying 
this study is that Lebowa is part of a developing region with 
conditions which are not the same as those of a developed country. 
This 
cal 
assumption 
parties are 
has several implications, for instance, that politi-
poorly developed in Lebowa, while the Magoshi are 
still dominant in their informal structures. 
Local authorities (town councils) are also not well established 
(institutionalised), and their functions are performed mainly by the 
Department of Home Affairs. The lack of institutionalisation and 
pluralism in Lebowa reduces the level of applicability to Lebowa of 
the conversion function of this model. The conversion function of 
Almond and Powell's 
modate a situation 
relevant structures 
lised, as is the 
political norms. 
model should, therefore, be adjusted to acccom-
in which it is often difficult to identify the 
because they are not adequately institutiona-
case with systems which are not based on Western 
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In the model of Almond and Powell, structures are particularly impor-
tant as the implementors of functions (structural-functionalism). 
The absence of sufficiently formalised structures in Lebowa 
complicates a discussion of the functions. It proved to be difficult 
to link functions to specific structures. 
It was possible to identify the six processes of the conversion 
function in Lebowa, including political communication, and to link 
them to the particular structures responsible for these processes. 
However, due to the factors mentioned above, it would seem that the 
categories used to describe the process, did not encompass the entire 
conversion function of the Lebowa political system. Some of its 
crucial characteristics, such as those related to the absence of 
functional specialisation in some instances, were not captured by the 
conversion function as defined by Almond and Powell. 
It is concluded, therefore, that the analysis of the conversion 
function of the Lebowa political system showed that, while one aspect 
of Almond and Powell's model has succeeded, to a large extent, in 
addressing the structural-functional aspects of the system, the model 
is not perfectly suited to a political system dominated by traditio-
nal values and is involved in a transition process away from traditio-
nalism, such as the political system of Lebowa. This conclusion was 
reached despite the fact that Almond and Powell cite numerous 
examples of traditional situations in their works. 
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However, this 
and Powell's 
does 
model 
not mean that the conversion function of Almond 
proved to be useless in all respects. On the 
contrary, the model provides an extremely useful framework which 
facilitated this study. The conclusions are, therefore, not a 
reflection on the entire model of Almond and Powell, but refer only 
to one part thereof, namely the conversion function. 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
Having analysed the conversion function of the political process in 
Lebowa, the purpose of this section is to draw general conclusions 
from all the preceding chapters. The following conclusions are drawn 
in respect of the Lebowa political system: 
The first and important observation made during this study is that 
the conversion process in the Lebowa political system reflects a 
merging of African (traditional) and Western practices of political 
activities. There are, therefore, two different sets of political 
norms in the same system. This means that the model of Almond and 
Powell is much more difficult to apply. It seems that the model is 
better suited for political systems with a homogeneous political 
culture such as the United States of America. 
In addition, there seems to be a tension between these two sets of 
political norms in Lebowa. The impression gained is that the input 
functions are still, to a large extent, dominated or determined by 
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African political norms. The discussions showed that the structures 
responsible for these functions do not reflect a high degree of 
pluralism. In other words, there are not many political parties, 
interest groups and 
Western political 
aggregation. The 
other institutions, which are mostly based on 
norms, involved in interest articulation or 
traditional structures, which are poorly institu-
tionalised, are mainly responsible for these functions. 
The 
lity 
output functions in Lebowa are, however, mainly the responsibi-
of structures based on Western political norms, such as Parlia-
ment, the Cabinet, the bureaucracy and the judiciary. This illus-
trates the point made previously that there are two sets of political 
norms underlying the political system in Lebowa, and that an inherent 
tension between them is caused by the unevenness of political develop-
ment in Lebowa. 
One indicator of political development underlying this discussion is 
the degree of institutionalisation of the system. The discussions 
contained in the various chapters show that, while the output struc-
tures are mostly institutionalised in Lebowa, the input structures 
are not as well established. Another factor contributing to the 
weakness of the input structures is the prevailing traditional politi-
cal culture which is not conducive to the effective and active for-
mation and operation of these structures. 
The tension between the two sets of political norms mentioned above, 
is mainly on the input side and was best articulated by the political 
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activities at the University of the North and in some other parts of 
Lebowa, especially the Sekhukhuneland district. The demands 
articulated by students at the University of the North can be inter-
preted as a demand for democratisation (i.e. institutionalisation 
and a higher degree of pluralism) on the input side. It would appear 
that the intention was to enforce the application of Western politi-
cal norms on the input side, thereby creating a balance with the out-
put side of the political system. In other words, the same political 
norms would then apply to both input and output functions). 
However, given the idea of David Easton, and also that of Almond and 
Powell, that two of the types of inputs which are important for the 
maintenance of the system, are demands and support, and given the 
Lebowa government's insistence on a strong output side, it seems that 
the input side will remain weak or poorly institutionalised. There-
fore, the ostensible contradiction in the Lebowa political system is 
that the Western-oriented output structures benefit from the under-
developed nature of the input structures, which are predominantly 
African-oriented. 
Since the inception of Lebowa in 1973, there seems to have been no 
real effort to modernise or develop the input side of the political 
system to attain the balance between input and output as outlined 
above. The political changes since February 1990, however, played a 
significant role in setting the scene for the transformation of the 
input structures. Alternatively, it may have signalled the ultimate 
demise of the Lebowa political system. 
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The second general aspect to be considered relates to certain conf lic-
ting traditional components entrenched in some of the Western-
oriented political output structures. The membership of the traditio-
nal Chiefs (Magoshi) in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly serves as a 
good example. In terms of the rules of procedure governing the 
proceedings in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, both the traditional 
leaders and ordinary members of the House are treated equally in the 
House. 
This practice is in conflict with traditional norms and customary 
practices in Lebowa. Traditionally, a Kgoshi (Chief) is respected 
and obeyed at all times by all people. 
Despite the impartiality and equality insisted upon by the rules of 
procedure, ordinary members of the Legislative Assembly still feel 
obliged to respect and honour the traditional Chiefs, even at the 
expense of democracy. This adversely affects the standard and 
quality of debates in the House and the output side is weakened. 
In conclusion, it seems desirable to highlight the peculiar situation 
in which Lebowa finds itself. The focus here is on the Lebowa politi-
cal system, but Lebowa is not a state with a clearly demarcated 
political system of its own. In the second chapter, it was shown 
that Lebowa is part of the larger political system of South Africa. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to discuss the Lebowa political 
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system without constantly refering to the more encompassing South 
African political system. 
As indicated 
self-governing 
borders of the 
earlier in this study, Lebowa is a non-independent 
territory within the geographical and political 
greater Republic of South Africa. In practice, the 
and political aspects of both the Lebowa political socio-economic 
system and the South African political system are so intertwined that 
it is difficult to discuss one without making reference to the 
other. The problem of demarcating the Lebowa political system was, 
therefore, not resolved, and the discussion was guided by pragmatic 
considerations. 
The above-stated remarks notwithstanding, a study of the Lebowa 
political system seems to be imperative. Lebowa is in the midst of 
political development, due partly to the new political environment in 
South Africa. The future of the Lebowa political system has not yet 
been worked out, and it may even disappear as a separate entity. It 
was, however, important that this study should focus on a part of the 
system as it functioned until the changes were initiated. It repre-
sents an aspect of South African politics which is important but 
often neglected: the politics of rural areas. It is hoped that this 
study will contribute towards a better understanding hereof. 
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9.6 RELEVANCE OF THIS STUDY FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
It was assumed for the purposes of this study that Lebowa is present-
ly involved in a process of political development. This phenomenon 
was not discussed as such in this study, and the emphasis was rather 
on a specific political dynamical aspect, situated in the context of 
development. Utilisation of the conversion function of Almond and 
Powell's model as a tool for analysing the Lebowa political system, 
prompts the question whether Political Science as a discipline is 
well-equipped to study the political process in developing countries? 
The discipline is relatively well suited to study the phenomenon of 
political development. It often focuses on strategies for develop-
ment (such as modernisation theories) or explanations of underdevelop-
ment (dependency theories). These theories do not, however, address 
the prevailing political dynamics and political structures of the 
particular developing states, irrespective of the stage of their 
development, to understand the politics of such a country or region 
on a micro and macro level. 
The challenge is, therefore, to move beyond merely studying political 
development, by focusing on indicators such as structural differentia-
tion or functional specialisation, and to embark on political analy-
ses which are premised on different political values. The emphasis 
should be on understanding the politics of a primarily traditional 
society, notwithstanding of the fact that it is undergoing develop-
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ment. This aspect of Political Science, and its interface with 
development, seems to need more attention. 
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